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This thesis examines South Africa's relations with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and private international banks 
in the period 1970-1987. The thesis is written in the language, and 
uses the conceptual tools, of 'regulation theory', an approach 
whose emphasis on 'time-changing' empirically-grounded explanations 
of a country's global interactions, it is suggested, represents an 
advance over modernisation and dependency approaches. 
The thesis traces the altered circumstances of the international 
financial system since the early 1970s. It points to the struggle 
by the IMF to' come to terms with these changes in harmonising a 
new international financial system. The IMF has, however, increased 
its superv'isory power in relation to most countries in the 
developing world, especially after the oil-price hike of 1973. The 
basis for, and implications of, the explosion in p~ivate 
international bank lending in this period is also examined. 
This analysis is followed by ,an examination of the crisis in the 
South African political economy since the early 1970s and of the 
way this crisis was influenced by global events. It is argued that 
South Africa's international economic relations were transformed 
by both global and domestic forces and came to be dominated by 
issues of international finance. 
The second part of the thesis examines South Africa's relations 
with the IMF and private international banks. This relationship 
was supportive of the apartheid state's development strategy for 
most of the period 1970-1985. It is argued that until the 1980s, 
the relationship also benefited the western industrialised 
countries who profited both materially and strategically, from 
their economic relations with South Africa. 
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However, in 1983, the US imposed restrictions on its support for 
IMF loans to South Africa. By mid-1985 a combination of political 
and economic changes within South Africa forced some foreign banks 
to withdraw their normal credit facilities to South Africa. These 
events precipitated a dramatic change for the worse in South 
Africa's international financial relations. It is argued that 
although there has been some improvement ' in these relations since 
1987, the country's relations with the IMF and banks have not 
returned to their previous mostly support~ve character. A 
combination of international, regional and domestic economic and 
political factors has ensured that the current crisis in South 
Africa's international financial relations is already deeper, more 
prolonged, and more damaging to growth prospects, than the crisis 
of the mid-1970s. 
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PREFACE 
The original research for this thesis was carried out at the School 
for Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University 
in Washington DC and at the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research at the University of Durban~Westville, where the author 
is presently employed. The thesis is registered in the Department 
of Economic History at the University of Natal and the research was 
carried out under the supervision of Professor WM Freund. 
This study represents original work by the author and has not been 
submitted in any form to another University. Where use was made of 
the work of others it has been duly acknowledged in the text. 
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This thesis is dedicated to my parents. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines South Africa's international financial 
relations, especially its relations with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and private international banks in the period (1970-
1987), an era characterised by conditions of crisis and change both 
in the international economy and in the political economy of South 
Africa itself. This thesis is written in the language, and uses the 
conceptual tools and organising principles of regulation theory, 
an approach which though derived largely from the works of French 
regulationists Aglietta, Lipietz and de Vroey, also owes some debt 
to the US 'social structure of accumulation' adherents Gordon, 
Bowles, and Weisskopf. 1 Regulation theory's intrinsic emphasis on 
notions of crisis and change, both in the mechanisms of the 
internat~onal financial system and in the political economy of 
individual nation states, in 'time-changing' empirically-grounded 
explanations of a country's location and interaction with the world 
economy, it is suggestedJ represents a distinct advance over the 
grand teleologies of modernisation and dependency approaches.' 
The nature and character of a country's location within and 
relations with the world economy may change back and forth over 
time, from being say, supportive of a particular form of growth 
and development, to being detrimental to such growth by promoting 
vulnerabili ty and underdevelopment. The form of support could 
change in fundamental ways, so too could the nature of 
'dependency'. A country's trade, technology and financial relations 
may under certain circumstances constrain national economic 
strategy. Under different circumstances these links may offer 
opportunities which may advance the potential of national economic 
and political strategies. These kinds of changes in the nature and 
character of a country's links with the world economy often 
compromise and show up the limitations of the totalising 
prescriptions, the 'black and white patterns' of both modernisation 
and dependency approaches. These changes are themselves deeply 
rooted in crises and changes in the international financial and 
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monetary system and in the accumulation strategies and 
institutional and political structures of individual nation states. 
The thesis traces the altered circumstances of the international 
monetary and financial system and its regulatory institutions since 
the early 1970s. It points to the largely unsuccessful struggle by 
the IMF and the advanced industrialised countries which dominate 
the IMF, to come to terms with these changed circumstances in 
harmonising and facilitating balance of payments adjustment, 
exchange rate co-ordination, the growth of output and _employment 
on a world scale, and the supervision and control of international 
financial affairs. The IMF has, however, increased its supervisory 
power and influence in relation to most countries in the developing 
world, especially after the 1973 and 1979 oil-price hikes and as 
declining prices for primary good exports intensified balance of 
payments crises in these countries. The basis for the explosion in 
private international bank lending in this period is examined as 
are the effects of this explosion on the attempt to establish a new 
mode of regulating financial interaction on a world scale. 
This analysis of global developments is followed by an examination 
of the accumulation and political crisis in the South African 
political economy since the early 1970s, ie of the change in the 
domestic regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. The 
discussion traces the way this crisis was influenced by 
international economic events and changes. It also examines the 
effects of both the domestic crisis and global developments on the 
nature and structure of South Africa's international economic 
relations. The central features of the cr1S1S are examined, 
especially in the years 1975/6 and 1984/5, when the country ran 
into considerable difficulties in its external financial relations. 
It is argued that South Africa's international economic relations 
were transformed by both international and domestic forces and came 
to be dominated by issues of international finance and capital 
outflows. 
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Against this background the second part of the thesis examines 
South Africa's dealing with the IMF and banks. The analysis traces 
f · , the basis for and changing nature and character of South A r~ca s 
relations with the IMF and private international banks. South 
Africa's relationship with the central institutions of the post-
war global economy, the IMF and private international banks, was 
supportive of and beneficial to the apartheid state's largely 
nationally-determined growth strategy for most of the period 1970-
1985, except for a brief period in the mid-1970s. It is argued 
further that, until the very different circumstances after the mid-
1980s, the relationship also benefited the western industrialised 
countries who profited both materially and strategically, from 
their investment, trade and political links with South Africa. Both 
the IMF and private international banks generously supported 
requests . from the state and private sector for foreign loan 
financing in this time. During South Africa's mid-1970s political, 
economic and balance of payments crisis, the country received 
strong and unqualified support from the IMF. At the same time, 
however, it appeared that private holders of South African bonds 
disposed of their holdings whereever possible and that private 
international banks tightened up on the terms of their lending and, 
as far as can be ascertained, also cut down on their massive 
funding of state and parastatal infrastructural and strategic 
proj ects, which was the main feature of their ' South African 
exposure at the time. 
Bank lending, increasingly of a short-term character, and mainly 
to the private sector this time, increased dramatically in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, supported by a combination of more 
favourable international and domestic factors. 
In 1983 a small, then largely unnoticed, change in US policy 
towards South Africa resulted in the imposition of restrictions or 
qualifications on US support for IMF loans to the apartheid state 
and the IMF itself produced its first critical report on the 
relationship between apartheid and economic growth. By the mid-
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1980s the escalation of political resistance to the apartheid state 
reached a point where, from the perspective of foreign banks, the 
prospects of a 'destabilising and unsettling slide' to black 
majority rule appeared a distinct possibility. These political 
factors, coupled with equally important economic considerations 
such as the banks' heavy exposure to South Africa, the prior (1983) 
decision of the IMF, with US support, to restrict balance of 
payments assistance to South Africa, the onset of further massive 
defici ts in the country's external accounts, the dangerously short-
term maturity structure of South African debt and the decline in 
the relative attractiveness of the South African economy as 
compared both to .its own post-war economic performance and to its 
international ~ompetitors in the 1980s, all acted to drastically 
reduce South Africa's creditworthiness, standing and status as a 
debtor country. ·The actions of the banks in withdrawing normal 
credit facilities to South Africa in mid-1985, precipitated a 
dramatic change for the worse in the nature and character of South 
Africa's international financial relations. It is argued here · that 
although there has been a noticeable improvement in South Africa's 
international financial relations after 1987, the country's 
relations with the IMF and banks have not returned to their 
previous mostly supportive and harmonious character. A combination 
of international, regional and domestic economic and political 
conditions has ensured that the current crisis in South Africa's 
international financial relations is already deeper and more 
prolonged than that of the mid-1970s. 
The South African political economy continues to be in cr~s~s, 
despite attempts at political and economic restructuring. The 
country's ability to generate a new, robust and sustainable growth 
model to escape the crisis has been limited by the strained and 
abnormal state of its relations with the IMF and private 
international banks. This is not to suggest that the restoration 
of these links, or even a new more internationally acceptable 
political dispensation, will be SUfficient to resolve South 
Africa's economic crisis. 
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The restrictions on capital inflows however, while problematic, 
have not brought about the total collapse of the country's economic 
and productive base, so precipitating rapid political change. Part 
of the reason for this lies in the previous supportive role of 
foreign multinationals, banks and the IMF for South Africa's post-
war growth model of import-substitution and state-led 
infrastructural and strategic industrialisation. This support from 
multinationals often acting in 'partnership' with national capital, 
from private international banks in the form of foreign loans and 
from the IMF, in the form of financial assistance when the strategy 
led to balance of payments problems, enabled the apartheid state 
to develop its import-substitution industrialisation and an 
infrastructural and strategic base more sophisticated than those 
of most o.ther developing or mi ddle-income countries, and hence one 
relatively more resilient to international economic pressure. 
Significantly though, the state did not in the post-war period 
intervene to the same extent to support, in an active devel'opmental 
sense, the growth of an internationally competitive manufacturing 
sector, a factor which goes some way towards explaining South 
Africa's inability to resolve its present economic crisis. 
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1. Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1986, 1987; De Vroey, 1984; Gordon, 
Bowles and weisskopf, 1983 
2. Noel, 1987, p327 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: HISTORY, LITERATURE AND THEORY 
(1) BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 
This thesis examines the nature, character and structure of South 
Africa's international financial relations in the period from c1970 
to 1987, ie from the end of the fixed exchange rate regime which 
regulated the international economy since the war to the dramatic 
and painful financial experience which confronted South Africa in 
(and in the two years after) August 1985. The financial history of 
south Africa's international economic relations is studied, as are 
the changes in the dominant features and trends in the country's 
international financial relations. The core chapters of the thesis 
are Chapters 4, 5 and 6, in which the history, crisis and 
transformation of South Africa's relations with the central 
institutions of the modern post-war international .financial economy 
- the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and private international 
banks is examined. This analysis is preceded by a critical overview 
of the changes in the institutions, mechanisms and rules of 
international finance, since 1970 (Chapter 2) and of the changes 
in the nature and structure of South Africa's international 
economic relations, and in the economy itself. (Chapter 3) It is 
against the essential background of these latter changes, that the 
'narrower' issue of South Africa's international financial history 
is studied. 
The thesis begins with an overview of some methodological, 
historical and theoretical questions relevant to the study of the 
location of particular countries within the post-1970 world 
economic system. 1 After some preliminary remarks and observations, 
which immediately follow this introduction, Chapter 1 proceeds to 
an examination of the long-term and structural features of the 
South African political economy which have shaped the nature and 
character of this country's relations with the world economy. This 
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is followed by a critique of the literature on South Africa's 
international economic relations. 
It is argued that the literature on South Africa's relations with 
the world economy has failed adequately to take into account either 
those special features of the South African economy, which have 
defined the uniqueness of this relation in comparison with other 
developing countries, or more recent changes such as the dramatic 
growth and sudden curtailment in international loans and credit, 
changes which make a reassessment of the theoretical and historical 
basis of these relations imperative. The existing body of 
literature tends to see South Africa's relations with the world 
economy, especiaily foreign capital inflows, as being either a 
powerful influence, the engine of growth and industrialisation, the 
source of all creative and productive ideas, and as contributing 
to the breakdown of (irrational) racial ba:rriers in South African 
society (modernisation, liberal approaches), or as distorting, 
promoting dependency and vulnerability at the same time and in the 
process of industrialisation, 
racial barriers (dependency 
and reinforcing or accomodating 
and dependent industrialisation 
approaches). A critique of these approaches, is followed by an 
outline of an alternative approach to the study of a country's 
relations with the world economy, an approach based on regulation 
theory. It is argued that such an approach offers a more useful, 
subtle and flexible framework for studying South Africa's 
international economic and financial relations than the dogmatic 
and holistic prescriptions of either modernisation or dependency 
variants. The approach allows one to envision these relations as 
being neither uniformly positive nor uniformly problematic, but as 
moving in the spectrum between these poles in a era of interacting 
and overlapping crisis and change in the international economy and 
South African political economy. In the years between 1970 and 
1987, we shall see that South Africa's relations with the IMF and 
the private international banks, the dominant theme of this 
dissertation, first grew in i mportance and then deteriorated in 
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ways which find explanations based on modernisation and dependency 
approaches seriously wanting. 
(2) WHAT CAN ECONOMIC HISTORY CONTRIBUTE TO THE STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE? 
Susan Strange has argued that the study of the international 
political economy, and of aspects of it such as the international 
financial system, has been hindered by conventional disciplines 
such as economics and international relations. The myopia of the 
former and the state-centrism of the latter, she goes on, has led 
to a 'stultifying neglect of structural power in matters of world 
production (and) world finance ... ,2 Strange is critical of the 
'enclosing insti~cts' of economists which lead them 'into a curious 
indifference ... towards factors perc.ei ved as lying outside the 
enclosing fence, especially when these factors smack of the 
political or the unexpected. ,3 Conv~ntional economic accounts of 
the post-1973 crisis in the international economy, for example, 
often rest on the 'exogenous' shocks brought about by the oil price 
hike as though this was 'some kind of natural catastrophe having 
nothing to do with the mismanagement of the dollar or the freedom 
accorded to the major oil companies. ,4 
She contends that more light on the really hard questions is often 
shed by economic historians, by development economists and by 
specialists in business history and management. In similar vein, 
we would like to suggest that the economic historian can bring to 
the study of international financial relations a liberating 
emphasis on the complexities and subtleties enmeshed in the 
interrelationships between states, institutions, markets and ideas. 
Because the management of international finance credit mechanisms 
is essentially political, in touching on issues of power, it is 
only with difficulty satisfactorily explained within the 
'enclosing' framework imposed by conventional economics. The 
accounts of economic histori ans, on the other hand, are not 
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invariably or simply reduced - like most of the deductive economics 
of today are - to the ' const ruction of mathematical models of 
elegance, without in all cases [being] a close approximation to the 
behaviour of man. ,5 They are therefore less encumbered by the 
demands of the mathematical sciences and the 'simplicity' (often 
absurdity) these demands force onto such theories of political 
economy. Nor does economic history make parsimony - ie using the 
fewest possible variables in explaining phenomena - into a virtue. 
, Freed' from such concerns as these, economic history allows, 
though not inevitably, an easier, more productive and satisfying 
ramble into byways most often unexplored by practitioners of 
conventional economics, yet ones which we would argue are essential 
to an understanding of international financial relations that is 
neither reductionist nor technicist. This is not to imply that 
there is no place for mathematica~ economics or econometrics in 
economic history. Nor is it meant to imply that economic history 
is by definition or inevitably either 'better' because it is more 
free ranging, or 'less rigorous' because its lacks the precision 
of, say, modern neo-classical economics. 
This present study is at one and the same time international, 
historical and, in parts, comparative. The study spans seventeen 
turbulent and volatile years in the economic and political history 
of South Africa, and in significant sub-regions of the world, 
including the Middle East and the newly industrialising countries 
of Asia. It covers a period of great uncertainty and change in the 
international political economy, both in its rules and mechanisms 
as well as in many of its central features and directions. It 
touches on developments in contemporary world history and world 
politics. It is located within an as yet unsettled debate on the 
question of the characterisation of an individual country's 
location within the world economic system. It grapples with notions 
of 'crisis'in capitalist accumulation and encompasses the issue of 
economic and political transformation of society. We would argue 
that these tasks may very satisfactorily, though not exclusively, 
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be tackled from the intellectual underpinnings and traditions of 
economic history by someone with a training in, and an 
understanding and appreciation of the value of, conventional 
economic theory. 
(3) WHY STUDY SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS? 
As recently as late 1985, Freund remarked that the subject of 
international credit and financing was a 'very underresearched 
issue in South African e~onomic history. ,6 Though this has often 
been regarded as sufficient reason to undertake a study, the 
underresearched state of a subject is not in itself compelling 
enough reason to justify research. For in fact, no study may indeed 
be needed. However, significant developments and changes in the 
nature and structure of South Africa's international economic 
relations in the 1970s and 1980i, formed the backdrop to Freund's 
observation. Following the debt crisis of August 1985, the 
remarkable extent to which South Africa's international economic 
relations, ie the set of trade, services, investment, technology 
and loan transactions with the rest of the world, had in the 
preceding decade beco·me skewed in the direction of financial 
issues, suddenly became apparent. In particular, the extent, nature 
and implications of South Africa's previous heavy borrowings from 
the IMF and private international banks came to dominate 
discussions of South Africa's international economic relations. 
Moreover, in the period since the early 1970s South Africa's 
relations with the IMF and private international banks initially 
increased in significance and then dramatically deteriorated, for 
reasons which have not been systematically explained. Banks, 
bondholders and the IMF responded differently to the crisis of the 
mid-1970s as compared to the mid-1980s crisis. 
As Kahn points out the emphasis on loans, rather than direct 
investment, since the early 1970s is reflected in the increase in 
the proportion of indirect investment to total foreign investment 
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from 32pc in 1970 to 61pc by 1984. 7 The maturity period of South 
Africa's private international bank loans shortened sharply by the 
early 1980s, and the proportion of non-bank private sector debt 
rose to over 50pc of total debt by August 1985. Both these aspects 
represent a reversal of the position in the mid-1970s, when South 
Africa's foreign loans were predominantly borrowed by the state or 
parastatal agencies, and were of a longer maturity. 
South Africa also borrowed heavily from the IMF in the mid-1970s 
when it experienced severe economic and political difficulties, 
and again in 1982. IMF assistance to South Africa in the mid- 1970s 
was greater than the combined assistance to all other African 
countries in that time. Only Britain and Mexico were bigger 
beneficiaries of IMF assistance in 1975 and 1976. The escalation 
in inte~nal res~stance to the apartheid state after 1976, also 
served to focus attention ,on bank and IMF loans to South Africa, 
and made the issue front-page news on the international media. 
Campaigns against IMF and bank loans to South Africa increased in 
extent, intensity and effectiveness in the 1980s. The curtailment 
of IMF assistance in 1983 and of new bank loans to South Africa 
after 1985, has placed considerable strains on the country's 
balance of payments, and on growth prospects, despite a slight 
easing of the country's debt situation after the agreement of 
February 1987. 
These changes in the nature and structure of South Africa's 
international economic relations arose out of and reflect changes 
both in international financial markets, in particular the growth 
in the extent and sophistication of the Eurocurrency market, as 
well as the development since the early 1970s of an economic crisis 
within South Africa itself. Seidman has shown, for example, that 
the rate of profit of US firms in South Africa fell relative to the 
rest of Africa. 8 These and other relevant changes both in 
international financial markets and in the South African economy 
are discussed more fully in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. 
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These factors suggest that no longer can the obviously 
underresearched nature of South Africa's internat~onal finance and 
credit be ignored. 
(4) LONG-TERM AND STRUCTURAL FEATURES WHICH HAVE SHAPED THE FORM 
OF SOUTH AFRICA'S LINKS WITH THE WORLD ECONOMY 
South Africa's relations with the world economy have been shaped 
by the particular circumstances of its industrialisation, the basis 
for its insertion into international trading, investment and 
strategic relations and the way in which these relations evolved 
and became 'codified' thereafter. These features of the South 
African political economy have often been downplayed in discussions 
of South Africa'~ international economic linkages, and especially 
in debat~ about their ~ffect in shaping the development of the 
modern South African economy. Alternatively, these features are 
interpreted in very different ways, depending upon the theoretical 
foundations underpinning the analysis. 
Thus for example, one theoretical point of entry into studying the 
international aspects of a country's development (and its impact 
on the local economy) has been provided by dependency theory. 
Dependency theory traces the origins of what is termed the 
distorted, 'centre-determined' development in 'Third World' 
countries (alternatively peripheral, semi-peripheral, sub-
imperialist) in numerous externally-derived forces. These include 
the legacy of colonial dependence; the selective exploitation of 
a volatile, unstable primary export sector; adverse and 
deteriorating terms of world trade; an accomodative local state 
(colonial or neo-colonial); its inability to pursue an autonomous 
national-determined development path; a technological and financial 
dependence on the metropolitan centres; the absence of a viable 
capital goods sector and hence debilitating dependence on capital 
goods imports. Some versions of dependency conclude by arguing that 
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capitalist industrialisation in the periphery is as a result 
impossible. 
Explanations of development and underdevelopment that rest on 
notions of dependency have generally tended to downplay the role 
and creativity of national capital in development, so reducing the 
central players to exploitative foreign capital and an invariably 
accomodative local state. However, it is our contention that some 
countries, and South Africa can be numbered among these, have to 
some extent succeeded in developing into fairly self-generating and 
creative capitalist centres, albeit of a second rate order. During 
the period of the post-war boom some of these countries 'with a 
powerful enough state structure' were able for some time to take 
relative control over their relations with the world economy, and 
managed to lay the basis for the development of a national 
productive, infraptructural and strategic foundation. 9 Their 
development was derivative in many ways, and linked crucially to 
their trade and investment relations with the industrialised 
capitalist countries. 
But various factors enabled these countries to pursue a form of 
internationally-linked development, that did not simply translate 
into a state of dependency and underdevelopment, of being exploited 
and totally vulnerable to the dictates of world capitalism. On the 
contrary it has been shown, and in South Africa's case will be 
shown, that the 'dictates' of world capitalism as it were, may turn 
out at certain times and in certain circumstances to ensure a high 
degree of protected development for some countries. Thus for 
example, South Africa's gold reserves and role as a regional and 
stabilising power are two such factors ensuring this. This section 
examines some of these long-term, historical and structural 
features in the South African political economy which are often 
'lopped off' or disregarded within the confines of a dependency 
approach. 
(4.1) Gold as a primary export commodity. 
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Social formations in the developing world are often characterised 
by their unusual dependence on one or two primary export 
commodities, whose price fluctuations and volatility have posed a 
major problem for their development. South Africa has been highly 
dependent on gold in this way and foreign capital played a vital 
role in the early development of the gold mining industry. Yet as 
a primary export commodity gold possesses certain unique intrinsic 
and institutionalised characteristics which set it apart from the 
primary exports of most other countries outside the industrialised 
capitalist world. Though its role has changed, its status as an 
(official or unofficial) international monetary asset, has meant 
that South Africa-has benefited from the ready market, and for most 
of this century, a guaranteed price for its primary export 
commodity. It is still possible, because it is widely regarded as 
money, for gOld . to be used as a means of settling international 
payments. 
Although as we shall note again in Chapter 3, the variability in 
the gold price introduced an instability into the South Africa 
economy which contributed to the development of the generalised 
crisis in the economy after 1973 and its high price at the turn of 
the decade of the 1970s contributed in disguising some very serious 
problems in the economy, it must also be pointed out that the gold 
price has been at a significantly higher level since its official 
and fixed dollar-denominated price was abolished. (see Figure 1) 
This higher price floor has meant as Kaplan has shown, that South 
Africa's terms of trade, ie the ratio of the price of South African 
exports to the price of South African imports, 'have not been 
nearly as unfavourable as those of other primary exporters ••. ,10 
Excluding gold, South Africa's terms of trade have declined each 
year from 1970 to 1986 except between 1972-73. But the picture as 
Table 1 shows changes significantly by the inclusion of gold in the 




































AVERAGE ANNUAL GOLD PRICE: 1974-1985 
1974 7S 76 77 78 
SOURCE: De Kock, April 1987, p2 
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SOURCE: South African Reserve Banki Nedbank Survey, 1983, Pl16 
Furthermore, gold mining revenues I especially after the second 
World War, played a central role in the development of the local 
manufacturing industry I and hence contributed to a nationally-
17 
based economic development much more than was possible for most 
countries whose economies were 'narrowly' centred around primary 
export commodities. 11 Table 2 shows that in the period 1910-1946, 
gold contributed some 50pc of total export earnings. This has been 
an important factor in helping to stave off the kind of balance of 
payments crises experienced by so many other colonial and 
developing countries in this time. Additionally, these foreign 
exchange earnings have allowed South Africa to pay 'without undue 
difficulty, for the capital goods it urgently needed to expand its 
total national production ... indeed gold has been able to finance 
the imports without which industrial expansion would have been 
impossible •• 12 
Gold's status in the international monetary system and the 
secondary beneficial effects on national development, places it in 
a different league from most other primary exports, with all their 
attendant vulnerabilities. Dependency theorists may point to South 
Africa as a one-produ~t economy, and in that they woul.d be correct. 
But that product is and has been gold. 
TABLE 2 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS FROM GOLD EXPORTS, AND AS PERCENTAGE OF 





















SOURCE: Adapted from South African Statistics, 1982, Section 16.5 
(4.2) South Africa's 'Settler Community', the State, and National 
Capital. 
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South Africa's relatively large settler community 13 of both 
Afrikaner (Dutch) and British origins has had a strong commitment 
to an autonomous national development which has resulted in a less 
distorted, less foreign dominated and more balanced and diversified 
development than has been the fate of many other developing 
countries. The importance of a permament 'European population' with 
their 'high economic and cultural aspirations' in the construction 
of the, modern South African economy and society has been stressed 
in two works by Frankel. 14 This settler presence has made its impact 
both at the level of the state and in a particularly creative 
nationa~ bourgeoisie. First, at the level of the state this factor 
has manifested itself in numerous ways. Kaplan has shown that the 
movement away frqm an almost total dependence on the gold mining 
industry and industrial protectionism (and the taxation of mining) 
formed part of a state strategy 'principally designed to foster 
local industrialisation' . 15 Protection of local industry and import-
sUbstitution policies remained, until the 1972 Reynders Commission 
report, a central and virtually uncontested feature of state 
policy. Davies et al have argued that though 'South Africa remains 
a peripheral social formation caught in the imperialist nexus' from 
1924, the 'state itself became the mechanism for an attempt to 
transform the nature of South Africa's incorporation into the 
imperialist chain ... ,16 
More important, however, was the massive state sponsorship, 
especially in the 1920s, 1950s and again (using foreign bank loans) 
in the mid-1970s, of local infrastructural enterprises and 
development., The harbour boards, the central South African 
railways, the Rand Water Board and the Land Bank (which was 
reformed in 1912) were all created as state enterprises before 
Union.
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The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was set up in 1921. 18 
The Smuts government created the electricity supply commission, 
ESKOM, which Christie refers to as a "major institution of South 
African 'state capitalism'" in 1924, ie immediately before the 'PACT 
government came into power. Christie also shows that by the end of 
the second World War, most of the 'commanding heights' of the South 
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African political economy were owned by the state through its 
parastatals. These included the agricultural Control Boards, the 
iron and steel corporation, ISCOR, and the Industrial Development 
corporation (IDC). 19 
Following the capture of the state by the National Party in 1948 
and especially in the wake of the growing security crisis and 
threat of sanctions after 1960, other state policies to promote 
national development were introduced, including import controls 
which 'compelled foreign manufacturer-exporters to develop 
franchises or otherwise directly participate in the South African 
economy, state financial assistance to investors ... ,20 etc. The 
presence of a settler community also spurred local development by 
providing a not insubstantial, though as became clear later, 
limited internal market for some manufactured products. O'Meara 
has sho~h that while the National Party goverment after 1948 
secured the political conditions for rapid accumulation by all 
capital" the conditions created for the even more rapid growth of 
Afrikaner capital, in agriculture, in finance and in secondary 
industrialisation were part i cularly marked. Table 3, however, 
illustrates that the growth of Afrikaner business did not wait upon 
the coming into power of the National Party, with the number of 
Afrikaner businesses increasing markedly between the years 1938 and 
1939, especially in commerce and manufacturing. After 1948, 
according to Wassenaar, the state-owned IDC was used to further 
'strengthen Afrikaner participation in the industrial progress of 
the country ... [and] as a bulwark against the Anglo-American 
Corporation.' 121 
It is important to emphasise, however, that it is not our view that 
the various South African governments after 1924 were, despite the 
anti-British rhetoric of the 1920s, set on an anti-foreign 
capitalist purge, in which the sole beneficiaries were to be the 
rising national bourgeoisie, especially of Afrikaners. Indeed as 
Kaplan and others have shown,22 the relationship between the South 
20 
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African state and> fractions of capital, national and foreign, were 
always complex, and require a more disaggregated and subtle 
analysis than the narrow demands of this section allow. Our 
contention is simply that t~e early attempts by the South African 
state to implement a programme of national economic development and 
the time and space this allowed for a variety of state policies to 
become translated into action, has led to the realisation of a 
relatively more balanced form of national development than that 
characteristic of other peripheral social formations. To see South 
African development as being determined solely by the impulses of 
the metropolitan centres, with which its evolution and shape is 
often narrowly associated, would be to fail to appreciate these 
kinds of state interventions. 
The South African state's role in establishing the more general 
conditions under which capital accumulation has unfolded in this 
country, to the benefit of both local and foreign capital will not 
be analysed here. These aspects such as the racial controls over 
the labour force, the process of labour's cheapening and 
differentation, policies in regard to black urbanisation, housing 
etc were often crucial to the survival and growth of smaller, more 
labour intensive local capitalists, especially in the period after 
the second World War. 23 
21 
The second manifestation of the settler community's impact on South 
African national development, was felt through the creative role 
of local capital. Legassick's work, for example, while not denying 
the obvious importance of foreign capital in South Africa's 
development, correctly insists on the distinctive and creative role 
of native capital. Thus he argues that the '[v]olume of foreign 
investment should not lead to an underestimation of the strength 
of local capital.' 24 Mining on the scale which occurred in South 
Africa, called for the development of local industries such as 
food, timber, chemicals and metals, and the mining industry, which 
was becoming more locally owned, contributed to set up industries 
such as SAPPI and AECI. By the 1930s already local share ownership 
of the mining industry had increased from 15 to 40pc. 25 The 
formation of the Anglo-American Corporation is symptomatic of this 
change. Innes has contended that AAC as a 
fraction of international capital with a strong local 
commitment, had a far greater interest than any other fraction 
of mining capital in the expanded reproduction of the South 
African social formation, and that this explains both its heavy 
economic and political involvement in the area as well as the 
relative ease and eagerness with which · it ... sought to form 
economic and political alliances with other local classes. Its 
international links not- withstanding, AAC should thus be seen 
as being in a profound sense, a 'representative' of South 
African capitalist interests. 26 
In contrast to other 'developing countries' it would seem that a 
growing proportion of accumulated cap~tal remained in South Africa. 
Further evidence of this increasing local involvement in South 
African development at the time was the formation of the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) in 1921, the first in the British 
Empire. The SARB took over the right to sell gold from the 
mineowners and gradually established local control over monetary 
policy.27 In general the development of financial institutions was 
soon t~ prove important to the process by which mining surplus was 
redirected towards supporting domestic manufacturing industry. 
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In manufacturing, local capital developed its hold between the wars 
and does not seem to have been overwhelmed by the flood of foreign 
investment to the extent of some other countries of intermediate 
development. In this period the state regulated the relations of 
capital to make this possible. Legassick illustrates this 
contention, pointing out that South Africa capital 'has been able 
to obtain a near dominant position in some sectors domestically, 
and even expand into international investment; that Afrikaner 
capital 'has been a major force towards resisting the unbridled 
dominance of foreign capital'; and that the trend especially after 
the war was towards an increasing inter-sectoral, interpenetration 
of capitals and towards a partnership of local and foreign capital 
in many sectors o~ the South African economy. 28 In the 1980s, South 
African capital displayed its strength by buying up the assets of 
disinvesting foreign corporations. 
Duncan Innes as we have noted, has shown how Anglo-American 
corporation, despite its international links, early on developed 
a particularly South African character with an unmistakable 
interest in the expanded reproduction of the South African 
economy.29 Later in this thesis, we shall see how in recent years 
the further internationalisation of South African capital, and its 
ability to take advantage of the opportunities created by 
disinvesting companies, provide further evidence of the 
sophistication and responsiveness of local capital. These factors 
point to the importance of recognising national capital as a 
partner (in some kind of triple alliance with foreign capital and 
the local state) in the process of South African development in a 
way not accommodated within a dependency framework. 
(4.3) South Africa's role as a Regional Power in the post-war World 
Economic System. 
Developing countries, especially those pursuing populist or 
'socialist' models of development have often discovered that the 
cost of financial assistance received from the IMF and World Bank, 
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the institutions established at Bretton Woods in 1944 ostensibly 
with the object of promoting stability and growth in the world 
economy, has been high in terms of loss of control and autonomy 
over developmental policy. In pursuit of their role within the 
world capitalist economy, these supposedly 'neutral' institutions, 
have extracted promises of policy changes within a wide variety of 
a borrower's domestic economic pol icy, as a precondition for 
financial assistance. This, as can be illustrated from numerous 
case studies (Jamaica, Tanzania for example) can and has often led 
to a dramatic alteration and distortion in the borrower's 
development strategy. Such financial dependency on the IMF (as well 
as private banks whose own lending is often conditional on IMF 
supervision) is i.tself in many cases the result of distortions and 
structural imbalances created in an earlier (colonial) phase of a 
country's integration into the world economy. One of the great 
strengths of dependency theory is that by setting out to understand 
the functioning of the world economy as a system, it has 
facilitated and enriched our understanding of these processes. 
However, it remains true that not all peripheral or semi-peripheral 
countries who borrowed from the IMF, World Bank and private 
international banks, have had to face these intractable problems. 
It will become clear in Chapter 4, for example, that IMF assistance 
to South Africa, especially in the form of the massive loans of the 
mid-1970s and 1982, came with little or no conditionality, despite 
South Africa's pursuance of economic policies in regard to exchange 
controls, import controls, subsidies and labour market 'rigidities' 
among others, which are anathema to the IMF's view of the world and 
of development and growth. South Africa's relatively privileged 
status (until the mid-1980s) contrasts sharply with the experience 
of other developing countries, as we shall see in Chapter 2, and 
arises out of two important factors related to the country's role 
and place within the post-war world capitalist system. 
Incidentally, these factors also partially explain why western 
industrialised countries for long resisted the imposition of 
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comprehensive and mandatory sanctions and disinvestment against 
South Africa. 
First, in 1978, US President Carter's National Security Advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski identified Iran (then still under the Shah), 
Brazil and South Africa, as among the more important regionally 
influential nations within the western world, noting that changes 
within these countries will have profound consequences throughout 
the areas in which they are situated as well as in the major 
centres of world capitalism. 3o South Africa's particular role within 
the global capitalist system, has developed over time in a way 
which has served to limit the scope and possibilities for political 
and economic changes within smaller and weaker states in Southern 
Africa. Its own political stability was therefore vital if it was 
to perform this role successfully. until escalating international 
pressure . and the unprecedented pol i tical upheaval and economic 
crisis since 1983/4 combined to bring IMF and private bank loans 
and credit to an abrupt halt these regional dynamics transcended 
issues of human rights violations, racial discrimination and other 
moral and political considerations. 
Secondly, the scale of economic and financial interpenetration 
between South Africa and the western industrialised countries has 
for long been such that the fate of South Africa has been of no 
small significance to these countries and in particular to many , 
multinational corporations and banks. Faced with stagflation in 
their home countries, multinational corporations 'stepped up their 
competition ' in the (late 1960s and) 1970s for the profitable 
business of regional sub-centers like South Africa and Brazil. ,31 
These corporations and banks generated a substantial proportion of 
the profits and earnings for specific firms and countries in the 
core areas of the capitalist world economy at the time. The 
characteristics which rendered countries like Brazil, 
South Africa 'eligible as the leading candidates 
Iran and 
for this 
partnership were: their .'disciplined' low cost labour force; 
valuable mineral resources; a strong parastatal sector, providing 
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infrastructure and cheap inputs and a market; powerful local firms 
to act as private sector partners to the growing number of 
transnationals; and a state capable of maintaining these 
conditions, whatever the aspirations of their inhabitants. ,32 In 
short the attractiveness of these countries to foreign capital was 
predicated upon a simul taneous or prior nationally-based 
development both thorugh state and private sector initiatives and 
control mechanisms. 
It is this higher degree of 'symmetry' in the interpenetration of 
economic relations between South Africa and the industrialised 
countries, the relatively greater degree of mutual inter-dependence 
and benefits (as compared . with that of most other developing 
countries) coupled with the political and stabilising regional role 
that South Afric~ has played which forms the basis for the greater 
support 'that South Africa received from the IMF and other 
international organisations. IMF assistance to South Africa under 
easy terms (low conditionality) was, until 1983, one way in which 
South Africa benefited from and was 'rewarded' for its role as a 
sub-regional centre within the world capitalist economy. It was 
also the basis upon which its increasing vulnerability to balance 
of payments crises after 1974 has been modulated. However, whereas 
for long, the US and other Western countries had seen South 
Africa's role as promoting and maintaining regional stability, this 
changed in the aftermath of the rapid deterioration in the 
apartheid state's international political, and financial' relations 
which set in after 1984. The US, for example, thereafter began to 
see south Africa's domestic and regional policies as causing and 
perpetuating instability in the sub-continent. 33 
(5) THE LITERATURE ON SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
RELATIONS 
The literature on south Africa's financial relations with the IMF, 
World Bank and private international banks, is not vast. In part 
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this reflects the relative insignificance of these private and 
public international loan flows to South Africa until the beginning 
of the 1970s. Thus for example, a thesis on the IMF, by a South 
African, John Wilmot, submitted to the University of South Africa 
in 1960, was totally devoid, save for a few isolated footnotes, of 
any reference to South Africa, a founder member of the Fund. 34 
Frankel's pioneering work on capital investment in Africa 35 was the 
first, and remained for long the only, systematic account of South 
Africa's investment relations with the rest of the world. The 
section on South Africa analysed the amount of, return to and 
fluctuations in the supply of foreign capital to South Africa's 
mining industry, in the main, as well as the implications for the 
structure of the economy, of the dominance of the mining industry. 
However, the emphasis mainly on share capital investment from Great 
Britain, France ~nd Germany reflects the relative unimportance of 
international bank loans and credit in the first fifty years of 
South Africa's industrialisation. However, Frankel did show that 
South Africa's close links with the London money market, enabled 
this country to develop a means of access to the world's largest 
money market, which were largely closed to non-British African 
countries. 36 
The survey of the literature which follows has a double purpose. 
First, to examine whether and how South Africa's international 
financial relations have been dealt with in the literature. And 
second, though peripherally at times, to trace the theoretical 
contours of the deba~e in this literature on the way South Africa's 
integration ' into the world economy has been characterised. Two 
broad theoretical frameworks are identified, the first based on 
modernisation theory, emphasises the (positive) value of foreign 
capital and technology in the economic and social upliftment of 
'backward' peoples and countries which enables them to grow 
increasingly to resemble 'modern' (American) society. Most of the 
more recent (post-1970) literature, on the other hand, appears to 
have been influenced by dependency ideas, or caught within the 
framework of questions posed by dependency, even if they are not 
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always directly located in the dependency paradigm. Dependency 
theory stresses the links which bind . developing to developed 
countries, and the negative and exploitative character of these 
links. As we shall see, although only Bloch's work appears to be 
a direct product of the 'dependent development' version of 
dependency theory,37 even some of the more sophisticated work such 
that of Kaplan takes off from the questions posed by dependency.~ 
A substantial body of literature on South African industrialisation 
had tended to argue that 'industrialisation is accompanied by 
forces which inexorably erode 'ascriptively based' modes of social 
organization such as apartheid ... ,39 Foreign investment which was 
also seen to be crucial to South African growth and 
industrialisation, was therefore according to this view, an 
important element in the erosion of apartheid. Michael O'Dowd is 
perhaps the ~est known exponent of this thesis. 4o This view, which 
Milkman has oddly labelled 'africanist ,41 and which in the more 
general literature would be labelled a variant of 'modernisation 
theory' has been criticised both for its crude economic determinism 
and for its inconsistency with the historical experience of 
simUltaneous increased growth and intensified racial oppression in 
the 1960s. It tended to smooth over, deny or at least ignore the 
constraints imposed on South African industrialisation through its 
integration into the world economy. A modern variant of this 
argument, including that of Bromberger, would hold that foreign 
sector influence is essential (though not in any inevitable sense) 
to the breakdown of the racial hierarchy, which in turn would be 
good for growth. 42 Its proponents, mainly in capital and the state 
would be opposed to sanctions and disinvestment on these grounds. 
Although there remains a sUbstantial body of opinion which would 
subscribe, at least to the latter version of modernisation theory, 
there has been little or no advance in the theoretical 
sophistication of this thesis. Thus for example, in a more recent 
article Dickman argues strongly for South Africa to maintain an 
open economy. He contends that foreign capital will be a crucial 
element in creating sustainable growth in a post-apartheid 
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society.43 The rest of this survey looks mainly at the more recent 
dependency influenced literature. 
First et al, in their 1972 study of western investment in South 
Africa pointed to the extent and implications of the 
interpenetration of western and South African business interests. 
Their remarks on the role of multinational companies, and of 
international bank loans to South Africa after the war, and 
especially after 1970, are primarily designed to illustrate foreign 
capital's support for the apartheid regime. In short the work 
represented a sort of counter-argument to the earlier modernisation 
literature's insistence on the capacity of foreign investment to 
undermine apartheid. The work's reference to South Africa's 
international financial links is useful in marking out the point 
at which these links begin to assume new significance, but it has 
no, nor does it claim, any theoretical pretensions, save some throw 
off observations in the conclusion about whether south Africa has 
changed from being a 'satellite power' to a 'metropolitan power in 
its own right'." 
Legassick's early work touched on south African foreign investment. 
It also represented one of the early revisionist or Marxist 
challenges to the then dominant modernisation or liberal view. 
Legassick was influenced by the new ideas of dependency theory. 
Thus, for example he talked about the change in South Africa over 
a hundred years from being a 'peripheral part of the world economic 
system to a developed sub-metropole, generating development and 
exploitation in its own periphery. ,45 
Yet, interestingly, he tried to strike a balance between the 
obvious importance of foreign investment and the distinctive and 
creative role of native capital. Legassick observed that the state 
received foreign loans for infrastructural investment, even as 
early as the 1950s, and that this was important in creating 'a more 
favourable situation' for foreign investment. He refers to. a $IOm 
1951 credit to the state by a consortium of US banks, brought 
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together by (the bankers) Dillon Read, and of World Bank loans of 
over $200m, which was borrowed by the state railway, SAR, and ESKOM 
among others, in the decade of the 1950s. 46 At the time (as Christie 
too points out) the World Bank provided ESKOM, in particular with 
significant amounts of loans, having recognised the 'crucial role 
of Escom in the South african political economy. ,47 
In the mid-1970s, there emerged a dependency-influenced, though 
clearly in parts anti-dependency, view in the work of the South 
African Poulantzians (Morris, Kaplan, Davies and O'Meara). They 
argued that through the influence of the state, national capital 
succeeded in establishing a period of capitalist development 'which 
entailed both a
O 
deepening of capital and the expansion of 
capitalist production into new areas.' Yet they also argue that 
despite South ° Africa's 'relatively high levels of 
industrialisation' and 'regular assertions of 'independence' the 
country remains a 'peripheral social formation caught in the 
imperialist nexus.' The 'externally' caused recession of the mid-
1970s is cited as an example that international incorporation 
remains 'determinate'. 48 
Bill Johnson characterised foreign investment as the 'secret of 
the South African miracle', and his 1977 book, though uncomfortably 
conspiratorial in parts, was written at the beginning of the period 
when international finance became an important factor in South 
Africa's international economic relations. The country had received 
its first significant direct financial assistance from the IMF in 
1975 and 1976 and the state and parastatals had borrowed large sums 
from private banks for infrastructural investment in the mid-
1970s. Johnson was perceptive enough to warn that South Africa's 
foreign loans might create a kind of dependency, which would make 
it vulnerable to pressure from the West, though his view that the 
origins of the crisis that brought an end to the South African boom 
of the 1960s 'all lay in the world beyond' (perhaps 
unintentionally) tends to somewhat overvalue the 'external 
factor' .49 
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In another vein, the works of 'state interventionist' proponents 
such as TA du Plessis, which arose out of the 1970s debate over 
the question of an appropriate industrial development strategy for 
South Africa, also represented an implicit kind of dependency 
position. They saw South African industrialisation as being overly 
dependent and vulnerable on the world economy, mainly through its 
reliance on gold exports and capital goods imports, and argued that 
the continuation of some . form of import-substitution 
industrialisation was the way to address this. Bell went on to 
strongly argue the case for the extension of import-substitution 
into some areas of capital goods. Again, this literature was more 
important for the. general debate about the nature of South Africa's 
'dependency', than on the issue of its international finance. so 
Both Bloch and Seidman invoke the idea of 'dependent development 
or industrialisation', in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of the 
more total ising versions of dependency theory. The latter approach 
argued, on the basis of an intrinsically unequal relationship 
between an exploitative 'centre' and an economically weak and 
politically and militarily vulnerable 'periphery', that 
industrialisation in the latter was an impossibility. Bloch wrote 
of dependent industrialisation as a situation where the dominant 
impetus comes from outside the periphery. For Bloch, South African 
development processes though impressive, were locked into 
'imperialist' dynamics of development, especially technologically, 
so that South African firms 'could not escape their dependence on 
a rhythm of .accumulation set in the imperialist centres. ,51 
The Seidmans remarked on the significant industrialisation of South 
Africa and some twenty other 'semi-peripheral' countries which had 
emerged as 'outstanding examples of .. dependent development. ' Their 
work has more to say on issues of international finance than 
Bloch's. They argue that private international banks, in the wake 
of stagnation in the advanced industrialised countries, expanded 
their loans to 'subcenters' like South Africa and Brazil in the 
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1970s, the latter group of countries being more willing to pay 
higher rates of interest. Within this framework, they devote 
considerably attention to the details of international bank and IMF 
loans to South Africa.~ 
But if proponents of modernisation stand accused of ignoring the 
constraints on South African development imposed by the world 
economy, both dependency and dependent development approaches tend 
to 'liquidate the unique history 'and development of specific 
countries' .53 The emergence of the concept of dependent development 
mirrored its popularisation in the international literature. 
Cardoso, for example, 54 by invoking the concept of ' associated 
dependent development', stressed the 'primacy and explored the 
diversity of actual concrete situations 'of dependency. ,55 The 
intention was to avoid the crude generalisations of the more 
t 'otalising versions of dependency approaches such as those of 
Frank, Amin and Wallerstein. 56 While Frank spoke of four centuries 
of 'continuity in change' Cardoso's work emphasised the rapidly 
changing nature of some Latin American countries. 
Yet, and we shall return to this point again shortly, explanations 
based on dependent development (or other 'labels' such as sub-
imperialism, semi-periphery) remain insufficiently sensitive to the 
simultaneous overlapping and interaction between crises and change 
in the way the international economy is regulated, on the one hand, 
and crises and change in the underlying productive and 
institutional bases of accumulation in individual nation states, 
on the other hand, in explanations of the way in which individual 
countries relate to the world economy. Though undoubtedly an 
advance over the formulations of Frank and others, dependent 
development exponents continue to pose questions about a country's 
relations with the world economy within the limits of the same 
paralysing conceptual format. 
The work of Petras and Morley represent one attempt at posing these 
questions in a new way, by defining the problematic as one of 
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exploitation rather than development. Their study of Brazil, South 
Africa and Iran rejects concepts such as dependence and 
modernisation, and focuses on class relationships at the national 
and international levels. They contend that class cleavages extend 
beyond national boundaries and involve 'international class 
units. ,57 They locate these 'sub-imperialist' powers in a 
contradictory and changing relationship both to the advanced 
capitalist countries and to other peripheral societies in the 
region they themselves dominate. Internal political struggle 
against these repressive regimes, class differentiation and 
economic growth/crises are examined within this problematic. The 
introduction of political factors and of class differentiation 
within these 'sub-imperialist' powers helps to put back more of a 
country's own history and development into an analysis of its 
relationship with the world economy, though the meaning and 
significance of their new concept of 'international class units' 
does not emerge forcefully enough to be more analytically 
appealing, than say, dependency. 
Amin and more recently Amin et al have gone so far as to argue that 
South Africa is an 'independent developed capitalist state which 
has a definite role in the network of imperialist relations. ,58 
They argue that the country has built its own technological 
capacity and in international financial relations its position is 
one of 'equal integration into the world economy. ,59 They argue that 
international bank investments in South Africa have been the 'major 
catalysing factor in the genesis of a relatively autonomous South 
African capital.'~ 
These views appear to deny the applicability of conventionally 
posed dependency or dependent development ideas to South African 
development and although there is merit in their claims about the 
country's own productive and technological capacities, they end by 
actually standing the dependency argument on its head in the South 
African case. For they tend to see South Africa as a full blown 
imperialist power, intent and with the power to exploit its 
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immediate periphery, its 'constellation of South African states.' 
This portrayal is sterile in much the same way as the dependency 
characterisation of South Africa. It would be difficult to see how 
South Africa's own relative vulnerability to international 
financial pressure from the IMF and the banks of the advanced 
capitalist countries after 1985, can be satisfactorily explained 
within its terms. How one would locate the political struggle in 
South Africa or the origins and form of the post-1970 crisis in 
its political economy into this schema, is also hard to 
conceptualise. Surely these factors alone introduce a complexity 
into the equation which makes the characterisation of South Africa 
as an independent or autonomous capitalist state (just like any 
other! ) somewhat problematic? Finally, what they mean by an 
'independent capitalist state' is far from clear. 
Kaplan's work on the internationalisation of South African capital 
highlights one aspect of the strength and/or sophistication of 
South African capital. He tends to see South African capital as 
'not so much dependent and under the iron heel of metropolitan 
interests that determine its (development) possibilities, (but) as 
quite creative and adaptive, increasingly uninterested in expanding 
investments only or even primarily in South Africa, partly for 
economic reasons.' 61 In a subsequent paper on South Africa's 
changing place in the world economy, Kaplan begins by posing the 
question of "whether South Africa could be said to be a 'dependent' 
economy, ie one so reliant on 'foreigners', in one way or another, 
that it is incapable of generating its own economic momentum. ,,62 
Here Kaplan" examines more fully recent developments in South 
Africa's international financial relations, and discusses 
especially the background and polit ical controversy surrounding 
south Africa's 1983 loan from the IMF.63 Kaplan's work succeeds in 
introducing South Africa's international financial relations onto 
the agenda. However, the question he poses at the beginning is not 
satisfactorily answered, partly because it cannot be satisfactorily 
answered in that form, and one (perhaps even Kaplan) is left at the 
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end with a feeling of emptiness at having been robbed of an easy 
answer. 
(6) CRITIQUE AND ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUALISATIONS 
This survey of the literature on South Africa's international 
financial relations and of the way its links with the world economy 
have been characterised in this literature reveals the paucity of 
this literature and the fact that most of the more recent and 
creative attempts to grapple with the question of South Africa's 
relations with the world economy are influenced by dependency 
theory. What follows is an attempt to critique the central tenets 
of dependency as a forerunner to the introduction of an alternative 
approach to the study of a country's relations with the world 
economy, . ie reguiation theory. 
Participants in the debate about development have invariably begun 
by retracing the history of this debate. Paul Cammack has 
challenged this (futile) preoccupation arguing that, '(d)espite 
the challenges to the modernisation approach the debate is still 
grounded in ideas which are at one and the same time naive, 
ideologically coloured, ethnocentric, · ahistorical and over-
elaborate and which have been abandoned virtually in their totality 
as it has developed.,M Given the absence of any new ideas in the 
exposition of the modernisation approach as applied to the South 
African case, and the dominance of a dependency influenced view the 
post-1973 literature, this study, in the spirit of Cammack's 
remarks, takes off from a critique of more recent arguments, in the 
belief that this would prove both less tedious and more useful. 
Let us begin by making one observation about the dependency 
argument as it relates to South Africa which places the debate in 
an analytically and politically different terrain than debates 
elsewhere in the 'Third World'. For there is an interesting twist 
in the dependency argument as it applies to South Africa. In most 
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post-colonial and post-independence societies (ie the societies 
out of whose experience the dependency approach originally drew 
its strength) the dominant political actors, the state and popular 
classes fought their 'dependency' to attain greater autonomy over 
their development. In South Africa however, the apartheid state and 
most fractions of capital have vigorously supported an extended 
role for the foreign sector especially since the mid-1970s, even 
when in a contradictory way, they have often simultaneously striven 
for greater nationally-based development. Their strident campaign 
against sanctions and disinvestment, rests fundamentally on the 
belief that South African economic growth, now and in a post-
apartheid future, will be constrained and damaged by being cut off 
from the stimulus of foreign capital and technology. Even more 
ironically, popular and left forces in South Africa have been so 
preoccupied with the struggle against apartheid, that they have not 
been overly concerned one way or the other with the question of the 
costs (or benefits) of South Africa's links with the world economy. 
On occasions they have indeed been hopeful that foreign pressure 
can topple the apartheid regime, disregarding entirely any 
consideration of the costs of repaying this 'favour' or 'debt' for 
the independence and autonomy of a post-apartheid South Africa. 
Despite some creative attempts by Legassick, the Poulantzians and 
others, questions about the nature and character of South Africa's 
insertion into the world economy, continue to be posed in terms of 
a dependency rubric, as even Kaplan I s 1983 piece illustrates. 
Whereas the great merit of this approach lies in focussing 
attention on the 'links between economic spaces in the world 
system', its weakness is that it is not concerned enough with 'the 
concrete conditions of capitalist accumulation, whether in the core 
or the periphery.' Lipietz has summarised the kernel of the 
dependency view as follows: 
The North needed the South as an outlet for the export of its 
surpluses. Also the wealth produced in the primary sector of 
the ~outh w~s transf~rred to the North through unequal exchange. 
Any ~ndustr~al emanc~pation of the South would have represented 
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an aggression against the Noratnho'utacnodmet.~~ North possessed the 
military means to avert such 
Dependency theory whilst no doubt an advance over earlier 
modernisation approaches,~ has in turn overschematised, dogmatized 
and generalised our thinking on these issues. It has failed to 
focus on the transformations which have occurred in the mode of 
regulating the world economic and financial system. Further it has 
largely failed to take account of the transformations in the 
production/consumption nexus and in the regulating mechanisms of 
capitalist accumulation within countries. 67 Nor has it been 
sufficiently concerned with the way in which global changes have 
been transmitted to specific countries; the way these in turn may 
produce both crises and opportunities for development; and the way 
in which domestic crises and changes again transform the dominant 
features~ nature" and character of a country's relations with the 
world economy. 
However, Paul Cammack has recently mounted a strong defence of 
dependency especially against the 'structure-functionalist and 
pluralist' consensus of Evans et al.~ Cammack's defence may equally 
be directed to 'left critics', who have correctly pointed to the 
limitations of the cruder versions of dependency and their 
refutation by latter day 'classical Marxists', what Cammack calls 
the 'black and white pictures presented by either Gunder Frank or 
Bill Warren ... ,69 In short he argues that in the major works of the 
classical marxists, including Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Gramsci, (as 
against their treatises on the Third World), and especially in more 
contemporary studies of dependencistas, such as Cardoso, who are 
lesser kn9wn in the English speaking world, there is to be found 
all the analytical sophistication and attention to national 
specificities and variations, the emphasis on history, comparative 
case studies, class differentiation, class conflicts and alliances 
" , 
and the role of the state, reputedly absent in the dependency 
approach. The critique of dependency, Cammack argues, is based on 
a "thoroughly misleading 'standard version' of the development of 
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the debate and the nature and deficiencies of 'dependency 
theory' ."70 
There is no doubt that the introduction of Cardoso-type variations 
and subtleties into 'dependency theory' contributes enormously to 
the analytical sophistication of studies of the insertion and 
interaction of nation states into the world economy. But for all 
this refinement, dependency approaches continue to comprehend a 
'concrete social formation ••. as a standardised, inevitable 
pattern. ,71 They insist on a schematization which tends to close and 
stultify explanations. They fail to capture crucial tendencies and 
changes over time and in character in the nature of capitalist 
accumulation in individual nation states, changes which have to be 
continuously 'found' in order that the system continues to work in 
the face of periodic crises. Neither has it dealt adequately with 
equally fundamantal changes in the regulation of the world economic . 
and financial system as a whole. Changes in the latter set of 
factors invariably have profound consequences for a country's links . 
with the world economy, as well as its own capacity to 'find' new 
correspondences between its production/consumption nexus and the 
institutions which evolved to support accumulation. Dependency 
approaches have failed adequately to account for these changes and 
problems. 
The ongoing debate around these issues has produced alternative 
explanations which focus on the development of crises and the 
conditions for renewal of accumulation in specific capitalist 
societies and the way these shape and (more likely) are themselves 
shaped by changes in the international institutional environment 
within which accumulation occurs. The French regulation school, 
which counts among its leading proponents, Alain Lipietz, Michel 
de Vroey and Michel Aglietta 72 has proposed the concepts of 
'regimes of accumulation' and modes of regulation (in the American 
version, ' social structures of accumulation I) to describe and 
capture these notions. 
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An accumulation regime is a particular combination of production 
and consumption which can be reproduced over time despite 
conflictual tendencies; and a mode of regulation refers to an 
institutional ensemble and complex of norms which can secure 
capitalist reproduction pro tempore despite the conflictual and 
antagonist character of capitalist social relations... [the] 
discovery of effective modes of regulation is an outcome of 
social and political struggles which stabilise to form a 
hegemonic system - class alliances, based on consensus armoured 
by coercion, which shape the interests both of the ruling ang 
dominated classes into conformity with the accumulation regime. 
These ideas and concepts are important in arriving at an 
understanding of a country's economic and financial links with the 
rest of the world. More particularly they help us to understand 
better the changes, both within specific social formations and the 
international eco~omy, and their interactions, referred to above.~ 
Dependency theorists showed correctly, argues Lipietz, that the 
existence of an unequal development of capitalism between 
nations, followed by the stabilisation of structures of 
exchange, favored fast accumulation in the advanced countries. 
There seemed to exist ... a regime of accumulation on the global 
scale with respect to which core/periphery polarization plays 
a regulating role.~ 
Dependency theory then goes on to argue that this 'regime' was 
imposed by the core upon dominated countries because it was 
necessary that some parts of the world take on the function of 
resolving problems of capitalist accumulation in the core, or that 
this 'regime' was imposed with the intent of resolving crises. 
Lipietz arg~es that the open-endedness of history, the class 
struggle, capitalist competition, the autonomy of national social 
formations and the sovereignty of states are among the factors 
which should warn us against making such functionalist 
propositions. For to do so 'would be to suppose that each 
compromise or each shift of power relations at a given place on 
earth corresponds to the necessary adjustments of a cybernetic 
system endowed with perfect homeostasis.' 76 Imperialism was not 
therefore 'created' to resolve contradictions in accumulation in 
the 'centre', but 'it continued to exist; it developed because, in 
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fact, it resolved them .•• only in [this] sense can it be said, 
things being what they are and history having its habits, that 
imperialism's function is to resolve these contradictions.,n 
Lipietz demonstrates that until World War 1, an extensive regime 
of accumulation (extension of the scale of production) based on 
the widened reproduction of capital goods dominated the 'core' 
capitalist countries. since World War 11, an intensive regime of 
accumulation (continuing reorganisation of work, the creation of 
production line methods and 4::he real subsumption of labour to 
capital) focussed on mass consumption. This reg~me of growth 
Lipietz calls Fordism, which was accompanied by an emerging new 
mode of regulation, institutionalisi ng mass consumption. This mode 
of regulation included the spread of collective bargaining, state 
provision of social services, easier access to credit etc. 78 By the 
end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, Fordism as a mode 
of capital accumulation, seemed to reach certain limits, not least 
of which was that productivity gains slowed. As ~ong as 
productivity gains were not present to offset rises in capital 
intensity and real wages, a crisis of profitability would set in. 
Any attempt to reduce mass buying power resulted in a recession, 
any increase cut into the rate of profit. 
Given that regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation change 
within a capitalist mode of production, (as noted above for core 
capitalist countries between the 1930s and 1970s) the futility of 
constructing a general theory of core-periphery relations on the 
basis of the articulation of modes of production itself becomes 
apparent. 
In the 1970s the emergence of the NICs, on the basis of strong 
authoritarian political regimes who chose economic strategies which 
capitalised on the advantage of abundant cheap labour to offset 
pressure on profit rates, demonstrated that 'exclusion from the 
virtuous circle of intensive accumulation was in no way final.'~ 
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In broad terms two strategies or schemes can be distinguished among 
these countries. The first, where products are mainly re-exported 
to the core, Lipietz refers to as 'bloody taylorization', which 
centres mainly around textiles and electronics industries with low 
technical compositions of capital, a l arge fema l e labour force and 
anti-worker repression. The second, he defines as peripheral 
Fordism, whose consumption-based growth rests on a combination of 
local middle class consumption, worker consumption of domestic 
durables and cheap exports to the core countries, but where 
qualified employment positions, for example in engineering remain 
external to the country. Though there is a marked variability among 
these countries they share the characteristic of having a strong 
internal market :for manufactured goods. Domestic manufacturing 
plays ' a significant role in the national regime of accumulation. 
The growth of the NICs has also been followed by an increase in 
trade between these countries and the rest of the 'south', the old 
raw material exporting countries, thereby introducing a further 
layer or stratification into the hi erarchy of the nations in the 
world economy. Significantly, the exports of the NICs to the south 
are in general, more sophisticated and capital intensive than its 
exports to the core countries. 
Given all these variations Lipietz concludes that 
[t]he Third World today appears as a constellation of particular 
cases with vague regularities constituted out of the fragments 
of the logic of accumulation (which proceeds well or badly 
depending on local circumstances) and tendencies that arise and 
fall over a few years without establ ishing any stable mode of 
regulation. 80 
In the 1970s, the development of peripheral fordism was enormously 
boosted by the explosive growth of the international financial 
market, following the sudden increase in the volume of disposable 
funds after the oil price hike of 1973. These surpluses, deposited 
in private international banks, 'were crying out for borrowers at 
any price ,81 what with the downturn in the advanced capitalist 
countries limiting ,new profitable sources in these established 
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centres. In this system the transfer of value to the core occured 
via debt interest charges, in addition to the earlier profit 
repatriation by multinational companies. 
This new global regulation of development by private banks allowed 
for much experimentation in the internal modes of regulation wi thin 
peripheral Fordist countries. Some 'chose' liberalism, others 
experimented with protectionism and rigorous planning, and 
different models coexisted in the same country. Mexico for example 
exported oil and labour, while making available to the USA along 
its border, a zone of sweatshops 'where bloody taylorization runs 
free' yet elsewhere developed peripheral Fordism. 82 
These developments in international financial markets and the 
variations in the economic performance of peripheral Fordist 
countries they allowed as. well as the problems tney subsequently 
posed, have combined to create serious difficulties for those 
explanations of 'core-periphery' relations in the post-1973 era, 
which remain within the broad dependency rubric. Since the late 
1960s there has been a noticeable decline in aid/grants, a decline 
in direct foreign investment and after 1973 especially, a dramatic 
growth in private international bank loans to developing countries. 
In many of these borrowing countries (an authoritarian) state used 
these loans to support its own, largely internally-determined 
development strategy. It could also use economic policy to 
encourage the private sector to borrow from transnational banks. 
These bank loans would then be used to support one or other model 
of development of the sort alluded to above. 
Now while it would appear that these foreign loans intensify 
'dependency' thereby strengthening the case of cruder versions of 
dependency theory (ie greater dependency on private banks, growing 
debt burdens and submission to IMF supervision), it is true that 
such loans have often strengthened the state and (at least 
temporarily) enhanced national development, as Stallings has 
demonstrated in some detail for Peru, for example. 83 For as Lipietz 
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shows 'when the loan is advanced to finance the import of capital 
goods, the bank prevalidates a given strategy for 
industrialisation, but it is the firm or state which choses the 
strategy.,M The growth of direct foreign investment outside the 
core capitalist countries in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s had 
occurred largely at the discretion of the investors and (usually) 
remained firmly under their control. The countries which 
'benefited' from this foreign investment undoubtedly lost some of 
their autonomy over economic questions. But the growth of the 
international financial markets and the increased lending of 
private international banks created th~ conditions for some of 
these countries to partially reverse this loss of autonomy. At the 
very least the nature of the dependency changes to one of financial 
dependency, which, as long as the country's credit rating stands 
up, is not incompatible with a greater degree of nationally (as 
against externally) based control over the strategy and directions 
of development. 
The slowdown in the growth rates of the advanced capitalist 
countries; the rise in global status of the OPEC countries; the 
explosion in international capital markets and in bank lending to 
peripheral Fordist countries; and the increase 'South-South' 
exchange, all combined by the late 1970s and early 1980s to 
introduce variations, subtleties and exceptions into the 
characterisation of the role and place of countries in the world 
economy which seriously upset the value and explanatory power of 
the simple dichotomy model of dependency. 
In particular the dependency approach fails to adequately account 
for shifts over time in regimes of accumulation and modes of 
regulation within capitalist social formations in the 'core' and 
'periphery', as well changes over time in the global regimes of 
accumulation (the move to flexible exchange rates; the emergence 
of private international bank regulation). 
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(7) CONCLUSION 
Looked at in terms of regulation theory, South Africa's post-war 
strategy combined an economic policy of import-substitution 
industrialisation with the social and political system of 
apartheid. Gelb refers to this mode of regulation as I racial 
Fordism',M for while accumulation occurred on the basis of linking 
extended mass production to mass consumption, on both sides these 
processes were restricted by racial and institutional factors. By 
the early 1970s this model began to break down, as did the 
international mode of regulating international monetary relations. 
The interaction of crisis and change in the international economy 
and the South African model of import substitution 
industrialisation led in the period 1970-1987 to very significant 
changes in this country's international financial relations. 
Though there appears to be a growing recognition of the strengths 
of regulation theory in contextual ising crises and change, it is 
important to point out that the debate over its relevance and 
explanatory power has only just begun.~ The usefulness of 
regulation theory in explaining the crisis in the South African 
political economy since 1973 has been pioneered by the researchers 
of the Economic Trends Group and this research has only just begun 
to attract a wider and critical aUdience. 87 Although critical of the 
usefulness of applying regulation theory in explaining domestic 
developments in the post-war South African economy, Nattrass, for 
one, nevertheless accepts that 'as a theoretical framework which 
stresses the inter-relationship between economic and socio-
political processes, it has some potential. It is after all, 
important that analysts of South Africa locate economic 
developments firmly within the parameters of apartheid institutions 
and structures.'~ 
This thesis is written in the language, and uses the conceptual 
tools and organising principles of regulation theory, which as the 
foregoing analysis has attempted to show, has certain advantages 
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over both modernisation and dependency approaches. However, given 
the continuing debate and controversy over its value and status as 
a theoretical paradigm,~ the strong case for its use here is not 
made, ie it is neither argued that regulation theory is the only 
theoretical foundation for understanding South Africa's 
international financial relations, nor that this study 'proves' the 
undoubted superiority of regulation theory over alternative 
explanations in all respects. Nevertheless, regulation theory does 
provide useful and incisive conceptual tools and ideas, centrally 
those of 'regimes of accumulation', and 'modes of regulation', to 
undertake such a task, and it is in this latter sense that the 
approach is used here. 
One of the greatest strengths of regulation theory is in 
conceptualising economic and socio-political change and crises over 
time in individual nation states and in the international economy 
as well as the interactions between these national and global 
dynamics. In the period this dissertation covers (1970-1987) the 
South African economy entered (and remains within) a crisis of a 
form distinguishable from its earlier long boom phase by the 'shift 
from a reproductive to a non-reproductive cyclical downswing,90 in 
1974. The major part of this study of the history, character and 
transformation of South Africa's international financial relations, 
is located against the background of this generalised crisis of 
accumulation and the struggle over the apartheid form of the South 
African state. But it is also located within changes and crises in 
the international mode of regulating monetary and financial affairs 
in the wake ' of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. In both 
South Africa and in the international economy we witness a period 
of struggle for a new order, for new modes of regulation and 
regimes of accumulation, to replace those set up at the end of the 
second World War. 
Within the context of these crises, IMF and private bank loans and 
credit . were critical in both a directly monetary and indirectly 
supportive sense, at specific moments of economic and political 
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tensions in South Africa. The actions of these institutions 
facilitated the process of state-led infrastructural and strategic 
investment and helped to alleviate politically':" induced tensions and 
allowed the space for the restoration of a climate of stability 
within which strategies of economi c regeneration and political 
reform aimed at subverting a more radical transformation to a post-
apartheid political and economic order were tested, albeit with 
varying degrees of success. The IMF's massive financial assistance 
to South Africa after the Angolan raid and Soweto uprising in 1976 
and again in 1982, and private bank loans and credit virtually 
throughout this period of orisis, with the exception of the months 
immediately after August 1985, are examples here. 
But at other moments in this period of South African economic 
history i IMF an~ private bank actions in themselves produced 
moments of severe economic and political tensions and instability. 
At these times the integument enveloping South Africa within an 
international economic network tightened to squeeze South Africa, 
whereas in other instances it stretched outwards in an 
accommodative way. The IMF and transnational banks operate on a 
broad canvas of often contradictory and conflicting demands and 
circumstances, so that their relationships with specific countries 
are not functionally fixed and unilaterally either supportive on 
the one hand or exploi tati ve and damaging on the other. Their 
actions vis-a-vis South Africa after 1983 (IMF) and in 1985/6 (the 
banks) are examples here. 
It is at these latter moments when the 'damaging' actions and 
policies of the IMF and banks coincide with a generalised crisis 
of accumulation and or political tensions that the underlying 
strengths or resilience of a country ' s economy are tested. In South 
Africa's case the actions of banks in 1985, following IMF 
restrictions in 1983, combined to expose the underlying crisis-
ridden nature of the economy, which their own supportive assistance 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL MODE OF REGULATION: FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE 
RATES, THE IMF AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL BANKS 
(1) INTRODUCTION 
In 1944 an international monetary system was established at Bretton 
Woods in the united States of America (US), which set up a way of 
regulating international economic relations. The system which 
emerged after much debate, was based on the strength of the US, 
both politically, economically and in terms of technolgical 
supremacy. In addition the US had largely escaped the worst 
consequences of the war. The dollar was substituted for gold as 
the main international currency for making payments and settling 
international debt. The value of currencies was linked to the 
dollar, which was in turn linked to gold at a fixed rate. The 
sys~em became known as the gold or fixed exchange rate system. 
A second foundation of the Bretton Woods system, apart from the 
hegemonic role of the US, was the successful operation of the 
monetary mechanism which was established. This monetary and 
financial mechanism facilitated and enhanced the expansion of world 
trade and industry in the post-war years, until the early 1970s. 
Its success in this period rested first on what Aglietta calls the 
'international monetary constraint' 1 and second on an adequate 
supply of international liquidity. The international monetary 
constraint operated in a 'very straightforward and drastic way 
through adjustments in the balance of payments. ,2 Central banks, 
which had a central role to play in the system had to settle dollar 
deficits in their balance of payments by drawing down their dollar 
reserves. This in turn restricted their room to manoeuvre on 
domestic macroeconomic policy and forced a tighter line on monetary 
and fiscal policy. In this way the deficit was absorbed. But the 
constraint was 'doubly asymmetric ,3, for surplus countries were 
able to 'sterilize' their surpluses, so avoiding the pressure of 
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adjusting their macroeconomic policies in the opposite direction. 
Thus a polarisation of surpluses and deficits, a 'cumulative 
process in which both deficit and surplus countries move deeper and 
deeper into their respective situations' 4 was also avoided. de 
Vroey notes that '[t]hanks to this mechanism, Fordism [the regime 
of accumulation based on assembly-line production and mass 
consumption, referred to in Chapter 1 above] was allowed to develop 
in the different countries without the disturbances brought about 
by systematic financial tensions.'s 
An adequate supply of international liquidity was ensured as long 
as the US ran a surplus on its basic balance, the net balance on 
current and long-term capital accounts. In essence this required 
the US to run persistent trade surpluses, through maintaining a 
high foreign demand for US goods and ensuring a low penetration of 
foreign goods into the US market. This system rested on the 
continuing technical superiority of US production over that of 
other cou.ntries. It also tended to restrict US macroeconomic 
policy, in the sense that such policy was called upon 
simultaneously to satisfy both an international function, ie 
ensuring international liquidity, and a regular domestic function. 
Given the exceptional growth of Japan and other factors, it was 
apparent that these conditions could not last forever. The 'seeds 
of disruption,6 in the post-war international mode of regulation, 
were there from the start. 
By the second half of the 1970s, after the oil price increase, the 
attempts to demonetise gold and the official acceptance of floating 
exchange rates, the US basic balance began to run into deficits -
and erratic deficits at that. Systematic polarisations in balance 
of payments deficts and surpluses, contrasted with the 'balances' 
of the 1960s; and there emerged gradually a private market for 
international credit which by its very nature eluded the regulation 
of the monetary authorities. As a result the international monetary 
system had 'been profoundly altered and is much more fragile as a 
result of a double change: the introduction of flexible rates and 
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the emergence of what Aglietta calls the 'international debt 
economy,.7 In this new dispensation, the role of private 
international banks and of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
has become critical, even if not always successful and positive. 
Under a system of flexible exchange rates, the (deflationary) 
adjustments needed to eliminate balance of payments deficits occurs 
through its expenditure-reducing and expenditure- switching 
effects. The former refers to the decline in real incomes as a 
resul t of the effects of depreciation on the pric~ level; the 
latter to the increase in the price of foreign goods relative to 
domestic goods which (invariably) follows a depreciation, and which 
therefore boosts ' the consumption of domestic goods. The move to 
flexible exchange rates had important implications for gold, which 
was no longer fixed in price, as under the gold-exchange system. 
For maj:or gold producing countries like South Africa, this 
flexibility in the gold price proved to be a major boost to its 
mining industry, as well as to the general economy, though as Kahn 
observed, 'the volatile nature of the gold price meant that the 
economy and the balance of payments had from time to time to adjust 
to the unpredictable and sometimes sharp swings in the gold 
price. ,8 
The emergence of an increasingly sophisticated international market 
for credit and loans, over which little or no monetary sovereignty 
exists, has allowed debtor countries greater freedom to manoeuvre. 
Deficits do not exert as ' much pressure for their elimination, as 
in the old mode of regulation, as they can now be turned into 
increased indebtedness. As de Vroey has noted 
national macroeconomic policies of deficit countries become more 
independent of foreign constraint (so decreasing one form of 
d7pe~d7ncy), ~u~ at the cost of a misperception of their own 
~l.qul.dl.~y posl.tl.on and a decrease in credit worthiness (so 
l.ncreasl.ng dependency of another form).9 
But the earlier autonomy of surplus countries is also affected. 
The by-passing or short circuiting of central bank control which 
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the (easy) availability of international credit has facilitated, 
has meant that surpluses can no longer be neutralised by central 
bank action. These surpluses now more directly affect national 
macroeconomic policy. Though the monetary constraint is reimposed 
in a different form where exchange rate misalignments persist, 
these adjustments have not necessarily been re-equilibrating, as 
the experience of systematic polarisations in deficits and 
surpluses since the mid-1970s has shown. 
In short, since the second half of the 1970s the international 
monetary system, which regulates international trade and capital 
movements has become less stabilising, extremely fragile and 
ambiguous. 10 If 
a generalised international financial cr~s~s has been avoided 
it is only because the international banking community has been 
aple to exhibit enough self-control, absence of panic, and 
flexibility in debt-rescheduling. 11 
But there are increasing signs that the banks will not be able to 
maintain this position for long. As we shall see later South Africa 
did not immediately benefit from such flexibility in rescheduling 
when it ran into considerable financial difficulties in August 
1985. The flexibility displayed by the international banks in the 
form of the 1987 debt-rescheduling agreement, followed the 
restoration of political stability after the domestic turmoil in 
1984-86. 
It is against the background of these broad changes in the mode of 
regulating the international economy that we now . need to examine 
more specifically the role, ideology, changing place and functions 
of the two central institutions of the international monetary 
system, ie the IMF and the private, transnational banks. The study 
of South Africa's international financial relations cannot proceed 
without a more detailed picture of developments on these fronts. 
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This chapter first traces the origins, functions and ideology of 
the IMF. It will attempt to analyse the factors which transformed 
the world economy in the 1970s and 1980s. It will trace the 
struggles by the IMF to come to terms with these altered 
circumstances, especially in the areas of exchange rate 
stabilisation and balance of payments adjustment processes. It will 
become apparent that in the period this study is centrally 
concerned with, that the IMF largely failed in its efforts to 
adjust successfully to the new conditions of the international 
economy. After much debate in the 1970s the IMF assumed the 
important supervisory role of disciplinarian or policeman to the 
international economic system. Its stamp of approval, became a 
critical precondition for bank loans to countries in need of 
external financial assistance. On occasion the implementation of 
the IMF's favoured deflationary policy package ran counter to the 
banks objectives, but in general the relationship between banks 
and the IMF over questions of financial support to developing 
countries worked well, though not without its ups and downs. Given 
the limited resources of the IMF, this complementary relationship, 
which facilitated lending to deficit countries was important in an 
era in which these countries desperately sought foreign financing. 
Obtaining the IMF's stamp of approval and accepting large amounts 
of bank loans was, however, not always costless as we shall see. 
Furthermore the IMF soon lost control over the extent and form of 
bank lending. 
As we shall see, the IMF was even less successful, in some of its 
other important roles. First, its restructuring programmes appeared 
t~ have had little or no success in promoting growth and employment 
in developing countries, and given an asymmetry in its adjustment 
methods, which we shall note later, its role in shaping economic 
policy and promoting economic growth, employment and incomes in the 
industrialised world was limited to say the least. Secondly, in an 
era of increasing conflict and rivalry between the US, Japan and 
Europe, the IMF's attempts at co-ordinating exchange rate policies 
and the management of floating exchange rates was to prove 
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particularly frustrating. Thirdly, it failed to create and sustain 
a climate of global financial stability, so essential to the smooth 
conduct of world trade and investment. This is most evident for 
example in the continuing problems created by the international 
debt crisis. Finally, its own lending (as against private bank 
loans) in supplementing member country reserves has proved to be 
inadequate in relation to the magnitude of these countries' balance 
of payments problems, despite the new special lending facilities, 
such as the Oil Facility and the Extended Fund Facility, created 
in this period. 
Part of the reasons for these failures, arose from the growth of 
the international financial markets, of bank lending, and the 
implications these essentially 'anarchic' developments had for 
controlling and co-ordinating international economic relations. 
Among the" problems arising from the rapid growth of international 
bank lending were: the unrestricted and legally or institutionally 
uncontrollable movement of private (financial) capital (by some 
measures there had been a decline in the mobility of productive 
capital 12); the role of private banks in funding balance of 
payments deficits; the continuous innovations in these markets 
which strengthened international banks regardless of national 
political boundaries and individual currencies; and (when the debt 
crisis set in) their individualistic and uncooperative response to 
ini tiati ves such as the Baker Plan, which called upon banks to 
increase lending to debt-ridden countries, at a time when they were 
intent on stabilising and reducing their exposure in such 
countries. This chapter examines the forces which created the 
massive growth of international bank lending. It also comments 
briefly on the problems these developments posed for the emergence 
of a new and successful international mode of regulation. 
The altered circumstances of the international economy after 1970 
and the changes, experiments, successes and failures of adjustment 
to these new conditions are, it is argued, better analysed within 
the parameters of regulation theory. This is particularly true in 
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understanding the changing role of the IMF and banks. At one level, 
dependency proponents tend to see the IMF as an all powerful and 
monolithic institution, designed for, capable of and highly 
successful at manipulating international financial affairs in the 
interests of the major capitalist countries, especially the US. 13 
As as we shall see this functionalist notion may be correct only 
in a narrow and particular sense. But whatever its objectives, it 
will become clear that in the altered circumstances of the post-
Bretton Woods era, the organisation has not always been noted for 
being highly successful in carrying out its tasks. This failure has 
been a central factor in perpetuating international monetary and 
financial instability in the 1970s and 1980s. It may be more 
correct to characterise the IMF in this period as an international 
agency which, while powerful and influential in relation to 
developing country borrowers, was at the same time undergoing the 
usual problems of transformation, uncertain about its role, 
searching for a new role, hesitant in carrying out its functions, 
and with a membership sometimes at loggerheads, given conflicting 
national interests in the post-1973 global economy. 
Furthermore, dependency approaches emphasise and tend to seek 
uniformity, regularity and homogeneity in relations between (on 
the one hand) the advanced capitalist countries and international 
financial organisations they dominate and (on the other) developing 
countries, as the former set about the systematic underdevelopment 
of the latter. Such approaches fall short in explaining deviations 
from the unambiguous black and white patterns and images they have 
constructed "to explaining relations between sets of countries in 
the world economic system. Regulation theory, on the other hand, 
is better balanced, consciously seeking explanations which uncover 
both the beneficial and detrimental features and effects of a 
country's integration into the world economy. It is comfortable in 
coping with change, uncertainty, subtlety, uniqueness and crises. 
For regulation theory focuses directly on the processes of crises 
and change. The post-Bretton Woods era, was very much an era of 
crisis and change as the struggle to respond to altered 
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circumstances and to produce a new international mode of regulating 
international economic relations, dominated discussions and debate 
at the IMF, corporate boardrooms and elsewhere. 
(2) THE IDEOLOGY AND ROLE OF THE IMF IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
RELATIONS. 
The IMF together with the World Bank are the two key public 
financial institutions in the world economy. Both organisations 
were planned as specialised agencies within the United Nations 
system at the UN Monetary and Financial conference at Bretton Woods 
in 1944, and the IMF was formally established on 27 December 1945. 
The original functions of the IMF are set out in article 1 of the 
Article of Agreement under which the fund was established. 
According to this article the purposes of the IMF are: 
1) to promote international monetary cooperation through a 
permament institution which provides the machinery for consultation 
and collaboration on international monetary problems. 
2) to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance 
of high levels of employment and real income and to the development 
of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives 
of economic policy. 
3) to promote exchange rate stability, to maintain orderly exchange 
arrangements among members and to avoid competitive exchange 
depreciation'. 
4) to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of 
payments in respect of current transactions between members and in 
the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the 
growth of world trade. 
5) to give confidence to members by making the general resources 
of the fund temporarily available to them under adequate 
safeguards, thus providing them with the opportunity to correct 
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maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to 
measures .destructive of national or international prosperity. 
6) in accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen 
the degree of disequilibrium in the international balance of 
payments. 14 
The IMF presently consists of 152 members who are classified for 
analytical purposes as well as in order to determine their 
eligibility to receive financial assistance from special 
facilities, as either 'industrial' or 'oil exporting' or 'non-oil 
developing countries' etc. 15 There also exist sub-categories, such 
as 'non-oil developing countries', who are also 'major exporters 
of manufactures',' in which sub-category South Africa for example 
is presently classified. The IMF has developed a set of criteria 
for clas~ifying countries, but finding common and consistent 
characteristics is difficult if not impossible. There could for 
example be some argument about whether South Africa is a 
'developing' country or not, even whether it is a major exporter 
of manufactured goods. This vagueness can produce anomalous 
situations and as we shall see in Chapter 4, South Africa was able 
to use this vagueness to its advantage in one or two instances. 
The IMF's primary overarching aim is to facilitate the growth of 
world trade, which is held to be crucial to the need to generate 
'high levels of employment and real income and the development of 
the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of 
economic policy.' The major instrument by which the Fund attempts 
to meet this objective is through loans to members who experience 
short-term balance of payments difficulties, ie those countries 
unable to earn enough foreign exchange to pay for the imports they 
need. Despite its nearly 50 year history, however, it was only in 
the 1970s, (ironically) at the end of the (fixed) dollar-exchange 
system established at Bretton Woods, in the wake of the oil price 
hike of 1973 and the subsequent balance of payments problems 
experienced by oil-importing countries, that the IMF came to the 
forefront of public attention. For as the post-war mode of 
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regulating the world economy collapsed and problems of accumulation 
overtook both developed and developing countries, many countries 
were forced to turn to the IMF for financial assistance. In many 
instances this assistance was provided after a stabilisation 
programme satisfactory to the IMF was agreed upon. Such a programme 
often dramatically altered the national economic priorities and 
strategies of borrowing countries. Thus the IMF soon became in this 
way one of the most powerful international organisations of the 
twentieth century, decisively influencing, the well-being of the 
majority of the world's population, especially those living in the 
'Third World'. 
The position that the IMF came to occupy in the 1970s , was a far 
cry from that envisaged at Bretton Woods. The growth in private 
bank lending to developing countries after the 1970s was one factor 
which accounted for this change in the IMF's position in the world 
economy. The funds available to the IMF have 
become dwarfed by the huge growth of those (reserves) associated 
with private international financial markets. No longer the 
major source of financing of balance of payments deficits, the 
IMF became responsible for negotiating the terms of a small 
pilot loan and the successful completion of the negotiations 
would be a signal for frivate banks to provide the bulk of the 
new finance required.' 
Thus the influence and weight of the IMF derives not because it 
lends much money but because the granting of its pilot loans to a 
developing country is the key that can open the door to the private 
international bank loans and bilateral (tied) aid-grants that most 
developing countries need to stay afloat. For the Fund does not 
provide deficit countries with SUfficient foreign exchange to 
facilitate medium to long-term economic adjustment, but only enough 
to stave off short-term collapse. That seal of approval, as it 
were, as well as subsequent private international capital inflows, 
is in general given to countries prepared to accept changes in 
their economic policy (and implicitly in their development goals 
and strategy) which the IMF demands. The Fund's criteria for 
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granting this approval are not only technical. They invariably 
include ideological preferences against import controls, exchange 
and price control as well as consumer subsidies, though 
significantly the Fund is usually not opposed to wage control. 
Green, however, argues that the ideological element in the IMFs 
policy is rather overstressed and that the two most consistent 
strands in IMF policy prescription, ie. favouring devaluation and 
opposing consumer subsidies 'do not add up to any standard 
political, political-economic or economic ideology.' Nevertheless 
he accepts that the 
IMF is prone to be sure it knows best, to generalise from a 
limited number of cases, to be selective in the use of data 
(especially when available data are fragmentary, conflicting 
and of doubtful accuracy) and rigid in presenting its case, not 
least in its occasional dialogue with friendly critics ... That 
is in a real sense an ideology, but not what is normally meant 
by ideological controversy about IMF prescriptions ... '7 
Whether ideological or not in this sense, IMF intervention and 
prescription, especially since the late 1970s, appears from the 
evidence to reflect an enormous power (a power not proportional to 
the financial assistance it provides) over the direction of 
international financial relations and especially over the 
development strategies and policies of many developing countries. 
The Latin American Bureau (LAB) argues that the IMF is 
the channel that western nation's use to supply that financial 
support and impose the conditions on deficit countries that 
reinforce those development strategies approved by the West. 
Thus the IMF is one of the key instruments for determining how 
LDC's approach their development problems.'8 
This is not to suggest, however, that the role of the IMF derives 
from some plot or conspiracy - us or otherwise - against the 
peoples of the world - although it often looks that way given the 
effect . on developing countries and the dominance of the US in the 
IMF. (We shall return to this point in the conclusion of this 
section) However, as even the IMF's official historian has noted, 
the organisation's concern with politically sensitive subjects such 
as exchange rates and exchange restrictions mean that the fund was 
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bound to be politically controlled. 19 And that control is exercised 
by the large western industrial nations - most notably the US - and 
derives from the dominance of the US and other western industrial 
nations in the voting and hence decision-making process that is 
exercised by the twenty-two person Executive Board of the IMF -
where the real power rests. Brett has identified four voting groups 
within the IMF. 20 The first consists only of the US, which alone 
controls nearly 20pc of the vote. A second group consists of the 
powerful west European nations, including France, the united 
Kingdom (UK) and · the Federal Republic of West Germany (FRG) who 
hold about 28pc of the votes. A third category consists mainly of 
'intermediate' cc;>untries, who are represented on the Executive 
Board by richer nations, for example Spain. ,+he final group 
consists of the developing countries, but includes Saudi Arabia. 
The US, UK, FRG, France, Japan and Saudi Arabia are permanent 
members of the Executive Board. Fifteen members are elected by 
various country groupings and vote on behalf of all the countries 
in their group, no split votes being allowed. China is a permanent 
member of the Executive Board in its own right, ie it does not 
represent any other country or group of countries. 
The decline in US hegemony and the rapid growth of Japan as an 
economic and financial power in the 1970s and 1980s, has not yet 
filtered into changes at the IMF, where US domination remains 
uncontested. There is little evidence of recognition at the IMF 
and the central banks of the US and Europe of the growth of 
Japanese po~er in international financial affairs. It seems 
'strangely anachronistic' that the power structure established at 
Bretton Woods, has only been marginally altered, in the face of 
major changes in the balance of economic power relations since the 
mid-1970s. 21 Given all this it should be no surprise that developing 
countries exercise only a very I imi ted influence in the Fund's 
decision-making process. A totally united group of developing 
countries (in practice very hard to achieve) representing nearly 
65pc of the total popUlation of the IMF countries can muster no 
more than 45pc of the votes. And the US has an effective veto on 
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major changes in IMF policy (including the allocation of votes) as 
such decisions require a 85pc majority. It has also become 
traditional that a summit meeting of the leaders of the biggest 
western industrialised nations, either the G5 or G7, is held prior 
to the annual IMF meeting. Major changes in IMF policy are 
invariably settled at such meetings, making the IMF meeting itself 
a mere formality. In recent years, however, and reflecting the 
tensions of an unsettled international mode of regulation, there 
have eme~ged differences among the major industrialised nations 
about issues such as how to deal with trade imbalances, exchange 
rate co-ordination and the like, as well as to some extent over how 
to deal with the debt crisis. 
Yet control over the direction of international financial and 
economic ' relations still rests with the major industrialised 
countries. At the IMF, this control, which derives principally from 
their voting strength, is reinforced in numerous other ways. These 
include the fact that it is an uncontested tradition that the 
Fund's managing director is a west European and his deputy is a US 
ci tizen and that IMF staff members even those from developing 
countries are trained in the conservative tradition of the IMF and 
invariably support the united states position. Johnson comments 
that there is a strong tendency for IMF and us Treasury staff to 
be 'virtually interchangeable and even non-US staff tend to be 
selected on grounds of their congeniality to the us viewpoint. ,22 
Thus given the inherently political nature of the IMF and its 
dominance by the Western industrial nations it should not be 
surprising that it began to playa central role as the 'financial 
sheriff' of the West and especially of the private international 
banks which until recently lent vast sums of funds to developing 
countries. As Abdulla concludes 
Through app;opriat: ?ond~tions for its stand-by agreement and 
the country s stab~l~sat~on programme, the Fund imposes on the 
b~rrower the behaviour patterns which reassures transnational 
f~nance and the West as a whole. Governments which agree to be 
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economically timorous, socially conservative and p?l~tically 
docile can thus hope to obtain from the I~F a cert1f1~ate of 
good behaviour, which is then s~posed to g1ve a green l1ght to 
purveyors of commercial credit. 
The principle of political neutrality, which the IMF espouses, is 
thus a totally deceptive one. For the IMF military dictatorships, 
including South Korea and Brazil are sometimes considered 
exemplary. It was, for example only after the overthrow of the 
Unidad popular that co-operation with Chile was regarded as 
satisfactory. Given its origins within a particular configuration 
of power relations and its evolving role within the post-war global 
economy, the IMF . in practice, has found it easier to deal with 
undemocratic, authoritarian governments who are likely to have 
fewer qualms about executing the specific policies which are the 
inevi tabl.e consequence of the IMF' s monetaristic, laissez-faire 
philosophy. A member of the IMF staff is reported to have said to 
Rolf Knieper, 'not without a certain pride', that 
the establishment of the military dictatorship in Ghana was the 
direct consequence of an IMF mission: a democratic government 
organized along parliamentary lines would have been incapable 
of effecting the stipulated course of action with due severity. 24 
Despite their unhappiness with IMF prescriptions (and the 
occasional attempt to challenge the IMF and private banks 25) many 
developing countries have had little choice, given their 
integration into networks of world trade and investment, and the 
limited, virtually non-existent sources of alternative credit but 
to remain members of the IMF. Membership of the Fund became 
crucial, in the conditions of the post-1973 international economy, 
to the continued flow of loans from Western countries and major 
international institutional sources. Many developing countries are 
told by Western governments and private international banks that 
no rescheduling of debt or provision of credit would be made 
without a prior agreement with the IMF. Those that resisted 
(Jamaica, Nigeria, Tanzania, for example, at different times) found 
themselves facing severe economic and political crises. 
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Even Warsaw Pact countries such as Poland, Rumania and Hungary 
which have significant trading and debt exposure to the West have 
had little choice but to join the IMF, in order to qualify for 
further loans or to have their debts reschedul ed. Since 1986, there 
have been suggestions that the USSR was considering joining the 
IMF.26 In Poland's case, for example, private international banks 
were not prepared to grant it further unsecured loans or begin debt 
rescheduling talks unless Poland applied for IMF membership and so 
allowed its 'reconstruction programme' to be monitored by its so-
, t ' t t' 1 v called 1ndependen 1n erna 10na agency. 
However, while m~st countries have little choice but to go along 
with IMF conditions, the benefits of such associations (especially 
to the dominated classes) are dubious to say the least. It is far 
from clear that the objectives contained in Article I of the IMF 
statutes - balanced growth of world trade, higher levels of 
employment and rising real incomes have been facilitated by the 
IMF's method of operation - in particular the austerity programme 
that is the usual precondition for loans or access to private 
loans. On the contrary as Knieper observes, 
mass unemployment, pauperization and inflation are frequently 
the consequences of such austerity programmes. Moreover, there 
has so far been no indication that these negative consequences 
are merely the trade off for a long-term economic recovery: not 
one of the countries included in the IMF programmes can be cited 
as proof for the postulate that employment levels and real 
incomes rise following a preceding phase of 'purging' 
austerity. 28 
IMF .' assistance' therefore is hardly renowned for its success -
except of course if one views this from the perspect{ve of Western 
capitalist interests and those national capitals and states who use 
the IMF adjustment programmes as a justification for 
rationalization, cutting social programmes, pushing down wage rates 
and similar anti -working class austerity measures. This latter 
point must not be lost sight of. At the level of domestic politics, 
it is often convenient to make the IMF the scapegoat f~r 
'austerity'. As Lipietz notes, 29 'everyone-including the left _ 
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admits in private that the irresponsibility of .•. local leaders 
(sometimes makes) austerity inevitable.' 
No one, especially those resident in developing countries which 
have had to live under conditions of economic austerity imposed by 
IMF conditionality, doubts the power and influence of the IMF in 
international economic relations. That the IMF is dominated by the 
US, which continues to maintain an influence at the IMF no longer 
proportionate to its relative power in international economic 
affairs is also not in doubt. The dominance of the U~ and other 
European countries has allowed for the continued exercise of IMF 
power in favour ~f a particular view of development, one which 
generally favours the promotion of free-market ideologies. But 
strategic and political considerations also, as the South African 
experience will demonstrate, shape the IMF's view and support even 
in cases where a country':s economi c policies may deviate from 
'strict IMF orthodoxy.' 
The exercise of this particular brand of power and influence within 
the world economy, does not imply that the IMF has been successful 
in terms of the objectives originally laid down in its Articles. 
As we have noted already, it has hardly been successful in 
promoting growth, employment and incomes in developing countries. 
In contrast to the post-war boom, most of the period after 1970 has 
not been one which has been characterised by robust growth and 
employment even among the major industrialised countries. Nor has 
the IMF bee~ entirely successful in adjusting to the very changed 
circumstances of the post-1970 international economy. Adjusting to 
these new circumstances, ie facilitating the emergence of a new 
mode of regulating international economic relations, has been 
clearly identified as being a central task of the IMF after c1971. 
Amendments to its Articles first initiated in 1974 and made 
effective in 1978 and discussions over new guidelines for 
conditionality finalized in March 1979 are evidence of this search 
for a new role for the IMF. Despite these discussions, Buira has 
argued that the IMF entered the 1980s 'equipped with a set of 
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intellectual techniques and practices intended for and inherited 
from the very different international economic environment of the 
Bretton Woods system. ,30 This is most apparent in the areas of 
exchange rate co-ordination, balance of payments adjustment, the 
adequacy of its lending, and the 'control of international bank 
lending. Each of these four issues will be discussed in turn. 
The period 1970-1985, was one in which the role of the IMF was 
continually revised, often in an ad hoc manner. Its role as 
determined at Bretton Woods in 1944 arose out of an international 
economic environment that was based on fixed exchange rates. It 
was on that foundation that the IMF functioned from the end of 
World War II to 1971. The period immediately after the 1~ August 
1971 decision of the US to unpeg the dollar from gold (ie. 
effective.!y dismantling the fixed exchange rate regime established 
at Bretton Woods) was characterised by a great deal of uncertainty 
and ad hoc policy measures and actions in international economic 
relations. The IMF's response to the ending of Bretton Woods was 
not always conducive to promoting confidence in exchange rate co-
ordination and policy making. Despite a de facto floating exchange 
rate system, the "IMF only officially recognised floating rates in 
1976 and only then abolished the official price of gold. 31 The new 
guidelines for the IMF policy in regard to exchange rates and other 
issues, first discussed in 1974, proposed that the Fund exercise 
'firm surveillance' over the exchange rate policies of its members 
and adopt 'specific principles' for the guidance of its members on 
these policies. By 1976 the IMF had not worked out these 
principles. As the Economist noted this was 'an admission of 
confusion, if not of total defeat ... ,32 
It is true that the Fund's ability to exercise surveillance over 
floating exchange rates and to establish principles for member 
countries on exchange rate policies has been .complicated by the 
extreme cyclical fluctuations of currencies and the increasing 
degree of unilateral ism which floating exchange rates have 
promoted. The need for member countries to adopt policies in regard 
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to exchange rates, which take account of their impact on the smooth 
functioning of the international economy, a central characteristic 
of the Bretton Woods system, has not been urgent or even necessary 
under floating exchange rates. 33 The result, as Flight and Lee-
Swan note, is that by the mid-1980s , 'floating exchange rates are 
being blamed for the world's new economic problems and many . are 
calling for some form of fixed exchange rate management. ,34 This 
search for a new order was apparent for example in the attempt by 
central bankers to achieve exchange rate stability by unlimited 
foreign exchange intervention. (The 1987 Louvre Accord) 
The demise of US hegemony, and the gradual emergence of three new 
power blocs in the international economy (the US, Western Europe 
and Japan, each with different views on the way to deal with the 
problems . of the international economy) has also complicated 
decision making at the IMF and at G5, G7 and G10 meetings. : While 
they seem to agree on the broad ideological orientation and role 
of the IMF in the world economy, the twenty or so IMF Executive 
Directors have had such a variety of differing proposals over 
questions such as an appropriate exchange rate policy and balance 
of payment adjustment mechanism, that they could not agree on any 
one proposal. 35 There are numerous obstacles in the way of a return 
to fixed exchange rates. These include, in the main, the size and 
influence of the international financial market which flourishes 
in the climate of low surveillance and minimal control made 
possible by the floating rate system. It is equally clear, however, 
that floating exchange rates, have not been an unambiguous success 
in regulating exchange rate policies. The IMF has therefore largely 
failed in successfully introducing and maintaining an exchange rate 
system so essential to stabilising a new mode of regulating 
international economic relations. As we have already noted, 
maintaining exchange rate stability is a central function of the 
IMF and is clearly set out in its Articles of Agreement. 
The IMF has also not been very successful in establishing and 
stabilising another crucial aspect of its reponsibilities as the 
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primary financial institution regul ating international economic 
relations, ie in developing a successful process of adjustment to 
balance of payments imbalances. The broad mechanisms for such 
adjustment under fixed and floating rates were noted at the outset 
of this chapter. Under floating rates part of this adjustment is 
directly via changes in the exchange rate, and floating rates have 
made it hard for the Fund to exercise control over domestic 
economic policies affecting a sovereign country's exchange rates, 
let alone the· exchange rate itself, as we have noted above. The IMF 
has failed to strike the proper balance between handling deficits 
in balance of payments through adjustment of economic policies as 
against itself f~.mding such deficits. In the 1970s finance was 
relatively more available and more use was made of this mechanism, 
whereas the problem has become acute in the 1980s, as the 
availability of funds from the IMF and banks have dried up relative 
to the size of the deficits and in the wake of the debt crisis. 
It has 'also not been possible to achieve symmetry as between 
members with deficits and those with surpluses nor between 
developing and developed countries. As de Vries notes 
Since 1977 only developing members have used the Fund's 
resources and there is an understandable perception of asymmetry 
between developing and industrial members in that the 
conditionality applied to the use of the Fund's resources has 
significantly affected developing members, while surveillance 
under Article 1V ••• seems to have had little practical effect on 
the large industrial members. 36 
One of the most vigorous criticisms levelled at the IMF since the 
early 1970s, has been over the paltry sums it has lent and 
continues to lend to deficit countries in the developing world. in 
terms of objective five of its Articles of Agreement. In the 1970s 
Britain, for example was a major beneficiary, and as we shall see 
South Africa was a major beneficiary, even as late as 1982, when 
it was not always clear that South Africa qualified as a 
'developing country.' The growth of bank lending and (for a time) 
the largely successful co-operation between the IMF and the banks, 
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in a sense bailed the IMF itself out of this problem. As the 
Economist, noted, 'the IMF (has) played too small a part in helping 
to finance the huge $37 billion deficit in 1975 of the non-oil 
developing countries. The role of lender of last resort to the poor 
countries fell on private banks, and far too many last resorts 
there were.' 37 
The growth of bank lending, and the IMF's failure to control bank 
lending in the late 1970s and early 1980s, fuelled the debt crisis, 
which created an instability and uncertainty in the conduct of 
international economic relations. Though less likely to induce a 
collapse of the i .nternational economic system, such as it is, the 
debt crisis and the instability and uncertainty it has generated, 
persists to this day. If, as we would hold, the existence of a 
climate of stability, is a crucial element of an international 
regulatory apparatus, then again the IMF has fallen short in its 
role, especially in the 1980s. The build-up of the debt crisis 
itself is discussed in the following section of this chapter. 
In summary, we have argued in this section that the IMF has become 
powerful and influential, mainly vis-a-vis developing countries, 
who are forced to turn to it in times of external economic 
difficulty - either to seek its loans or its stamp of approval 
which has become a precondition for private bank loans. The needs 
of developing countries in this regard have been high, and the 
significance of the IMF's role decisive, in the period since the 
oil crisis of 1973. It is also clear , however that the IMF has been 
less successful in harmonising its role within and stabilising a 
new international financial and monetary order to replace the 
system established at Bretton Woods in 1944, which finally 
collapsed in the early 1970s. This latter point has been 
illustrated in relation to the four issues discussed above. 
One final point briefy referred to earlier in this Chapter needs 
to be clarified before we conclude this general discussion on the 
IMF. It concerns what might at first appear to be a highly 
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functionalist interpretation of the role of the IMF in the post-
war global economy. The IMF was not in the first instance 
consciously planned only to advance accumulation or resolve crises 
in capitalist industrial countries. Nor to take the obverse case 
was it planned to secure the underdevelopment of the 'Third World' 
in this cause. In a sterilised form the principles underlying the 
IMF's foundation, its objectives, and in many cases, even its 
prescription of financial discipline, are intrinsically sound, 
judged against most developmental criteria. The problem centres 
largely 'upon how the IMF, or more precisely the team of orthodox 
technocrats which make it up plays its role. ,38 
Given certain historical, economic and pol i tical imbalances in 
international power relations in the immediate post-war period, it 
develope~ in practice that this team of technocrats have generally 
come to support a particular view : of development and of 
development goals and a set of policies to achieve these targets. 
The weight and power of the US has, in ways already noted, ensured 
its predominance in IMF decision-making. In practice therefore, the 
IMF as a central institution within the global post-war mode of 
regulation took on, deepened and extended its lending and 
supervisory role in a way which stabilised and advanced a 
particular dominant economic and political configuration. In short, 
the IMF's role as an institution within the global mode of 
regulation became harmonised and stabilised within the post-war 
Fordist regime of accumulation. The relationship helped to ensure 
a relatively crisis-free reproduction of social relations for the 
long post-war boom. But the relationship continued to exist and 
developed in that form, because in fact it succeeded in ensuring 
a relatively crisis-free accumulation. To argue further that the 
IMF was specifically created with the intention to resolve crises 
in capitalist accumulation would be functionalist in the extreme. 
But even if it was deliberately created to perform this kind of 
'sinister' role, we would argue that circumstances arose after 1970 
Which seriously affected its ability to do so successfully. 
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In the post-1973 period for example, the IMF struggled to adjust 
its policies and overall role in an era of decline in US hegemony, 
the emergence of new economic powers, a new floating system of 
exchange rate determination and a rapid growth of private bank 
credit and bond issu~nce. In the wake of these problems the IMF 
found itself searching for a new role and mode of operation in an 
attempt to cope with conditions not anticipated at its founding 
nearly half a century ago, while still attempting to fulfil its 
tasks. In analysing the role of the IMF in the world economy, one 
is therefore practicing no more than an ' a posteriori 
functionalism' .39 Everthing works (to paraphrase Lipietz for the 
purposes of this example 40) as if the IMF was planned and designed 
for the express purpose of promoting accumulation in the 'centre' 
and underdevelopment in the 'periphery'. 
(3) THE LENDING SYNDROME: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND CREDIT SINCE 
THE 1970s 
Private international or transnational banking had its or~g~ns in 
the financing of trade and the outflows of capital, mainly from 
Britain to its colonies, in the middle of the 19th century. The 
internationalisation of banking was reinforced by the 
centralisation and concentration of capital after 1880. However 
the more rapid development of such banking activity only occurred 
after World War II. After the war, the larger United States banks 
opened overs,eas branches, especially in Europe, to service the US 
multinational corporations which began to penetrate the economies 
of Europe, and later Asia, Latin America and Africa. And so the 
increasingly international organizations of production triggered 
the development of an international financial market, in which 
dollar~denominated lending and borrowing became a central feature. 
If a bank in Europe lent in dollars it could, by' being European-
based, escape the banking regulations of its home country and 
because loans and other financial transactions were denominated in 
dollars it fell outside the regUlations of any European government. 
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Because this 'market' developed in Europe it became generally known 
as the Euromarket. This Eurocurrency (predominantly Eurodollar) 
market thus developed out of the new conditions of accumulation in 
the post-world War II capitalist world economy. 
The Eurodollar market was stimulated by the dollar reserves of the 
USSR and China, who, since 1949, sought European-based banks for 
their dollar reserves, where they could not be impounded by the US 
government. US banking regulations - such as Regulation Q, which 
imposed a ceiling of the interest rate that banks could pay for 
deposits in the US - provided a further impetus to the growth of 
the Euromarket as US companies deposited any idle earnings in the 
Euromarket where the interest rate was not controlled. 
However, .while the international banking sector, especially the 
Euromarket continued to grow during the 1960s, it was only in the 
period after 1973 that it came to play a predominant role in 
international capital movements. Up until then it was still widely 
believed that banking was in the main a national, rather than an 
international phenomenon. Writing in 1967, for example, that doyen 
of banking studies, Richard Sayers, commented that 'banking 
organisation does not easily straddle national frontiers', so that, 
'the banking business of the world is organised in the main on 
national lines,.41 In the time since Sayer wrote that, a remarkable 
transformation has occurred in the field of international banking. 
Banking is now highly international and becoming more so daily. 
Importantly too, international banking is now extremely innovative 
and no previously concei ved hurdle or barrier to its further 
internationalisation appears insurmountable. 
In the relatively stable macroeconomic environment guaranteed by 
the post-war global mode of regulation, banks and other financial 
institutions and the attendant regulatory arrangements, primarily 
reflected domestic concerns. Increased uncertainty about 
macroeconomic conditions and growing fiscal and current account 
imbalances, forced changes in financial systems and arrangements 
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by the early 1970s. The abandonment of fixed exchange rates was 
accompanied by a rapid expansion of cross-border financial flows, 
and by an increased variability in real and nominal exchange rates. 
These developments were to continue in varying degrees in the 
floating exchange rate era which followed. The uneven pattern of 
economic activity, higher and variable rates of inflation, growing 
sectoral and international payments imbalances and finally profound 
technological advances in telecommunications and data processing, 
all contributed to the changes in the nature of financial systems 
and regulations. In particular these general conditions and 
circumstances stimulated the growth of international bank credit 
and bond issues after c1973. 42 
Several specific factors account for the rapid growth and 
diversification in lending, especially to developing countries, 
after 1973. These include on the supply side, the recession in the 
advanced capitalist countries since c1971 which curtailed loan 
demand there; the abandonment of more conservative banking practice 
in favour of a more aggressive approach at about this time and the 
high profits earned from lending to some countries, although banks 
often operated on small margins in the early 1970s. On the demand 
side the principal factors stimulating international banking 
operations included the ever increasing demand from developing 
countries seeking balance of payments financing after OPEC I and 
the inadequacy, inflexibility and social and political costs often 
associated with borrowing from the IMF. Analysts differ, however, 
in the importance they assign to these supply and demand factors 
in affecting international bank lending and bond issuance after the 
early 1970s. Let us briefly examine these factors as they unfolded 
in the international economy of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Growing unemployment and inflation throughout the industrialized 
countries led to a decline in investment opportunities in these 
countries. International banks suddenly faced with a shortage of 
'high quality' borrowers in these industrialized countries began 
to lend, at rates of interest they would never have considered in 
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more prosperous times, to a select group of rapidly growing middle-
income developing countries includi ng Brazil, South Korea and 
Mexico, 'whose strong economic performance at that time was based 
on the extraordinarily rapid growth of international trade and 
buoyant commodity prices which marked the final stages of the post-
war boom. ,43 Low interest rates (both nominal and real) and low 
surveillance because private international bank loans came 
without the strings usually attached to, say official IMF loans 
and credits - encouraged those mi ddle-income developing countries 
to borrow. 44 
The 1973 oil price increase set off a quantum leap in private 
international bank lending. Those banks faced with a cqmbination 
of very large inflows of funds from the OPEC countries and a 
, relatively modest credit demand from domestic customers' 45 were 
happy to finance the enormous i ncrease in loan demand from oil-
importing developing countries attempting to finance their 
increased oil deficits. They did th i s by transforming relatively 
short-term deposits into long-term loans through the technique of 
roll-over credits. With little or no control over their activities 
private ' international banks continued lending vast amounts to 
developing countries in the mid to late 1970s. 'Bankers were quite 
literally falling over one another in their attempts to press new 
loans on developing countries' 46 • 
Bankers' risks were to some extent reduced by the introduction of 
variable int~rest rates on loans. However, this had the (negative) 
effect of making borrowers more vulnerable to increases in interest 
rates. The growth of syndicated loans, where hundreds of banks 
shared the risk of any single loan, further reduced the risk to any 
bank but increased competition between banks to lend to developing 
countries. This led to a general and gradual lengthening (from 5 
to 15 years) in the terms of loans, while spreads (charges over and 
above the market rate of interest, usually LIBOR, the London 
interbank offer rate) were squeezed narrower. In this period (1974-
1978) international banks appeared to pay little attention to 
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borrowing countries economic/political situations and policies, and 
took little account of what those borrowers did with the funds. 
Under such easy conditions, middle-income and some poorer, 
developing countries, especially in Latin America, tended to 
overborrow and a number of oil-exporting countries, including 
Nigeria, Indonesia and Mexico, also took advantage of the ready 
availability and low-cost of loans to embark on economic expansion 
plans. 
Table 4, illustrates the high level of loan flows from Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks to Latin American, 
other developing .and East European, countries in the period 1979-
1981 and its dramatic decline thereafter. 
Various factors contributed to the critical deterioration of the 
international loan and financial market after 1982 as : interest 
rates increased and there was a sudden fall in the number of 
longer-term loans available to developing countries. There was 
firstly the 'unfavourable' effects on both world trade and the 
terms of trade of many borrowing countries consequent upon the 
tight monetary and anti- inflationary policies introduced in the 
US and Europe. Through its effect on interest rates these policies 
caused a sharp jump in the cost of debt servicing. Secondly the 
sharp increases in oil prices in 1979 (OPEC II) brought with it a 
slow-down in economic activity among non-oil developing countries. 
Thirdly political upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan for example, 
tended to caution international banks, causing them to cut down on 
certain loans and/or to increase the costs of such borrowing. 
For all this, the middle-income developing countries continued to 
rely on private international bank credit rather than on the IMF. 
Two factors account for this. First, as we have already noted, such 
private credit was at first largely free from the economic policy 
conditions usually attached to IMF loans. Secondly, because until 
the introduction of the IMF' s Enlarged Access Policy (EAP) in 
September 1980, the IMF's resources were limited in relation to 
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TABLE 4 
LOAN FLOWS FROM THE BIS REPORTING BANKS TO DIFFERENT 





































borrower needs and bank resources. F+om the 1970s, however, further 
recourse to bank credit had become conditional upon IMF credit, 
which took the form of a small pilot IQan and was accompanied by 
a 'stabilization programme' to monitor and direct domestic economic 
(and implicitly political) policies and options in borrowing 
countries. By the 1980s the external debt situation of some larger 
debtor countries had become critical. The deterioration in 
international financial stability which followed was brought about 
consequent upon some serious blows to the confidence of private 
international banks and their capacity to see off the growing debt 
crisis. 
The first of these came towards the end of 1980 when a 
deterioration in Poland's economic and political situation forced 
that country" into negotiating an across-the-board debt rescheduling 
arrangement and accepting IMF surveillance. The second blow came 
from the Falkland crisis in 1982. Despite Argentina's assurance 
that it would stand by its financial obligations, a wave of panic 
swept through the international private banking world, as bankers 
became ' concerned about Argentina's, and other Latin American 
countries' ability to service their debt. A third factor affecting 
sentiment on the international financial market was the absence of 
growth in the industrial economies arising out of the depth and 
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persistence of the economic crisis in the advanced capitalist 
countries. This seriously affected the ability of these 
industrialised countries to absorb the increased exports of 
developing country borrowers, who had little choice but to export 
in order to meet their debt servicing cost. As Brett comments this 
led to a situation in which 'borrowers have to export or bankrupt 
the western banking system, while western countries have to exclude 
those same exports or bankrupt large sections of their own 
manufacturing industries.'u 
The final blow to, what the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), calls the 'morale and the smooth working of the 
international credit market' came in mid-1982 with the Mexican debt 
crisis sparked of a massive flight of (Mexican) capital to the 
United states. The BIS commented that 
in anticipation of steadily rl.sl.ng oil reserves Mexico had 
embarked some years earlier on policies of economic expansion 
which would probably not have been sustainable even in a more 
propitious world economic environment. Moreover ... Mexico had 
been covering an increasing part of its very large external 
financial requirements at short term, a policy which had been 
clearly visible well before the outbreak of the crisis ... 48 
The effect of all these factors has been a virtual standstill in 
new private international bank lending since about 1983, and the 
expanded policing and debt negotiating and debt rescheduling 
function for the IMF in world financial matters. Private 
international banks in the meantime have had little choice but to 
roll-over capital repayments for future years. The one exception 
to this has been South Africa. cut off from access to IMF loans in 
1983, South Africa was denied roll-over and extension facilities 
by Chase Manhattan in August 1985, a decision which prompted other 
banks to follow this lead, thereby forcing South Africa to declare 
a unilateral debt moratorium and later to attempt a rescheduling 
of its debt without, as far as can be ascertained, the assistance 
of the IMF. 
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The decline in new bank lending has, however, been matched by a 
vigorous rise in international securities or bond issues from the 
mid-1980s. As Lewis comments 
The pattern of current account deficits and surpluses has 
altered dramatically in the mid-1980s. For 1985, the US had the 
largest current account deficit ($115 billion) with the other 
industrialised countries having the largest current account 
surpluses. with Japanese and German lenders preferring to 
acquire securities and other claims issued directly by the 
united States, capital flows are running in the main amongst 
the industrial countries. The wealth transfer process has 
reverted to more 'traditional ' channels and international 
financing has returned to the pattern typical in post-war years 
before 1972 when it was normal for international bond issues to 
exceed new international bank lending. 49 
Developments in the international financial market between 1970-
1985 may therefore be viewed as havi ng two distinct phases. First, 
the massive growth in private international bank lending fuelled 
by the depressed state of, and hence low investment demand in, 
industrialized countries, the new conditions in the market arising 
out of the consequences on external balances of OPEC I, and the 
absence of co-ordinated policies and controls over the nature and 
terms of international bank lending. The growth of international 
bank lending in this period was sustained by, among other forces, 
the banks' desire to di,versify risks by granting loans with 
different risk characteristics, different interest rate adjustment 
methods and different funding requ i rements. This was also a time 
when the entire international monetary and financial system was 
itself experiencing crisis and largely ad hoc adjustment to very 
altered circumstances. This first phase lasted from the early 
1970s, but especially after 1973, until about the end of 1979. In 
this time of uncertainty and fluidity in international economic 
relations, the task of recycling petrodollars, 'which was so 
crucial to the maintenance of international economic 
stability •.. was assigned, almost in its entirety, to the 
international private banks.'~ 
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In the second phase, from 1980 to 1985, there came about a sharp 
deterioration in the international borrowing environment, a 
persistence of the recession in industrialized countries, the 
effects of OPEC II on external debt, higher rates of interest, a 
contraction in the volume of world trade, political upheavals and 






and led to 
internationally-diversified 
a marked decline in new 
international loans and the emergence of the debt crises and 
widespread rescheduling arrangements on existing loans. The growth 
of the securities or bond market and of floating-rate notes and 
bonds were the main (positive) developments in the period. 
(4) IMF AND PRIVATE BANK INTERACTION 
The separate and co-ordinated responses of the IMF and private 
international banks to the growing probiems (and opportunities) in 
the international economy after c1970 have been shaped both by the 
fact that they are organisations with vastly different objectives 
as well as by the specific and fluctuating circumstances which they 
each confronted in this time. However, their complementary role 
vis-a-vis lending to developing countries has led to an almost 
conspiratorial conceptualisation of their relationship in some 
circles. Despite the circumstances arising out of the crisis in 
controlling international economic relations which forced an 
increasing interaction between the IMF and private international 
banks, it would be incorrect to characterise their response to the 
crisis as some sort of conspiracy against developing countries. 52 
For while there are obvious points of commonality between the IMF 
and private international banks there are also clearly 
distinguishable divergences or difference of opinion over how 
specific problems should be handled. Thus, for example, private 
banks have generally applauded the conditions that are most often 
set for borrowing countries by the IMF. Irving Friedman of First 
Boston Corporation commented in 1983, 'like the banker, the Fund 
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does not like inflation, budgetary deficits and monetary excesses; 
it dislikes inefficient public sector activities, subsidies, 
artificial public utility pr~c~ng, domestic price controls, 
discrimination against foreign investment and so forth. ,53 
Private banks, however, do not always favour the deflationary 
policy which is the consequence of such an economic ideology. At 
the same time the IMF has viewed private bank lending to some 
countries such as to Peru for example, as a way for these borrowers 
to avoid or delay the implementation of IMF recommendations. These 
differences arise, as Bernal has suggested, 
from the different and specific logic which informs and 
determines the behaviour of the IMF and the banks. The IMF has 
a designated [sic] role to perform in world capitalism. The 
ambit .and nature of this role is determined by the developed 
capitalist countries which control the IMF. The transnational 
banks are driven by profit maximisation on a world scale. 54 
The interdependence that does exist between the IMF and the banks 
is therefore neither mutual nor symmetrical. The IMF relies on 
banks to utilise the investment and loan opportunities arising out 
of its policy recommendations, especially as it cannot itself 
provide the necessary financing to borrowing nations. The 
organisation hopes that the seal of approval it grants to borrowers 
would be sUfficient to induce private banks to lend, although, as 
in the case of Jamaica in 1977, such lending is not automatic. 55 The 
IMF has in fact few formal channels to influence the banks and no 
formal arrangement and instead relies on the formidable network of 
informal contacts that are a feature of the way in which the 
international financial system operates. On the other hand, banks 
rely on the IMF to reduce the risk of lending, by stipulating 
policies which, for example, ostensibly promote the ability to make 
repaym~nt or ease the mechanisms of repayment. 
Private international banks therefore appear to rely largely on 
the IMF to affect national economic policy in borrowing countries 
in a way which facilitates their operations. However, this is not 
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to suggest that banks do not have an 'independent' influence over 
economic development strategies in borrowing countries. As Mintz 
and Schwartz point out, though their effects are problematic and 
contingent, banks are nevertheless a source for many general trends 
in economic development and changes in industrial profiles. Banks 
have recently, and especially after the Peru case, become 'more 
comfortable' in their role as policy makers, as it were, in 
borrowing countries. In Peru, Chase Manhattan, leading a consortium 
of banks, forced the Government to eliminate a tax, which it was 
utilising to subsidise the purchase of food by the poor, so as, to 
maximise the portion of government revenue to be used for debt 
financing. Ultimately, as Mintz and Schwartz pointed out ' food 
subsidies were eliminated, wage controls instituted, and three left 
wing cabinet ministers were expelled from the government.,56 
Business Week noted that the banks by 'passing judgement on Peru's 
economic performance raised troublesome questions about foreign 
business interference in the affairs of a sovereign state'. 57 While 
negotiating or renegotiating loans private international banks have 
recently become themselves quite ' adept at extracting desired 
concessions' ,58 of which in the 1970s 'fiscal discipline', and 
'increased exports' or policies directed towards these ends, 
figured most prominently. In contrast to multinational 
corporations, however, banks remain less concerned with the way 
their funds are ultimately utilised. 
Private international bank activities and intervention in foreign 
countries, have in recent years been facilitated by the creation 
of an extremely sophisticated network of communications systems, 
operating units, offices, personnel and a strengthening of bank 
analytic capabilities. These and other advantages which private 
international banks possess, have even led some governments in the 
US or Europe to see in such international activities 
a means of advancing specific policy objectives of the state _ 
for example, diversifying raw materials sources, expanding 
e>:,port~ to reduce ? trade deficit or create jobs, providing 
f~nanc~al support (~n some cases disguised as aid) to a country 
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whose economic and political stability is of fundamental 
importance to the state, or conversely denying such support to 
., f' . 59 an Ob)ect10nable ore1gn reg1me. 
As we shall see later in Chapter 4, the US Treasury and state 
Department in the mid-1970s successf ully squeezed South Africa, by 
turning off the money taps (foreign bank loans) in the US and 
Europe so forcing the Vorster government into pressurising the 
smith regime in Rhodesia, into accepting the inevitability of black 
majority rule. 6o However, private banks themselves, have generally 
been more reluctant to demand overt political changes as a 
precondition for 'loans or debt rescheduling, as the South African 
experience after , 1985, which is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, 
testifies to. 
The relationship between private banks and the IMF has tended to 
fluctuate in the rapidly changing environment of the post-Bretton 
Woods period. We would argue that in the 1970s and early 1980s 
private international banks tended t o support rather than obstruct 
the role of the IMF in relation to lending to deficit countries. 
In the 1970s banks supported lobbies in the US and elsewhere which 
argued for an increase in funds to the IMF. By contrast, in the 
1960s banks preferred strategies and policies which restrained the 
lending role of the IMF in order to leave room for their own 
lending. 61 By the 1970s banks appeared less concerned by any 
potential competition from the IMF and their respective roles 
tended rather to complement one another. Given the uncertainty 
about the p~ecise role of the IMF in the post- Bretton Woods era, 
its limited lending resources, and the simultaneous growth of the 
international financial market, which itself emerged out of the 
crisis of the 1970s, it was convenient for the IMF and profitable 
for the banks to take on the role of recycling dollars. 
The fact that no mechanisms for controlling the flow of these funds 
existed, however, ' resulted in a mounting debt crisis from the early 
1980s and growing international fragility and instability. The 
absence of an adequate regulatory mechanism affected the process 
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of adjustment to balance of payments deficits and provided some 
debtor countries with a way of avoiding the kind of domestic 
economic adjustment which was forced upon them in . terms of the 
Bretton Woods arrangement. The availability of international credit 
allowed some of these countries to turn their deficits into 
increased indebtedness. Whether these countries received private 
bank assistance often depended upon the IMF's stamp of approval and 
the acceptance of a IMF restructuring programme. However, private 
banks' search for profitability especially in the period 1973-1979 
and the increasing difficulty faced by deficit countries in 
servicing their debts at a time of global recession and often 
declining demand . for primary commodity exports, resulted in an 
exponential and uncontrollable growt h in bank lending~ 
In these . circumstances, the effectiveness of the IMF's (or the 
banks own) supervision of economic restructuring declined. In other 
words bank lending grew because, in the absence of new loans, the 
probability of banks recouping any existing interest and capital 
repayments diminished. Threats to international financial stability 
posed by defaults as debtors began to recognise the declining power 
of banks in this situation also forced banks to maintain lending 
levels. By c1983, however, because of BIS, IMF and World Bank 
loans, and debt rescheduling, the immediate threat of a total 
collapse of an already fragile international economy receded to 
some extent, and net international bank lending began to decline 
sharply. 
Thus the short-term advantages to banks and the IMF in dealing with 
the problems of mounting deficits on the ' one hand and surplus 
petro-dollars on the other, by increasing bank loans to deficit 
countries without adequate regulatory mechanisms, was to turn later 
into a serious problem for setting up or stabilising a new 
international monetary and financial system, a new global mode of 
regulation. After c1983 co-operation between the banks, the major 
industrialised countries and the IMF in an effort to arrive at a 
co-ordinated response to the debt crisis began to break down. Thus 
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although it was reported that the international banking community 
supported the Baker initiative of addressing the debt problem,62 the 
initiative failed primarily because private banks did not respond 
positively enough to one of its key components, ie increased bank 
lending to debtor countries in support of comprehensive economic 
adjustment programmes to be supervised by the IMF. 
As banks and the IMF either joined forces as they did for most of 
the 1970s and early 1980s or acted independently to influence 
developments in the mainly debt-ridden developing ?ations, it would 
appear as if their actions must have had only one effect ie a 
determining and . undoubtedly detrimental influence on these 
countries. As Stallings puts it, 
[s]uperficialiy, the crisis seems to have severely undermined 
the power of the state as the banks and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) joined forces to demand austerity programs, 
and a lower level of state participation in the economy, in 
exchange for debt relief. The current situation thus 'appears at 
first glance to support the more extreme versions of dependency 
theory whereby external actors have a determining and 
detrimental influence on the Third world.~ 
However, as her study of international lending to Peru over sixty 
years shows, international loans may actually strengthen the state 
before, say, the debt crisis strikes, and the powerful state which 
emerges does not easily fade away.~ Gordon has argued that 'the 
role of the state [globally] has grown substantially since the 
early 1970s; state policies have become increasingly decisive on 
the internat'ional front, not more futile. ,65 A significant portion 
of international bank loans in the last fifteen years have gone 
directly to the state. The large volumes and low strings attached 
to these loans, raised, rather than diminished, the potential for 
increased national or state autonomy, including for example over 
the hegemonic fraction of the economically dominant class. Private 
international loans have a distinct advantage over, say, direct 
foreign investment. For while the essence of direct foreign 
investment is that the investor maintains control over the 
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investment, private bank lenders do not monitor the use of their 
capital as closely. 
The problem, however, as Stallings points out is that 
these loans can be cut off any time if lending conditions change 
in the international capital markets or if lenders become 
worried about a particular state's capacity to service its debt. 
The latter is not unlikely since private · loans are usually 
characterised by high (and floating) interest rates and short 
maturities and are thus prone to cause balance of payments 
difficulties. 66 
This potential danger of becoming 'mortgaged' to the international 
banks also obviously extends to private sector borrowers. These 
points, both the potential growth of state or national autonomy and 
the danger of being cut off from the international financial 
mark~ts, all have significance for post-l970 South African 
experience, as we shall note in the following conclusion, and again 
in later chapters. 
(5) CONCLUSION 
Changes in aspects of the international regulatory system in the 
search for a new global mode of regulation had a significant impact 
on South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. The move to flexible 
exchange rates placed fewer restrictions on individual nations in 
deciding on economic policy and allowed countries like South Africa 
to pursue and experiment with more nationally-based policies and 
strategies in areas such as fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policy and development strategy. For unlike fixed exchange rates, 
flexible exchange rates placed a lower premium on control, 
supervision and the need to be concerned with the impact of 
national economic policy on international cooperation and 
coordination. Flexible exchange rates also helped to 'free' the 
gold price, though with conflicting implications for South Africa. 
The generally upward (though erratic) movement in the price of gold 
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until 1980, was to prove an important windfall for South Africa in 
an era of crisis in its domestic economy. Despite the fall in its 
price from over $800 an ounce after 1980, gold continues to be a 
vital foreign exchange earner for the South African economy. At the 
same time, however, the often rapid changes in the gold price, have 
undoubtedly introduced an element of instability into the South 
African economy, which has contributed to the crisis in the economy 
and complicated any strategy for resolving this crisis. These 
issues are taken up in Chapter 3. 
IMF assistance to South Africa in the mid-1970s and again in 1982 
was m~de with little or no conditionality and the monetary and 
psychological support South Afr~ca received from the IMF, at a time 
when the Fund was itself struggling to establish a new role for 
itself in. the changed circumstances of the post-1973 world economy, 
was of no small significance to South Africa. When finally the IMF 
cut off assistance to South Africa in 1983 and the banks followed 
in 1985, South Africa was left to deal with with very serious 
problems. 
The growth of the international financial market, and in particular 
its syndicated loan segment, was to prove an important source of 
international credit for the South African state, parastatals and 
private sector, especially after bondholders temporarily deserted 
South Africa in large numbers in the wake of political instability 
around 1976. The state and parastatals used private international 
bank loans to embark on a massive programme of strategic 
infrastructural investments in the mid-1970s. The relatively higher 
degree of self-sufficiency in armaments I infrastructure and energy, 
among other developments I these investments made possible is 
perhaps one reason why the apartheid state has been able to resist 
intern~tional economic pressure with somewhat greater success since 
the mid-1980s, than most other developing countries faced with 
similar disabilities. The development of a relatively strong 
national economy, itself creative and resourceful, may have allowed 
South Africa to weather this storm, but that there was a storm, 
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there can be little doubt. In the second half of the 1980s, the 
absence of new foreign loans and or IMF assistance, threats to 
foreign exchange reseves, and a falling rand, all contributed to 
the continuing economic crisis in South Africa, despite a marginal 
improvement in the country's relat i ons with some European banks 
after 1987. 
The impact of the changes in the international economy on the state 
of the South African economy and on the pattern of South Africa's 
international economic relations will be examined in Chapter 3. The 
more detailed studies of South Africa's relations with the IMF and 
banks follow in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
88 
ENDNOTES 
1. Aglietta, 1982 
2. de Vroey, 1984 
3. de Vroey, 1984, p61 
4. de Vroey, 1984, p61 
5. de Vroey, 1984, p61 
6. de Vroey, 1984, p62 
7. Aglietta, 1982; Kahn, 1988, p2 
8. Kahn, 1988, p3 
9. de Vroey, 1984, p63 
10. de Vroey, 1984, pp60-63; Lipietz, 1986; Lipietz, 1984; de 
vries, 1987' 
11. de vroey, 1984, p63 
12. Gordon, 1988, p63 
13. See for example Payer, 1974, Hayter, 1981. 
14. IMF Articles of Agreement, 1946 
15. Angola, whose application for IMF membership was considered in 
July 1989, became the Fund's 152nd member. See Africa Analysis, 
07.07.89. 
16. Evans, 1985, pl19 
17. Green, 1985, p63 
18. LAB, 1983, ' p13 
19. Gisselquist, 1981, p217 
20. Brett, 1983, p27ff 
21. Flight and Lee-Swan, 1988, p167 
22. Johnson, 1977, p108 
23. 1980, p51 
24. 1983, p42 
89 
25. See for example Brazil's decision to suspend interest payments 
in 1987. 
26. Shelton, 1989, pxiii 
27. posulla, 1984, pp68-9 
28. 1983, p43 
29. Lipietz, 1987, p176 
30. Buira, 1983, p117 
31. Economist, 17.04.76 
32. Economist, 25.09.76 
33. Flight and Lee-Swan, 1988, ppl86ff 
34. Flight and Lee-Swan, 1988, p186 
35. Economist, 25.09.76 
36. de vries, 1987 
37. Economist, 25.09.76 
38. Lipietz, 1987, p176 
39. Lipietz, 1986, p20 
40. 1986, p20 
41. Sayers quoted in Lewis, 1987, p27 
42. International Capital Markets, IMF, January 1988 
43. Marxism Today, 1986, p16 
44. See for e~ample Bernal, 1982; Lewis, 1987. 
45. Bank of International Settlements, Annual Report, 1983, p119 
46. Marxism Today, 1986, p16 
47. Brett, 1983, p220 
48. 1983, p128 
49. Lewis, 1987, p46 
50. Marxism Today, 1986, p16 
51. Lewis, 1987, p47 
90 
52. This point is well made in Bernal, 1982. 
53. Friedman quoted in IRRC Research Monograph, 1985 
54. Bernal, 1982, pp89/90 
55. James, 1983, p94 
56. Mintz and Schwartz, 1986, p93 
57. Mintz and Schwartz, 1986, p94 
58. Mintz and Schwartz, 1986, p94 
59. Spindler, 1884, p71 
60. See for example, Johnson, 1977, p241. 
61. Gisselquist, 1981, p214 
62. See for example, de Vries, 1987, p251. 
63. Stallings, 1985, p257 
64. Stallings, 1985, p257 
65. Gordon, 1988, p63 
66. Stallings, 1985, p261 
91 
CHAPTER THREE 
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1970-1985 
(1) INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two, we examined the changes in the role and functions 
of the IMF and private international banks in the world economy in 
the period after the first oil price shock of 1973. These 
developments were among the central changes in the attempt to 
restructure the mode of regulation on a global scale. However, we 
argued there that despite changes , in the post-war regulation of 
monetary and financial relations, a new global mode of regulation 
was not successfully stabilised. The main objectives of the present 
Chapter are, first, to examine the effects of some of the changes 
in the global monetary and financial system on South Africa, and 
to set out the central features of the crisis in 'the South African 
political economy after c1973, a crisis which signalled the 
breakdown of South Africa' post-war regime of accumulation and mode 
of regulation. 
Secondly, this chapter examines the structure of and changes in 
South Africa's international economic relations since the early 
1970s. This will involve an analysis of South Africa's changing 
patterns of trade, investment and technology relations with the 
rest of the wor1d~ The analysis attempts to show how the structure 
and pattern of South Africa's international economic relations was 
transformed by changing international and domestic forces. This 
section also examines some of the inherent and acquired strengths 
of the economy, especially the importance of gold exports, 
technological developments in armaments and m1n1ng, and the 
national state's use of foreign loan financing for strategic and 
infrastructural investment, which helped though only for a limited 
period, to protect the country against some externally-generated 
shocks. 
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Finally, the chapter seeks to show that, South Africa's 
international economic relations came in this period to be 
increasingly dominated by questions of international finance, 
mainly in the form of its heavy borrowings from the IMF and private 
international banks. This will then set the stage for the more 
detailed analysis of these developments which follow in Chapters 
4 and 5. 
This analysis attem~ts to do more than coincidentally or 
conveniently juxtapose crises and change in the global and domestic 
mode of regulation and regime of accumulation on the one hand and 
the transformation of a nation state's international economic 
relations on the other. We would argue that crises and change in 
these areas in the context of the world economy of the 1970s and 
1980s, have in fact combined to profoundly alter the central 
features and nature of a country's international economic 
relations, ie they have altered the balance of the three main 
component parts of these relations, ie trade, direct foreign 
investment and international loan finance. A combination of these 
changes have, for many developing, middle-income and even 
industrialised countries since the early 1970s, had the effect of 
biasing finance at the expense of trade and direct foreign 
investment - if not absolutely then certainly in relation to the 
weight of these components as they existed in the period between 
the late 1950s and early 1970s. At the very least, the implications 
of the massive growth of international loans and credit for a 
country's relations with the world economy and for its own 
stability has been catapulted to the centre of the concerns of many 
countries since the early 1970s. This is true even for the US, 
though in ways different to that of developing and middle-income 
developing countries. As Smith has pointed out the international 
debt crisis has resulted in a stunning case of 'reverse dependency' 
in the form of the 'utter dependence of the US financial system on 
the major debtor countries of the Third World. 1 
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The link between global crises and change and their effect on 
international economic relations has not escaped the attention of 
regulation theorists, such as de Vroey and Lipietz in particular, 
but remains somewhat underdeveloped. Lipietz has remarked how in 
the wake of the first oil price shock and other global 
developments, international bank finance (and, it may be added, 
IMF loans) came to replace direct foreign investment as the most 
important item in the external accounts of many middle-income 
developing countries and the NICs, such as South Korea. 2 Developing 
these concerns, this chapter and the following ones argue that some 
countries such as South Africa, who were at the end of the long 
post-war boom phase, were able to recognise and capitalise on some 
of these global changes to pursue national strategies for ~conomic, 
infrastructural and technological development which enabled them 
temporarily to stave off economic decline though at the cost of a 
what for many was a debilitating financial vulnerability some years 
later. This process, which in South Africa's case took the form of 
borrowing on a massive scale from international banks and 
bondholders, had the effect of transforming the country's 
international economic relations. 
But additionally we would argue that domestic economic crises and 
stagnation also contribute to this transformation of a country's 
international economic relations. In exam1n1ng the 
complementary/competing relation between direct foreign investment 
and international bank finance, Gordon, for example has argued that 
when an economy 'has become stagnant and unstable investors tend . , 
to move their capital out of productive investments - because of 
increasingly cloudy longer-term prospects into short-term 
financial investment. ,3 So domestic crises may induce both shifts 
between major items in the external accounts of nation states (for 
example among the categories of trade, direct foreign investment 
and bank loans) as well as changes wi thin each category (for 
example in the maturity structure of bank loans). 
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In the South African experience the failure to replace the post-
war model of industrialisation based on import-substitution, with 
say, an internationally competitive, manufacturing-based export 
sector, rested partly on a variety of domestic economic, 
institutional and political constraints. These included the 
collapse of post-war regulatory arrangements, such as the racially-
skewed, yet stable production-consumption accord and the growth of 
a militant trade union and anti-apartheid resistance culture which 
threatened the institutional concordance governing capital/labour 
relations and the very foundations of political stability in this 
country. 
Despit~ the relatively advanced state of South Africa's 
technological and manufacturing sector judged against those of 
comparable countries, (a point we underline strongly in this 
chapter) it is true that the country failed in the 1970s and 1980s 
to develop an internationally competitive export sector which would 
have facilitated its insertion into the 'new international division 
of labour' in .the way which characterised the performance of some , 
of the Asian NICs, for example. Part of the reason for this failure 
rested on the state's inability, given the heavy and competing 
demands it increasingly faced as the economic and political crisis 
deepened, to support such developments by active intervention on 
the production side. In short, these and other factors acted to 
limit and stunt the growth and further diversification of South 
Africa's trade, and especially its exports, with the rest of the 
world. This is not to imply, however, that foreign trade, 
especially gold exports, became marginalised in its contribution 
to the economy in any way. 
Furthermore, intensifying international pressure, escalating 
internal resi.stance to apartheid, and the stagnation of economic 
prospects contributed to a decline in direct foreign investment 
into South Africa. The decline in direct foreign investment after 
c1973, the instability in export earning from gold, and for some 
periods, high and unstable domestic interest rates, were factors 
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which encouraged the state and private capital to turn to 
international bank credit in order to finance growth and 
development. While the state in the mid-1970s was still able to 
acquire medium to long-term loans, the mainly private sector 
foreign loans after 1979, were increasingly short-term finance. In 
the period between 1970 and 1982, this entire process was 
facilitated by the growth and diversification of and technical 
innovations in the international lending and bond markets and was 
very much in line with the state's own (nationally-determined) 
strategy of building up its strategic and infrastructural 
foundations at a time when the long post-war boom had come to an 
end and anti-apartheid pressures were gradually building up in the 
US, Western Europe and elsewhere. 
The interaction between global and domestic crises and the 
transformation of a country's international economic relations can 
therefore be causally linked in these and other ways. The effects 
of global developments, such as those examined in Chapter 2, as 
well as domestic economic and political crises on the · . 
transformation of South Africa's international economic relations 
in the period 1970-1985, will be examined in this chapter. This 
analysis has necessarily to be preceded by a study of the major 
economic and political developments and changes within South Africa 
in this time. 
(2) THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Developments in the world economy as well as in the structure of 
South Africa's international economic relations, especially since 
the mid-1970s, introduce complexities into any analysis of the 
nature . and character of South Africa ' s links with the world economy 
which rest on the grand teleological models of 'dependency' or 
'dependent development'. Changes in the international dimension 
have already been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. In short, these 
latter changes include the decline in US hegemony; the rise of new 
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industrial powers; the switch to flexible exchange rates; and the 
growth of an international financial market, in which private 
international banks, and the IMF (in a supervisory capacity) became 
central institutions. What impact did these developments have on 
the South African economy? 
While some of these changes in the nature, structure and balance 
of power relations in the world economy provided space for creative 
national development, other changes starkly revealed the cost of 
technological and economic dependence for many developing 
countries. Thus for example more radical self-reliant strategies 
were thwarted by .economic factors such as the sharp deterioration 
in the terms of trade of most primary exports and the effect of 
the oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979, and by political factors such 
as the perceived need by the superpowers in the mid-1970s for 
streamlining their allies and reasserting greater control over 
their spheres of influence. 
Stephen Gelb has shown that two of these developments in the world 
economy in particular were to have a significant impact on south 
Africa's balance of payments, on the south African economy as a 
whole and contributed to this country's growing crisis. 4 First, 
slowing productivity and the resultant increase in unit value of 
output which set in in the advanced industrialised countries from 
the late 1960s, had the effect of increasing the price level of 
South Africa's machinery imports. These increases which accelerated 
after 1973 were, according to Gelb, the 'primary initiating factor 
in the South African crisis, transmitting the effects of the 
developing international crisis to the domestic economy.' Secondly, 
the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime, resulted in greater 
instability in the South African balance of payments and in its 
foreign exchange reserves, as the value of the country's exports 
(gold, minerals etc) began to fluctuate more than before. 'The 
balance of payments and the foreign exchange constraint thus no 
longer exercised a stabilising long run effect through their role 
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in cyclical fluctuations, and instead became a destabilising (and 
unpredictable) factor. ,5 
But as Gelb points out, though these international developments 
and the growing crisis in the world economy suggest that the South 
African crisis was caused by 'unfavourable exogenous developments', 
the form of the crisis, the 'process of its development, its 
differential impact, depth, length' etc are a consequence of local 
patterns of accumulation and policy processes. South Africa's 
insertion into the international division of labour occurred on the 
basis of its gold, precious metal and raw material exports and 
capital goods imports. In the 1950s and 1960s rapid accumulation 
was founded on an industrial policy of import-substitution 
industrialisation (lSI), high profitability in mining and a 
relatively low and racially-skewed wage structure. The objective 
of lSI was to divert export $urpluses into the production of 
consumer goods for the domestic market. This was achieved by the 
introduction of high tariffs on imported goods. The policy was 
supported by the purchasing power of a racially-privileged segment 
of the South African population, ie the whites. The relatively low 
wage structure and repressive controls over the predominantly black 
working class, ensured high levels of profitability, even though 
the local market was small and limited. The source of industrial 
processes related to manufacturing and en9ineering remained largely 
external to the country, however, and this factor accounts for the 
• peripheral , in the characterisation of South Africa, Brazil, 
Mexico and o~her similar countries as being examples of experiments 
in 'peripheral Fordism'. The racially structured pattern of 
consumption and production, has, however, led Gelb to refer to the 
South African pattern of accumulation and its accompanying 
political and institutional framework in the post-war period as 
'racial Fordism',6 whose defining characteristics were a mode of 
regulation based on racial privileging (apartheid) and a regime of 
accumulation based on import-substitution industrialisation. 
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Whenever this model or strategy of accumulation led to problems 
for the country's external economic relations, adjustments occurred 
in terms of the Bretton Woods arrangements. Thus for example, when 
increased investment expenditure and capital goods imports 
eventually bumped up against the foreign exchange constraint, they 
forced the introduction of tighter monetary policies. These 
policies had the effect of slowing down investment, consumption and 
imports and so restoring stability to the balance of payments. In 
this era of fixed exchange rates, domestic policy was restricted 
by concern over its effects on international cooperation and 
coordination and was honed to protect foreign exchange reserves and 
to support the exchange rate. 
Coinciding with international developments, the regime of 
accumulation and ' mode of regulation set in place in South Africa 
in the post-war period upon which growth was generated, ie import 
SUbstitution industrialisation and a social and political order 
based on racial privileging, began to run into serious difficulties 
from the early 1970s. In general, South Africa began to experience 
problems not dissimilar to those of other 'peripheral Fordist 
countries', such as Brazil.7 The l imited size of the domestic 
market restricted the extension of mass consumption; the country 
failed to develop a sufficiently broad base of managerial and 
technical skills to maintain high levels of productivity; slowing 
productivity growth and growing crises in the main industrialised 
centres of Europe and the US, limited the expansion of manufactured 
exports so crucial to achieving more self-sustaining growth and 
finally and unique to South Africa, political factors constrained 
the expansion of exports into Africa. In addition, changes in the 
balance of class forces, especially after the Durban strikes in 
1973, resulted in higher black real wages and changes in the 
pattern of consumer demand. This affected the nature of both 
consumer imports and of production which required capital goods 
imports. 8 
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The growing recognition of the limited possiblities of further 
(consumption-based) import-substitution industrialisation which 
can be traced to the findings of the Reynders Commission report 
(1972) was being sharpened by the fact that slowing demand for 
South Africa's major primary exports in the advanced industrialised 
countries after c1974 curtailed the rate of growth of export 
revenue and placed definite limits on South African imports of 
capi tal goods and equipment, so vi tal to the growth of import 
replacement industries. Changes in imported technology had the 
effect of increasing capital intensity of producti?n and capital 
goods prices. Coupled with increasing black wages these factors 
served to reduc~ the profitability of manufacturing in South 
Africa. Kahn has observed that 'increased real wages, declining 
productivity of capital and declining commodity prices resulted in 
a secular· decline in South Africa's terms of trade' since the early 
1970s. 9 variations in the gold price, which occurred after the 
shift to flexible exchange rates, resulted in extreme fluctuations 
in the terms of trade including gold, and a consistent decline in 
these terms of trade excluding gold. By 1986 the terms of trade, 
excluding gold, were approximately 43pc lower than their 1970 
level. 1o 
with this background, we can now proceed to a detailed examination 
of the main features, and trace the behaviour of the central 
variables, of the crisis in the South African economy which set in 
in the early 1970s in the wake of crises and change in the 
internation~l economy and in the South African regime of 
accumulation and mode of regulation. The origin of the crisis in 
the South African economy is marked by the behaviour of two key 
variables in the cyclical downswing which began in 1974. These 
variables are unit labour costs and foreign exchange reserves. In 
the framework of regulation theory a cyclical downswing would be 
termed reproductive if unit labour costs fall and foreign exchange 
reserves rise, thereby creating the foundations for a cyclical 
upswing. However, in the South African downswings from 1974 to 1977 
and again from 1981 to 1986 these variables moved in the opposite 
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direction, pointing to the non-reproductive nature of the 
downswing. 
The first phase 1974-1977 was marked by the emergence of 
stagflation, ie. a combination of sustained price rises and high 
and rising unemployment. The real growth rate, which had ·averaged 
6pc in the 1960s turned negative in the first half of 1976 11 and 
was zero in 1977. The volume of manufacturing output fell by about 
6pc from mid-1974 to mid-1975, and after small increases for a few 
months, fell even further during 1976/77. Private sector investment 
in manufacturing began to drop from 1974, while total investment 
declined by about 13pc between 1975 and .1977. Black unemployment 
rose sharply to a new plateau in the 1970s. Black unemployment in 
every year between 1971 and 1981 was higher than for any year in 
the period 1960-t967, averaging 10/11pc in the 1960s and a much 
higher 15/16PC in the 1970s. 12 In addition the number of whites, 
coloureds and Indians unemployed, traditionally low because of the 
more protected nature of their end of the racially segmented labour 
market, increased by 250pc in the three years from January 1974. 
The recessionary conditions of this first phase did not, however, 
immediately produce a decline in nominal profitability; although 
there was a fall in underlying profitability conditions. Under 
pressure of rising nominal aggregate demand inflation accelerated 
and real interest rates turned negative. 13 
The mid-1970s witnessed a sharp deterioration in South Africa's 
balance of payments. South Africa's current account showed deficits 
of R998m, R1 813m and R1 671m in 1974, 1975 and 1976 respectively.14 
This was largely the result of high import requirements, including 
defence-related imports, a rising import bill in the face of 
mounting inflation in South Africa's main trading partners and a 
fall in the world prices of some South African exports. The gold 
price fell in 1975/6 under the impact of IMF gold sales and behaved 
erratically in the next few years until the massive rise after 
1979. The erratic price behaviour of gold added a further element 
of instability to South Africa's external economic relations. The 
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country lost 25pc of its foreign exchange reserves in the first 
quarter of 1976 alone and was forced to turn to the IMF for 
assistance, which it readily received. The government turned to 
policies to reduce demand, especially private sector imports, so 
pushing the economy further into recession. 
The South African state did not however, in response to the crisis 
in the economy, intervene in reshaping productive activity in the 
way some of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) did by 
directly supporting and developing their manufacturing sector in 
order to become more internationally competitive. Rather the state, 
basing its plans. on an anticipated gold price of over $200 an 
ounce, embarked on a massive strategic and infrastructural 
investment programme involving the upgrading and extensions to 
harbour and rail "networks, electricity, steel and energy supplies, 
all financed mainly by the credit and loans of the international 
banks and bondholders. With the state committed to such strategic 
investment and with severe balance of payments problems, the demand 
for international credit became more and more urgent. While the 
local South African capital market had developed greatly in the 
preceding decade, it did not have sufficient depth to finance 
balance of payments deficits and provide for the apartheid state's 
security and economic development as well. In the years 1974-76 
international bank lending more than doubled, both in volume and 
as a percentage of total foreign investment. 15 These issues will be 
examined further in Chapter 5. 
By the time of the Soweto student upr~s~ng South Africa's balance 
of payments was already strained by the rising price of oil, the 
effects of rec~ssion and inflation in the advanced industrialised 
countries, inelastic import requirements, including defence-
related imports, falling commodity prices and an erratic gold 
price. However these problems especially on the capital account 
were exacerbated by the events on and immediately after 16 June 
1976. At least six months earlier, South African troops had crossed 
deep into Angola, as part of a general western effort to stop the 
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MPLA from taking and holding onto power there after independence. 
But the adventure ended in a debacle 16 (supposedly, it was argued 
later) because of the failure of the US to support South Africa 
militarily. The incident served only to isolate South Africa 
internationally as foreign investors began to reassess their South 
African risk and exposure. The student uprising on 16 June added 
to these problems. 
Though the origins of these 'student' problems were immediately 
traceable to students' rejection of Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction in schools, the sustained and widespread resistance 
suggested a new spirit of optimism and confidence among the forces 
opposing the apartheid state. To these problems for the state, were 
added the continuing worker strikes which began in Durban in 1973. 
The strike momentum had continued unabated for the three years 
after 1973, the average yearly number of African workers on strike 
never declining below 30 000 compared to the 1960s when the number 
in anyone year never exceeded 10 0'00. 17 The possibility of such 
prolonged political tensions in South Africa soon made their impact 
among international financiers. Although the regime continued to 
receive the financial support from the IMF throughout 1976, the 
failure of a few South African bond issues in Europe at the time, 
increased interest rates on the country's foreign bank loans and 
a shortening of the maturity structure of such loans, were all 
early pointers to the problems South Africans only perceived much 
later and in rather dramatic terms. 
The economic recession and balance of payments deficits coupled 
with the growth of worker militancy and organisation, the Soweto 
student revolt of 1976 and the general escalation in resistance by 
unions and progressive political organisations, forced the state 
to embark on a limited programme of the reform of apartheid, 
especially in the fields of labour and urban policy from about 
1977. These reforms represented an attempt to change the 
insti tutional framework of labour relations, ie. an attempt to 
adjust the mode of regulation to rapidly changing circumstances. 
r 
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These reforms were initiated with the appointment of the Wiehahn 
and Riekert Commissions of enquiry in 1977. The appointment of the 
de Kock Commission of enquiry into monetary and exchange rate 
policy and the Kleu Commission into industrialisation policy at 
about the same time, was also part of the state's response to the 
growing crises and changes it faced in the mid-1970s. The work of 
these Commissions resulted in the gradual adoption of new policies, 
such as the liberalisation of financial markets and of exchange 
controls and a gradual though less distinct shift towards export 
promotion. Policies in regard to exchange rates, for example tended 
to favour mining as the principal export sector. Fitfully at first, 
but then gather~ng momentum in the late 1970s, a new though 
contradictory process of attempting to establish a new regime o~ 
accumulation and mode of regulation was being tested out within the 
South African social formation. 
A second distinct phase in the post-1973 crisis began at the end 
of 1981. By mid-1979, the phenomenal rise in the gold price, which 
in 1980 peaked at over $800 an ounce, allowed for some recovery of 
economic prospects. 
narrowly 'based. It 
But the recovery was slow, shortlived and 
was mainly consumer-led and made little 
impression on industrial prospects or investment. For from the 
early 1980s it became apparent that the rising costs of imports 
caused by a falling rand, and of working capital as interest rates 
rose, and the preference given to the mining sector in policy 
formulation, were beginning to eliminate the 'safety net' 
underneath industrial profitabi1ity.18 Bankruptcies increased and 
the (short~term) foreign debt of the private sector began to mount. 
In the months from August to October 1985, an average of fourteen 
South African-based companies were placed in liquidation each day. 
Between 1981 and 1986, one in six factories shut down completely, 
representing a drastic diminution in capital stock. The combination 
of recession, poor profitability and declining prospects in the 
medium to long-term, resulted in a massive drop in private sector 
investment in new productive capaci ty after 1980. Manufacturing 
output recorded real declines of between llpc and 12pc between 1980 
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and 1985, and employment in manufacturing fell from 1 449 000 in 
1981 to 1 326 900 in 1985. 19 Non-African registered unemployment, 
which as we have noted, had been historically low, with a previous 
post-war peak of 30 927 in 1978 rose to a seasonally adjusted 
figure of 62 105 in 1985, ie more than double the previous post-
war peak. 20 
Inflation ran at double-digit levels exceeding 13pc in 1984 and 
17pc in 1985. 21 The rand was under almost uninterrupted pressure 
from the beginning of 1982. Money supply had been expanding at 
annualised rates of between 25pc and 50pc between 198i and 1984. 22 
Government borrowing and the budget deficit increased and there 
appeared littl~ scope for reductions here, because of the apartheid 
state's priority expenditure on security-related expenditure and 
its own heavy 'reform-oriented' expenditure such as that on the 
tri-cameral parliament. Critically, the gold price which had peaked 
at over $800 an ounce in 1980, and had lulled policy makers into 
a false sense of South Africa's prosperity, fell sharply from this 
level and began to behave erratically after 1981. The gold price 
averaged $376oz in 1982, rose to $424 in 1983, and fell again to 
$361 in 1984 and to $317 an ounce in 1985. 23 These fluctuations were 
primarily a consequence of the adoption of 'monetarist' policies 
in the US, which forced both interest rates and the dollar up, 
until the dollar began to fall again from 1.985. 24 The current 
account of the balance of payments was in deficit between 1981 and 
1984. The change to surplus in 1985, was due largely to the 
dramatic fa;tl in the value of the rand, and the restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policy adopted in August 1984. (Details of the 
changes which were occurring in the structure of the balance of 
payments, and especially in the capital account will follow in the 
next section) Although personal savings dropped in th~ early 1980s, 
the slowdown in new industrial investment, was reflected in a 
concomittant increase in corporate savings. 25 
While similar processes of recession and crisis occurred elsewhere, 
what distinguished the South African crisis was the uneven impact 
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on manufacturing as compared to mining. In rand terms (gold) mining 
boomed, especially after mid-1983, although the rise in inflation 
in the wake of the falling rand made mining relatively costly in 
international terms. 
The economic crisis, and especially rising inflation and falling 
employment soon began to have an impact on the lives of working 
people. In the following paragraphs only the briefest outlines of 
the political problems South Africa faced in the years 1984-1986 
are surveyed. These political tensions were a significant factor 
in shaping the responses of private international banks to their 
South African loans. By Spring 1984, both strikes in support of 
demands for higher wages and township protests against rising 
rentals had become widespread. Since the formation in August 1983 
of the united Democratic Front, resistance to the first elections 
to the separate Indian and Coloured chambers of the South African 
parliament had mounted. This resistance to declining economic and 
social standards and to racially discriminatory political 
institutions combined and interacted in the years 1984-1986 to 
produce the most serious challenge to the South African socio-
political order since the student uprising of the mid-1970s. 
Nineteen-eighty four saw a sharp increase in strike activity, the 
number of working days lost being more than treble the 1983 
figures. 26 Labour conflict escalated in September 1984, with the 
entry onto the scene of the black mineworkers organised in the 
National Un~on of Mineworkers (NOM). Their wage dispute with the 
Chamber of Mines is likely to have been closely watched by overseas 
financiers and investors given the latter's interest in this . 
critical sector of the South African economy. Workers, students and 
youth organisations went on three political stayaways between 
September and November 1984. By October the state announced that 
it would be using the defence force to quell the township 'unrest', 
so arguably carrying the conflict into a state of civil war. Seven 
thousand troops and policemen occupied the Vaal Triangle township 
of Sebokeng and then the neighbouring townShips of Sharpeville and 
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Boipatong in the third week of October 1984, setting a pattern of 
township occupation and violent conflict throughout South Africa 
which was to characterise the next few years. In one of the most 
intense moments of this continuing political upheaval (some have 
called it an insurrection) over seventy people were killed in the 
eastern Cape in the aftermath of the stayway organised for the 
weekend of 16-18 March 1985, 'Black weekend'. In one incident on 
21 March twenty black people were killed at Langa township outside 
Uitenhage, the shooting occurring ironically on the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. 
Political resist~nce in the townships also became more organised 
than in any previous period of resist~nce to the apartheid state, 
as protestors formed alternative structures such as street and area 
commi ttees wi thin each township. These committees co-ordinated 
resistance and served as rUdimentary organs of 'peoples power.' In 
July 1985, the South African state found it necessary to impose a 
partial state of emergency to deal with the situation. Botha ' s 
Rubicon speech of 15 August 1985 failed to satisfy bankers and 
foreign investors that the state had matters under control. Earlier 
in July 1985, Chase Manhattan Bank had called in its South African 
loans so precipitating a crisis in this country's international 
financial relations. 27 Finally, on 12 June 1986, the state declared 
a full state of emergency, using those powers to restore some 
semblance of political stability onto the South African landscape. 
Changes in the international economy, such as those examined in 
Chapter 2, and the onset of economic cr~s~s and political 
instability after 1973 which have just been described, combined to 
produce significant changes in the structure of South Africa's 
international economic relations in the 1970s and 1980s. These 
changes will be examined next and summarised in the conclusion. 
The following analysis additional l y attempts to point to the 
inherent and acquired strengths of the South African economy, which 
in a sense partially protected it from some of the consequences of 
its participation and integration into the changing and volatile 
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world economy of the post-Bretton Woods era. The country's success 
in adjusting to changes in aspects of the international mode of 
regulation and its own internal crisis are assessed, alongside its 
failures and crises. 
Thus for example, the state's large-scale intervention in 
infra structural and strategic national development in the mid-
1970s, using the finance obtained so easily from private 
international banks and international bond placements: the 
attempted diversification of its exports and export markets: its 
response, albeit limited at first, to its technological dependency; 
the increasing i~ternationalisation of South African capital: the 
ease and success with which national capital stepped into the shoes 
of disinvesting foreign multinational corporations; the limited 
short-term political effects of trade sanctions and the debt crisis 
when many were predicting that sanctions would bring about the 
swift ending of apartheid, all point to the importance of 
recognising and understanding local strengths, strategies and 
policies in evaluating changes in the nature and structure of South 
Africa's international economic relations in the 1970s and 1980s. 
This recognition of the importance of national strengths and 
economic strategy follows from one implication of our earlier 
critique of most versions of dependency theory, ie the denial of 
the possibility tha~ developing countries, who are locked within 
the circuits of the world economy, can pursue a relatively 
, autonomous '. national economic strategy. This case is based on an 
~cceptance of Corbridge's argument that although 'the world system 
is greater than the sums of its component parts (of course) and 
this sets limits to localised political [and economic] action, 
these component parts, and some nation state's especially can still 
mould and change the system itself', at least in part. 28 
(3) THE CHANGING PATTERN OF SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE: 
1970-1985 
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Descriptions and analyses of South Africa's international economic 
relations invariably begin by emphasi sing, that in contrast to most 
of the developed, industrialised countries, this country has a very 
open economy. ie where exports and imports make up a very large 
slice of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Thus for 
example on average in the years 1961-65 exports and imports of 
goods and non-factor payments in real terms (constant prices) 
together accounted for 59pc of the country's GDP. On average in the 
years 1971-75 this comparable combined figure still stood at a high 
58,4pc. (cf the approximately 10pc combined total for the US) In 
the 1970s and 198·0s, however, this figure began to fall, first to 
52,2pc on average between 1976-80, and to 48,3pc on average between 
1981-2. 29 Real exports in particular have become less important in 
relation to GDP since the early 1960s. Real imports increased in 
importance from the early 1960s to the middle 1·970s, but have 
declined thereafter. Furthermore the aggregate of South Africa's 
imports and exports as a percentage of world trade has declined 
from 2,9pc in 1965 to 1,1pc in 1985. 30 This data does suggest that 
though still high by the standards of the least open and vulnerable 
industrialised countries, such as the US, the relative importance 
of South Africa's foreign sector, measured in trade terms, has 
declined. 
(3.1) Exports 
South Africa's merchandise exports, excluding gold, grew rapidly 
in the period 1970-19~5, increasing nearly seven fold in the 1970s 
and more than doubling again in the 1980s to the year 1985. 31 
Disaggregating in terms of major export categories, end- use and 
stage of production, reveals that there have been few maj or 
structural changes in South Africa's total exports, in the period 
1970-1985. (Table 5) One outstanding feature has been the share of 
gold in total export earnings. High throughout most of this period, 
ie over 40pc of total export earnings, gold earnings, aided by an 
exceptional price boost in 1980, rose in that year to exceed the 
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combined earnings of all other exports. (R10 141 compared to R9 
766) 32 This contrasts with the brief period in the years 1974-76 
when in an international environment of volatile movements in its 
price, export earning from gold fell to a low of nearly 30pc. 
TABLE 5 
SOUTH AFRICA'S MERCHANDISE EXPORTS ACCORDING TO END-USE AND STAGE 
OF PRODUCTION 




Total -Merchandise Exports 

















Given the dominance of gold exports, its price performance can 
seriously affect the current account, the balance of payments as 
a whole and the economy itself. Numerous global developments 
contributed to erratic movements in the price of gold in the period 
of this study. These include the volatility in the value of the 
dollar in the period after c1971, the vacuum left between 1971 and 
1976 by the effective ending of the fixed exchange rate regime and 
uncertain prospects for the US economy as a whole. Thus, for 
example, in 1980 the gold price averaged $613 an ounce, which was 
exactly double the average price of 1979, and more than three times 
the average of 1978. By February 1985, however, the gold price had 
fallen to around $285 an ounce. 33 
Export earnings derived from non-precious minerals, notably coal, 
chrome, iron ore, copper, uranium, t i n, antimony and asbestos, also 
increased throughout the 1960s and 1970s, fell in the early 1980s, 
stabilised and then revived after 1984. 34 The growth in coal exports 
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in the 1970s is most remarkable. South Africa's share of the world 
steam coal market increased dramatically from less than 4pc in 1970 
to a peak of 40pc in 1979, mainly as Leger has argued, because of 
its price competitiveness, reliability of supply and quality.35 This 
share dropped to 30pc by the mid-1980s as a result of increasing 
competition from rival producers such as Australia, and after 1986 
because of sanctions. Mineral products exports as a percentage of 
total merchandise export earnings increased from an average of 
13,lpc in the years 1975-79 to 20,4pc in 1982, so exceeding the 
share of precious stones and metal coins (including Krugerrands) 
and becoming the largest single export category. 36 Freund has argued 
that industrial mining in South Africa is far less labour-intensive 
than gold mining, and 'it is not clear to what extent low wages of 
South African miners influence the competitiveness of export 
prices.' '37 No doubt the rising international prices of such non- : 
precious metal exports in the 1960s and early 1970s were closely 
related to the increased demand from the US for military and . 
strategic purposes in the conduct of the Vietnam War. 
In absolute terms, South Africa's exports of manufactured goods 
expanded rapidly in the late 1960s and 1970s. 38 World Bank figures 
show a noticeable increase in the share of 'other manufactures' in 
total merchandise exports between 1965 and 1982. World Bank data 
shows a marked increase in South African exports to 'developing 
economies'in the same period. 39 Most of this was to Africa, and 
though disaggregated figures of South African exports to African 
countries are not made available (for political reasons presumably) 
it is not unreasonable to assume that the major share of this was 
to South Africa's captive market in southern Africa, and especially 
to pre-independence 'Rhodesia'. Zimbabwean independence in 1980, 
economic stagnation in many African countries and the South African 
mini-boom in 1983/4 which may have diverted production to the home 
market, are some of the reasons underlying the failure of 
manufactured exports to develop any further momentum. 
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An analysis of the relative contributions of the main industrial 
sectors to exports, shows that despite its absolute growth, the 
share of manufacturing exports has not increased since 1968, and 
in fact had fallen up to 1985. The share of manufactured exports 
fell from 37,2pc in 1972, to 28,4pc in 1980, rising slightly to 
33,lpc in 1985. 40 The share of agriculture has declined from 15pc 
to just over 3pc in this time. only mining's share of total exports 
has increased in this time to an average of over 60pc in the 1980s. 
Kahn has argued that this data suggests that South Africa's 
insertion into the international division has not fundamentally 
changed from its origins as a raw material supplier. 41 
An important factor which limited the growth of South African 
manufactured exports was the failure of the state, given the heavy 
and competing dem~nds on the fiscus, to intervene in supporting 
manufacturing development on the production side. Morris and 
Padayachee have argued for example, that 'although the state laid 
the foundations for local capital accumulation •.• it did not 
intervene radically within both capitalist enterprises and sectors 
with the aim of restructuring the very process of capitalist 
production itself .•• [the state] did not act in a coercive manner, 
as in the case of the South East Asian NICs, to ensure a radical 
restructuring of manufacturing capital in order to ensure its 
international competi ti veness. 42 Whatever support of this nature the 
state did provide was limited and occurred via the parastatals, and 
not more generally to the manufacturing sector as a whole, as had 
been recommended in 1972 by the Reynders Commission. The reason the 
state chose to ignore these recommendations at that time remains 
unclear. 43 
Furthermore South Africa's cost structure has risen more rapidly 
than that of its major trading partners, so limiting its 
international competitiveness in manufactured goods. Its limited 
domestic market in these products has meant that the country has 
not reaped significant economies of scale and the fact that South 
Africa's business cycles are out of step with its main trading 
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partners has sometimes resulted in a switch to meet domestic demand 
for manufactured goods. All these factors, plus the prolonged 
recession in the main industrialised countries, have contributed 
to limiting the development of South Africa "s manufactured goods-
export sector. 
Fransman has shown that some Asian and Latin American countries 
have successfully produced and exported certain manufactured goods, 
including capital goods, (machinery and equipment) mainly to other 
developing countries.~ Despite the above 'gloomy' picture, South 
Africa's performance with regard to manufactured exports has not 
been entirely unsatisfactory when gauged by such international 
comparisons. Thus for instance South Africa features well in the 
list of the top twenty-seven developing countries whose exports 
exceeded $1 billion in 1980. Half the manufactured exports of these 
twenty-seven countries came from the top four; Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
South Korea and South Africa. 45 In South Africa's case these exports 
were mainly in the category 'other manufactures', which is a very 
mixed bag of manufactured goods. This makes it difficult to assess 
the extent to which these figures are indicative of the growing 
diversification and flexibility of South African manufacturing 
industry. 
What is clear from the data, however, is the limited South African 
penetration of the international capital goods exp'ort market. South 
Africa's exports of capital goods declined from 7, 9pc of total 
merchandise 'exports on average in the years 1969-1973 to 5,3pc on 
average in the years 1976-1979. 46 (Significantly, in the same two 
periods, imports of capital goods, increased from 44,2 pc of total 
merchandise imports to 51,7pc) Machinery and mechanical equipment 
exports have remained static during the 1980s, averaging 1,3pc of 
total 'exports over this period. However one expanding area of 
manufactured exports, which may account for a large part of the 
'other manufactures' category is armaments. Kahn quotes Jane's 
Defence Weekly as reporting that 'Armscor is now the largest single 
exporter of manufactured goods in South Africa, with sales to 
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twenty-three countries valued in 1987 at R1,8b. I The accuracy of 
the report was confirmed by an Armscor spokesperson, who added that 
'Armscor had changed from an importer to an exporter in the last 
decade' .47 
It is nevertheless true that, despite some attempt at export 
diversification, South Africa still remains reliant on primary and 
intermediate goods exports for its crucial foreign exchange 
earnings, as is apparent from Table 5. 48 In short it would appear 
that Kahn's contention about the status of South Africa's place in 
the international division of labour as a raw material or primary 
goods exporter remains largely correct. However, unlike other 
primary goods exporters, South African primary exports are 
relatively more diversified, both in terms of products exported 
and countries of destination, and in addition its principal primary 
export, gold, despite the volatility in its price in the period 
after 1970, remains a rather special and unique commodity, a point 
made earlier in this thesis. w 
A few points have also to be noted about the structure of South 
Africa's exports by destination. The first is the rather dramatic 
decline in exports to the United Kingdom. In 1970 the UK accounted 
for 29pc of South Africa's export earnings. By 1980 this figure had 
more than halved. Apart from the UK's own economic decline and her 
declining share of world trade in the 1970s, the major reason for 
this was the 1975 British ban on the importation of gold coins, 
including Krugerrands. South African Krugerrand exports thereafter 
were shifted mainly to Switzerland. In the 1970s the US replaced 
the UK as South Africa's leading export market, 14,7 pc in 1980 
compared to 8,4pc in 1970. 50 The decade of the 1970s witnessed a 
further concentration in South African exports by destination, its 
six major export markets increasing their share from 59pc to 62pc 
between 1970 and 1981. 
However, World Bank figures show that the 1980s appear to represent 
a shift away from this trend of increasing concentration. 51 Fears 
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of sanctions in the 1980s may have increased the urgency for 
diversification. The Far East and Japan in particular, have 
increased their relative share of purchases from South Africa at 
the expense of western Europe and North America. In 1982 and 1983, 
Japan surpassed the US and UK to become South Africa's principal 
export market. 52 Taiwan has also become more important in this 
respect, surpassing Canada in 1982. 53 In general South African trade 
with the Asian economies has risen sharply in the 1980s, exports 
to Asia including Japan, rising from 19pc of total exports in 1980 
to 31pc in 1987. 54 Kaplan has arg~ed that the growth of markets in 
the Far East is significant 'not simply because of the further 
diversification of export markets, but also because the Far East 
is likely to be the area of the globe with the most rapid sustained 
growth in the medium-term. ,55 Exports to Africa, as we have already 
noted, began to decline in the 1980s, coinciding with Zimbabwean 
independence and continued political · tensions. South African 
manufactured exports are the most likely to have been affected by 
this shift. Nevertheless, by 1984 South Africa was still an 
important source of imports for Malawi, Mocambique, Zambia and even 
Zimbabwe. 56 
(3.2) Imports 
South African merchandise imports increased five fold in the 1970s, 
from R2 S47m to R14 414 in 1980, but slowed noticeably in the early 
1980s, especially in 1982/3. 57 Looking at imports by category, two 
changes of . significance need to be noted. First, imports of 
manufactured consumer goods has declined, indicating increased 
local production of such goods. 58 Second, imports of capital goods, 
especially of machinery and transport equipment, has become 
progressively more important. Capital goods imports increased from 
an average of 44,2pc of total imports in the years 1969-1973 to 
Sl,7pc on average in the years 1976-1979. These trends accelerated 
in the early 1980s. Kahn has calculated South Africa's import-
penetration ratios (IPRs, the ratio of total imports to domestic 
consumption) and his figures show that import penetration of 
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machinery has been high, showing no tendency to decline since the 
mid-1960s. Over half of South Africa's domestic expenditure on 
machinery is devoted to imported machinery. The category 'Motor, 
vehices and transport equipment' also has high IPRs. Though these 
IPRs have shown a downward trend since 1965, they have not fallen 
significantly given the high degree of protection of these 
sectors. 59 
South Africa's imports have become more concentrated by country of 
origin, its six largest suppliers increasing their share of total 
imports from 70,3pc in 1970 to 76,9pc in 1980.~ The US replaced the 
UK as South Afri~a's major supplier in the 1970s its share rising 
from 16,8pc in 1970 to 19,2pc in 1980. The UK's sales to South 
Africa fell from 22,3pc to 17,1 in this time. South Africa has also 
increased its purchases from the Far East, matching the trends in 
its exports; the Japanese import trade rising from 8,8pc in 1970 
to 12,7 pc in 1980. Japan in 1981 became South Africa's main 
supplier of 'vehicles, aircraft and transport equipment', 'base 
metals' , 'textiles and textile articles' , and 'optical, 
photographic and medical equipment'. 
This reliance on capital goods imports, which is a crucial factor 
in a country's development capacity, and the narrowness of its 
sources of supply, is a central feature of countries in the 
'dependent periphery'. Such factors which constrain a country's 
ability to pursue an 'internally-generated' development, form 
essential elements in the dependency approach to characterising 
development in the periphery and semi-periphery. South Africa's 
import structure, its heavy reliance on such capital goods and the 
technology embodied in them, and its concentrated supply sources, 
provide dependency approaches to a study of South Africa's 
interaction within the world economy with their strongest empirical 
weapons. But some "qualification of this position is essential. 
The results of South Africa's import-substitution programme, which 
was accelerated after the second World War, have been mixed. In 
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terms of this programme, the country has achieved some considerable 
success in the production of (previously imported) manufactured 
consumer goods. state support for the local automobile industry, 
via tariff protection and legislative incentives, has produced a 
higher local content in the motor and motor assembly sector. For 
entirely different reasons, ie the arms boycott, south Africa has 
developed virtual self-sufficiency in the production of armaments 
to the extent that it now exhibits in international arms fairs and 
exports military ware to some countries, as we have noted above. 
south Africa has had less success in the development of a capital 
goods sector which would allow it to reduce its 'dependency', and 
develop a more 'a~to-centred' expansion. However, this failure can 
be ascribed less to ~ome 'imperialist desire' to block the entry 
of new capital goods producers than to the inability of some 
potential new producers such as South Africa to insert themselves 
into the 'virtuous circle of intensive accumulation', ie the age 
of production for mass markets which marks the post-second World 
War capitalist world economy. 61 
Thus for example, Kaplan in his study of the local capital goods 
sector rejects the widely accepted view that the slow development 
of South Africa's capital goods industry, and especially of machine 
tools, arises (in part) out of the predominance of foreign firms 
in this country, a technological dependence (overseas licensing) 
and the lack of local research and development. 62 Rather, in 
attempting to explain this failure, he finds support in factors 
such as (1) .South Africa's inability to develop a regional export 
market in capital goods; (2) the limited role of state aid to the 
capital goods sector; (3) the ineffectiveness of tariff protection 
in the face of the more innovative strategies of the Asian NICs; 
and (4) the effect of the economic recession and business cycle 
fluctuations in reducing effective international prices (via 
discounts). 
Al though the development of the local machine tools industry 
compared quite favourably with that of South Korea and Taiwan 
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throughout the 1970s, by 1982 the industry began to stagnate for 
reasons which include those itemised above. South Africa has had 
greater success in another branch of the capital goods sector, ie 
in its telecommunications equipment industry, but despite higher 
state support here than for machine tools, such state involvement 
still cannot be compared to the more 'pervasive and direct' state 
assistance in the NICs.~ 
This type of analysis which derives from the concerns of regulation 
theorist~ such as Lipietz, while not denying South Africa's 
longstanding and heavy reliance on capital goods imports, 
nevertheless reflects a far more balanced approach to explaining 
the limited growth of South Africa's capital goods sector than 
those flowing from crude versions of dependency and 
underdevelopment. The latter approach tends to emphasize the 
centre's need to keep the outside world in a perpetual 'state of 
industrial non-development in order to flood it with its products', 
while regulation theory goes beyond this to seek explanations 
within national economies for a country's failure to insert itself 
fully and successfully into the international division of labour. 64 
(4) TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE IN THE POST-1970 SOUTH AFRICAN 
ECONOMY 
It is when we look at technology, that the importance of South 
African integration in the imperialist system becomes clear. 
This view expressed here by Bloch 65 in relation to South Africa's 
technological relations with the world economy, was not untypical 
of an earlier emphasis in the post-1970s literature, derived from 
dependency theory, on the negative consequences for Third World 
development of a technological dependence on the advanced 
industrialised countries. Implicit was the argument that the 
technological capability of the Third World was extremely weak. It 
was only in the late 1970s that this assumption was challenged as 
the focus of attention shifted to an examination of the indigenous 
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technological processes of specific nation states.~ The pace of 
technological advance since the second World War, and the growing 
ease of technology transfer has dramatically shortened the average 
period of dominance and the resulting international competitive 
edge of technological leaders. These possibilities have been 
crucial to the success of some developing countries, such as the 
NICs. Thus for example, in the nineteenth century it took India 
some forty years to manufacture textiles of a quality and cost 
comparable to the Lancashire mills. In the second half of the 
twentieth century, it has taken only a few years for Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong to produce high technology products better and 
more cheaply th~n the US. 67 In short, it would appear that 
developing countries are no longer inevitably or simply doomed to 
a cycle of low growth as a result of technological dependency. 
The following brief discussion of technological aspects and 
implications of South Africa's international economic relations is 
not intended to dispute the fact that economic growth in certain 
crucial sectors of the South African economy is, and has been for 
decades, closely dependent upon the availability of a technology 
imported directly from the advanced industrial countries and 
applied in relatively unadapted form. Kaplan for example,68 has 
shown that the indigenous technological capability in the South 
African machine tools industry is very limited. And in general, 
technology in the manufacturing and engineering sector has been 
almost all directly imported, mainly through multinational 
corporations. until the late 1970s even state bodies such as the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the South 
African Inventions Development Corporation (SAIDCOR) focussed their 
attention on obtaining foreign technology rather than on developing 
°a domestic capability.69 This dependence has not gone uncriticised 
in some quarters. Barlow-Rand Finance Executive, Evert Groeneweg, 
has argued that, 
South Africa is the best colony that Britain ever had and we 
still are. We import manufactured goods and technology. We do 
not create technology. That is typical of boards [of directors] 
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throughout this country. Nobody says, though this is slowly 
starting to change, that we've developed technology ourselves, 
that we've tried it, got the CSIR involved, and tested the 
market. This is because
70
0f the colonial mentality that sits 
squarely in our culture. 
While accepting the dominance of these technological links with 
the industrialised countries of Europe and North America, one 
should also attempt to remove the blinkers of dependency theory 
and acknowledge local technological capabilities and advances in 
South Africa. Kaplinsky groups South Africa with India, China, 
Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan and Argentina as among the countries 
who have made advances in their technology in recent times. 71 South 
Africa has been among the world leaders in technological advances 
in mining and mining equipment. Freund quotes the South African 
Mining journal which reported that by 1986 South African mines were 
pioneering the 'most advanced use of computer~ in deep-level mining 
anywhere in the world. ,n Leger attributes th~ 'spectacular' growth 
in the scale and profitability of coal mining in the 1970s to, 
among other factors, the 'technological breakthroughs in the 
beneficiation of local coals.,n 
The international arms boycott of South Africa has also spawned 
the (terrifying) growth of a military-technological self-reliance 
which has undoubtedly (no figures are available for strategic 
reasons) had 'positive' spin-offs for participating and 
complementary industries in metals and other branches of secondary 
industry. The uranium enrichment plant (NUCOR) and the oil-from-
coal project (SASOL) are further examples of the development of 
local technological capacity, the former being a 'natural' 
consequence of the country's resource endowment, the latter arising 
out of the post-1973 oil price increase and strategic 
considerations. 
The apartheid state has also stepped up research into the 
development of a local technological capability, and especially as 
the middle 1980s approached, bringing with it increasing threats 
and then the reality of sanctions and disinvestment, the urgency 
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of diverting resources to research, development and co-ordination 
became apparent. In 1979, a parastatal agency, the Council For 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was given the 
responsibility for developing a national programme for the 
promotion of technological development in the industrial and mining 
sectors. Direct financial assistance was channelled through the 
CSIR to firms in the private sector as the 'best way of encouraging 
technological innovation.' 74 The Kleu Commission of Inquiry into 
industrial strategy devoted considerable attention to technological 
issues. 75 Thompson points out that in the last ten years or so 
expenditure on research and development in the mining industry has 
increased dramatically, by 460pc between 1973/4 and 1980/1. Research 
and development by both the private and public sector has 
increased. 76 Despite the fiscal constraints of the 1980s, state 
funding of the CSIR, remained, at worst, constant in real terms 
from year to year. The recent moves (c1987) towards privatising 
some of the work and mode of operation of the CSIR (and other 
state/national research bodies) suggests that the deepening 
economic cris~s is making this state support more difficult to 
sustain. 
The rapid increase in direct foreign investment in the 1960s and 
early 1970s undoubtedly had the effect of facilitating the 
introduction of new technologies into South Africa, tying the 
country's development even more closely to international 
developments in this field. However, the gradual decline in the 
relative importance of such investment via multinational 
corporations, the growth of (more flexible) foreign loan finance, 
the increasing involvement of the state and parastatals in the 
economy in the 1970s, and the pragmatic considerations arising out 
of increasing international economic pressure (sanctions and 
disinvestment) have all led to greater attention being paid to 
developing South Africa's own technological capability. 
Even if, as Thompson suggests, South Africa has now chosen to focus 
its technological attention 'primarily on adapting relatively 
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sophisticated methods to local environmental conditions and 
developing highly sophisticated products and processes for 
strategic and military reasons', n the likelihood is that there 
will, in the years ahead, be a further acceleration of developments 
in local technology capacity. The country is likely nevertheless 
to remain dependent upon foreign technology in many crucial sectors 
of its economy even though it may be forced by political 
considerations to obtain these through increasingly novel and 
secretive means. Information about technological aspects of South 
Africa's international economic relations have gradually been 
forced 'underground' in the post-Soweto era, and this t~ndency may 
accelerate in the near future, in the absence of a resolution of 
its growing pariah political status. 
(5) THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF CAPITAL FLOWS TO AND FROM SOUTH 
AFRICA AFTER 1970 
Disaggregated and comparable data on South Africa foreign 
liabilities are most readily available for the period up to 1981, 
and the analysis which follows is occasionally constrained by this 
and the increasing secrecy about the source and destination of 
capital flows to the apartheid state in more recent years. 
The most striking features on the capital account of South Africa's 
international economic relations in the period since 1970 have been 
the marginally reduced reliance on foreign capital compared to the 
1950s and 1960s; the decline in importance of direct foreign 
investment, ie where the foreign investor, usually a multinational 
corporation, controls the investment; the increase in non-direct 
international bank credit, which in the mid-1970s were mainly 
medium and long-term loans to the state and parastatals, and in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s were predominantly short-term private 
sector borrowings; the growing importance of investment from the 
US at the expense of the UK and the rest of Europe; the gradual 
increase in local shareholding in multinational corporations, a 
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process accelerating in the 1980s in the wake of disinvestment; and 
the internationalisation of South African capital ie the increase 
in South African assets abroad. Developments on the capital account 
of South Africa's balance of payments reached a climax in mid-
1985, with the dramatic announcement by Chase Manhattan Bank that 
it was calling in its South African loans. 
As a developing country with increasing capital intensity, South 
Africa's reliance on foreign capital for meeting its investment 
requirements is not unusual. Van der Merwe and Bester have 
calculated that·South Africa together with Finland, Greece and New 
Zealand, among the countries 'at a similar stage of development',n 
had the highest dependence on foreign capital in the period between 
1956 and 1981, measured in terms of the ratio of its current 
account ~ef ici t to GOP. However, South Africa's total foreign 
liabilities (direct and non-direct foreign investment) as a 
percentage of GOP declined from a high of 58,3pc on average between 
1956 and 1964 to 53,lpc on average in the next eight years. Though 
it rose fractionally to an average of 54,lpc between 1973 and 1981, 
this was still lower than the average post-war level. 
In a reversal of the pre-war position, there was a decline in the 
importance of portfolio (share) investment and a rise in direct 
foreign investment in the 1960s. However, there was a decline in 
the relat~ve share of direct foreign liabilities and an increase 
in non-direct liabilities, especially by the public corporations 
and local authorities between 1975 and 1981. From a high of 61,lpc 
of total foreign liabilities in 1969, direct foreign investment 
dropped to a low of 41,4pc in 1976, and rose marginally to 45,9pc 
in 1981. 79 The increase in non-direct investment by the public 
sector since 1973 was mainly in the form of medium and long-term 
loans from private international banks as well as international 
bond placements. The most significant developments in these 
categories were those in the mid-1970s. Between the end of 1973 and 
the end of 1976, public corporation's 'long-term indebtedness to 
the rest of the world increased more than threefold, nearly three 
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and a half times the rate of increase in that of the private 
sector. ,80 By the late 1970s, however, the private sector's non-
direct borrowings, mainly short-term and trade-related loans, also 
increased dramatically. 
This rapid increase in state and private sector foreign loans and 
bonds caused a sharp increase in interest repayments. This growth 
has far exceeded the rate of growth of direct investment 
remittances and dividends payments and has placed added burdens on 
the trade account of the balance of pa.yments. Invariably more 
short-term capital has been required to finance foreign debt 
servicing. 81 
The shortening in the maturity structure of South Africa's loans 
was not · confined to those of the private sector. Rising 
international interest rates, fears of a world-wide debt crisis 
and growing domestic political uncertainty caused a marked 
shortening in the maturity structure of loans to both the private 
and public sector. The average ' maturity of government foreign debt, 
for example, narrowed steadily from 80 months in 1973 to 34 months 
in 1982. 82 This shortening of the terms of foreign loans 
facilitated a rapid withdrawal of capital by foreign investors in 
the event of political or economic collapse, as the 1985 decision 
of Chase Manhattan and other foreign banks was to show. 
The increase in the ratio of non-direct loan capital to total 
foreign liab.i1ities (from 23, 4pc in 1956 to 26, 7pc in 1971 and to 
46,3pc in 1976) may be contrasted to the sharp decline in long-
term share capital 
of share capital 
liabilities at the 
(portfolio investment). The relative importance 
declined from 25,1pc of long-term foreign 
end of 1956 to 15,2pc in 1971 and 8,1pc in 1981. 
The reasons for the decline, relative to loan capital, include 
changes in South Africa's exchange control regulations which 
facilitated the withdrawal of the proceeds of share sales, the 
increasing foreign loan requirements of the public corporations, 
and political uncertainty and instability, especially after 1976 
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which increased the risk of such equity investment in South African 
mining and industry. Thus for example, following the liberalisation 
of exchange control regulations over non-residents in February 
1983, a massive R1 158m o~ long-term share capital left the country 
as foreigners dumped their shares on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) in order to reduce political risk and to take 
advantage of more favourable conditions in international lending 
and bond markets. This offloading of shares by non-residents 
increased the tendency, discernible earlier, towards greater local 
shareholding. 
Already by the early 1980s, Kaplan had noticed that foreign 
companies were selling sUbstantial portions of their equity to 
local firms, especially to South Africa's own giant conglomerates. 
Foreign c.ompanies selling their shares included ITT, Brindon, Read 
International, British Steel, Firestone, Dunlop, Chrysler and 
Leyland. Kaplan attributes this trend to the recession in the 
advanced capitalist countries, rising interest rates there and a 
liquidity and cash shortage. South African companies buoyed for a 
time by prospects of increasing profitability in some sectors of 
the economy (and narrowing avenues for productive investment) and 
with the active encouragement of the state, were 'willing 
purchasers.'~ By the middle 1980s, as foreign companies began to 
withdraw their South African investments, it was clear that this 
increasing local shareholding was being translated into greater 
local control and an even greater concentration of economic power 
in the sout~ African economy. These developments are in direct 
contradiction to the tendencies predicted by dependency theory for 
peripheral and semi-peripheral countries. Thus for example the 
disinvestment of Premier Milling in 1987 resulted in a change in 
ownership and the restructuring of the food industry. The 
restructuring has enabled the new Premier Milling/SAB group to have 
virtual monopOlistic control over several sectors in which they 
operate. The Premier/SAB group is in turn controlled by Anglo-
American Corporation, South Africa's leading multinational 
corporation. The Coca-Cola and Barclays disinvestment has resulted 
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indirectly in further gains for Anglo.~ John Wilson, the Chairman 
of the British/Dutch multinational corporation Shell, has argued 
that 'disinvestment has been welcomed by many [South African] 
businessmen and the government as it has increased domestic control 
over business ••• It can truly be said that disinvestment has been 
development aid to South African capitalism. ,85 These tendencies 
towards greater local shareholding and control, coupled with its 
status as a 'partner' with foreign capital, a point we shall return 
to shortly, are clearly an important indicator of the growing 
strength of South African capital. The result of these processes 
has 'been a relatively less externally-oriented (or compradorised) 
structure of development than that characteristic of many other 
developing countries. 
Though the European Economic Community (EEC) countries remain South 
Africa's most important source of foreign capital, their share has 
declined from 71,3pc in 1956 to 63,8pc in 1971 and to an even lower 
55,1pc in 1981. The share of North and South America increased from 
14,3pc to 17,5pc and to 23,1pc in the same bench mark years, the 
sharpest rises occurring in South Africa's recession years of 1974-
76. In accordance with its greater international role in recent 
years Japan's investment in South Africa has increased, while the 
decline in Africa's share from a high of 4,9pc in 1966 to 2,4pc in 
19S1 was mainly the result of the more stringent foreign exchange 
controls introduced in Zimbabwe after independence. U 
For most of the period until c1981 South Africa remained a 
relatively attractive area for foreign investors. Van der Merwe 
and Bester have established that the average yield on foreign 
investments in South Africa remained relatively stable at between 
6pc and 7pc from 1957 to 1981. (1957-1961: 6,5; 1967-1971: 6,9; 
1977-1981: 7,0.) However, Seidman has s~own that rates of profit 
of US firms in South Africa turned negative in the 'mining' and 
'finance and insurance' sectors, and declined in manufacturing from 
15,4pc in 1974 to 6, 5pc in 1982. 87 Yields on direct foreign 
investment declined in the mid-1970s as South African economic 
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growth slowed, but those on non-direct investment rose in the 1970s 
mainly due to the higher returns on gold mining investments, 
following the rise in the gold price, and the higher rates of 
interest paid on the mounting foreign loans South Africa received 
since the early 1970s. M 
Any analysis of changes in the sectoral structure of foreign direct 
investment in South Africa is severely constrained by the fact that 
such data was last published in 1973. with the growing secrecy with 
which South Africa's international economic relations are being 
carried out, it seems unlikely that this data will be published 
again soon. While mining initially made up the greater proportion 
of foreign investment in South Africa r by the 1973 the 
manufacturing sector accounted for 45pc of direct long- term 
investment, followed by finance and insurance, and wholesale and 
retail trade, . which made up 29pc and 14pc respectively. 89 The 
distribution of non-direct long term liabilities between mining 
and manufacturing stood at 29pc and 31pc of the total respectively, 
followed by financial services with 23pc of the total. 
One indicator of more recent developments in this area is available 
from stock broker Davis Borkum Hare's report on foreign holdings 
in South Africa's mining shares. Their analysis for the period 
December 1984-June 1985 reveals that foreign shareholders owned 
28,5pc of the total South African mining shares issued as at June 
1985, compared with 27, 43pc as at December 1984. However, the 
report noted that since May 1985 'steady disinvestment by 
foreigners of South African mining stock has taken place, chiefly 
because of political and economic uncertainty concerning South 
Africa. ,90 The normal delay in the transfer of shares, meant that 
these changes were not picked up by the study. The restoration of 
some degree of political stability after mid-1986 and the large 
discounts available on foreign share purchases via the financial 
rand may have subsequently counteracted this decline. 
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It is important to point out that foreign investment has, since 
the second World War, played an important complementary role in 
domestic fixed investment in South Africa as part of a national 
economic development strategy. During the thirty-year period since 
1946, for instance, the net capital inflow on average amounted to 
11,6pc of the annual gross fixed investment in South Africa. 91 The 
high growth potential of the country in the post-war period acted 
to attract foreign direct and non-direct investment. These foreign 
funds complemented domestic savings and contributed to vast 
infrastructural and strategic investments which (as the recently 
appointed Reserve Bank Governor) Chris Stals observed in 1978, 
'prepared the way for future development - the transport and 
communications systems, water and power, supplies, chemical and 
steel industries and harbour facilities are good examples of how 
South Afr.ica employed its domestic savings supplemented by foreign 
capital to pave the way tor greater self-~ufficiency .•• '~ These 
developments are indicative of the extent to which foreign capital 
of all types, interacted in 'partnership' with local and national 
sources in South African development since the war. 
Approaches to the study of a country's relations with the world 
economy such as those based on modes of regulation 93 and the 
internationalisation of capital ~ have deepened and sharpened our 
understanding of these relations in such a way as to allow for the 
incorporation of a sophistication often lacking in dependency 
explanations. Another area in which this is evident is that of the 
interpenetra.tion of capitals. Dependency-based analyses tend to 
focus on the unidirectional flow of capital from the advanced 
capitalist countries to the developing 'Third World.' As a result, 
virtually no attention is paid to the growth of and international 
diversification in the productive and investment activities of 
corporations in developing countries. These exchange-oriented 
approaches have, in other words, failed to capture the significance 
and implications of the recent growth of powerful conglomerates in 
many developing countries, especially in the NICs, which have 
themselves become internationalised. South Africa's giant 
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corporations including Anglo-American (AAC) and Barlow-Rand may be 
counted among these conglomerates. 
It was Legassick 95, but especially Kaplan 96 who pointed to the 
emergence of this phenomenon in the South African case. Excluding 
gold reserves, which in South Africa's circumstances is an 
unusually large part of the country's 'foreign assets', the ratio 
of South African assets abroad to foreign investment in South 
97 Africa rose from 24, 7pc to 31, 6pc between 1956 and 1981-
Especially in 1981/2, South African investment overseas picked up 
dramatically, with subsidiaries in a wide range of sectors rising 
'like mushrooms' in various countries. Among these companies at 
the time were Triton (oil), CG Smith (sugar), Pick and Pay 
(retail), South African Breweries (beverages) Plate Glass (glass), 
and Boart. and Form Scaff (engineering). 98 It was not only the giants 
which sought 'fresh havens' for their investments, and of course 
not all were successful. w But leading the charge with its overseas 
flagship Minorco, was Anglo-American, South Africa's largest 
corporation, which in 1982 was listed as the largest single 
investor in the Us. 100 South African investment has been mainly in 
the advanced capitalist countries, especially in North America and 
Europe. Its investment in Africa has declined especially since the 
independence of Zimbabwe, which for some time was the principal 
location for South Africa's African investments. 
Some recent examples of South African investment abroad provide 
one with a startling picture of the diversity and sophistication 
of South African industry. Anglo American Corporation's investment 
interest in South America is one such example. The corporation and 
its associates own the entire share capital of Anglo-American 
Corporation of South America (AMSA). AMSA and Minercao Morro Velho 
SA (MMV), its gold mining subsidiary have an interest in the Crixas 
gold project in the Brazilian state of Goias. AMSA's non-gold 
interests in Brazil include the Codemin and Morro do Niguel ferro-
nickel mines; the Copebras carbon black phosphate and fertilizer 
group; the Catalao ferro-niobium mine and interests in the Bozano 
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simonsen group, which is involved in banking, finance real estate, 
mining and farming. In Chile, Anglo has investments in the Mantos 
Blancos copper mine; in Argentina its investments include Petrosur, 
a fertilizer producer and Petroquimica Argentina SA, a 
petrochemical company. 101 Barlow Rand is another example. Barlow's 
international interests are held largely through J Bibby and Sons, 
a company listed on the London Stock Exchange. Bibby's 'base of 
well established operations provides the group with the springboard 
for sustained international growth.' 102 Through Bibby, Barlow has 
investments in the agricultural sector, in science products, 
mechanical handling, paper products and packaging and security 
printing. Among i ts diverse industrial interests 'the science 
products division (for example) is a world leader in the 
manufacture of single-use hospital and laboratory plastics and is 
Europe's .leading producer of re-usable laboratory glassware.' the 
main plant for these operations is in the UK, with ancillary plants 
in Spain and France. Barlow's materials handling division 
distributes Hyster lift trucks throughout the UK, Belgium and the 
South Eastern USA, making it the largest Hyster distributor in the 
world. 103 
These examples of the internationalisation of South African capital 
are (as Kaplan has observed,1~) an index of the growing 
sophistication of South African firms and of their ability to take 
advantage of changes in domestic and international conditions. 
Internationalisation has strengthened these corporations and left 
them more d~versified, both geographically and in currency terms, 
in the process. The decline in the environment of profitability 
within South Africa since c1981 and the gradual easing of exchange 
control regulations undoubtedly spurred South African companies to 
invest abroad. The fact that these South African conglomerates were 
able to seize the opportunities which opened up, and were later in 
a position to use their overseas profits to diversify further, 
point to the need to recognise South African capital as not just 
dependent and 'under the iron heel of metropol i tan interests', 
which determine and distort local development, but as creative, 
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adaptive and successful too, increasingly uninterested in expanding 
investments only or even primarily in South Africa, partly for 
• ,105 econom1c reasons. 
One aspect of the preceding analysis of capital movements which 
has been touched upon demands further comment at this stage, as it 
leads logically on to the analysis in the following chapters. And 
this relates to the dramatic increase in non-direct foreign 
investment, mainly loans, both short-term and long-term, and both 
to the public and private sector in the period since 1970. The most 
noticeable feature of' foreign investment in the mid-1970s was the 
increase in the non-direct long-term indebtedness (borrowings) of 
South Africa's public corporations (parastatals) and local 
authorities. Increases of 54pc, 61,6pc and 34,5pc were recorded for 
the (recession-hit) years from end- 1973 to end-1976 as compared 
to increases of 12, 3pc, 20, 2:pc and 17, 8pc for the private sector's 
non-direct long-term indebtedness in the same period. In Chapter 
5 it will be shown that the greatest proportion of this was in the 
form of medium and long-term loans for the state's infrastructural 
and strategic investments. 
The private and public sector contributed more equally to the 
dramatic escalation in non-direct foreign investment in the period 
between 1980 and 1985. Non-direct foreign liabilities increased 
fourfold in the period as compared to the twofold increase in 
direct foreign investment, so that by 1985 non-direct liabilities 
stood at R5~ 534m and direct liabilities at R27 927, ie half the 
, stock' of non-direct investment. The sharpest year- on-year 
increases were generally in the private sector. Between end-1983 
and end-1984, for example, private sector non-direct investment 
increased by 61pc. Most of this increase took the form of short-
term trade-related loans, which were being encouraged by the South 
African Reserve Bank at the time. Short-term non-direct investments 
to the private sector increased by 92pc between end-1983 and end-
1984, rising from R6 271m to R12 052m. The major creditors to both 
the private and public sector were foreign banking and financial 
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institutions. In 1981, for example 82pc of public sector borrowings 
were from foreign financial institutions.'~ However, South Africa's 
international borrowings also included loans from the IMF (over and 
above its reserve tranche limits) in 1975, 1976 and 1982. These 
borrowings are included in South Africa's international economic 
accounts under 'liabilities related to reserves' and classified as 
liabilities of the monetary banking sector. 
We turn finally in this section to examine the implications for a 
country like South Africa, of the change in the balance of direct 
and non-direct foreign investment, which occurred in the 1970s and 
1980s. While it is naive, in such an integrated world economy, to 
believe that individual nation states can hope to . be truly 
independent over questions of economic growth, development and 
policy, it is equally naive and crude to believe that the nature 
of the interrelationships that exist are such that one group of 
countries (those in the periphery) are destined to a form of 
development (or underdevelopment) that is entirely determined by 
the pace, rhythm and needs of another group of countries (those in 
the centre). Direct foreign investment, which occurs at the 
discretion of the investor, has undoubtedly decreased national 
autonomy over economic priorities in the recipient country. As 
Kudrle observes 
The growing interdependence of the world economy presents a 
threat to national sovereignty and direct foreign investment 
appears as perhaps the most palpable specific threat. The word 
'direct' .implies control by the foreign owned economic presence 
within a sovereign state, so that suspicion and conflict come 
almost automatically. 107 
However, there has been a relative decline in direct foreign 
investment in developing countries since the late 1960s and a 
concommitant increase in borrowing from private international 
banks. In South Korea for example direct foreign investment 
accounted for 82pc of all capital inflow in 1960, and borrowing on 
the international money market only 18pc. By 1975, these 
proportions had been reversed. '08 We would argue that the nature of 
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international bank loans may increase the borrowers autonomy and 
freedom to manoeuvre on economic, social and political decision-
making and development. This arises from the nature of control over 
the uses of foreign loans as compared to direct foreign investment. 
Because private international banks, unlike multinational 
corporations, most often have neither the inclination nor interest 
in monitoring the use of their credit, borrowers, either the state 
or corporations, may experience an increase in their relative 
autonomy. 
This c~ange in the structure of outside finance must be clearly 
understood. In the case of direct investment, a 'captain of 
industry' from the centre takes the 'risk' of exploiting a 
peripheral force and tries to sell the product, either in the 
centre or elsewhere. He may have borrowed the money himself, but 
in any case he is acting on his own ini tiati ve and will 
repatriate any profits he may make. In the case of bank loans, 
the bank prevalidates the borrowers income. More specifically 
when the loan is advanced to finance the import of capital 
goods, the bank prevalidates a given strategy of develo~ment, 
but it is the firm or state which chooses the strategy.' 
The new danger, though as has already been pointed out in Chapter 
2, is that of becoming mortgaged to the international banks. 
Private bank loans are usually short-term, with high floating 
interest rates and can be cut off if lenders become worried about 
the borrowers capacity to service the debt, or conditions in the 
international capital market change, or if there are fears about 
the political or economic stability of the country in question as 
the South African experience of August 1985 vividly illustrates. 
The switch to international bank loans and credit both by the state 
and private sector in South Africa as the increasingly dominant 
form of foreign capital inflow since c1973 has in our view totally 
changed the earlier structure of South Africa's links, 
vulnerability and 'dependency'. These changes in the international 
dimension under which accumUlation occurred, allowed the South 
African state to pursue policies of national industrial, strategic 
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and infra structural development, mainly through the operation of 
its parastatals, wi th greater autonomy from the 'dictates' of 
direct foreign investors and it may be argued even from fractions 
of national capital. However, a new 'financial dependency' was 
produced. When Chase Manhattan Bank called in its loans to South 
Africa in mid-1985, the consequences of this new form of dependency 
became dramatically and painfully apparent, and caught South 
Africa's banking and monetary authori ties by surprise. These 
developments will be examined in greater detail in the chapters 
which follow. 
(6) CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to examine changes in nature and 
structure of South Africa's international economic relations in 
the period since 1970, against the background of the growing 
international economic crisis discussed in Chapter 2 and an 
inten'sifying domestic economic and political crisis. It has shown 
that a variety of changes in the global economy as well as in the 
South African political economy have contributed to a reshaping of 
South Africa's international trade, technology and investment 
relations in a way which has biased issues of foreign loans and 
financial investment at the expense of trade and direct foreign 
investment. 
The chapter began with an analysis of the origins and central 
features of ~he crisis of the South African political economy. This 
analysis has been made in terms of the propositions of regulation 
theory, an approach whose ability to incorporate notions of crisis 
and change in a theoretically-informed study of a country's 
relations with the world economy over time, represents an advance 
over earlier modernisation and dependency theories. In terms of the 
propositions of regulation theory, a non-reproductive cyclical 
downswing in the South African ecqnomy was identified as having set 
in from c1974. It was argued that though exogenous factors, the 
rise in the price of imported goods and the instability caused by 
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the erratic price of gold, were important factors in transmitting 
to South Africa the growing crisis in the international economy 
after 1973, the nature, form and character of the crisis in South 
Africa were fundamentally affected by local economic, political and 
institutional developments and policies. 
Two intensified periods of crisis within the longer term downswing 
were examined in more detail. These were the years 1974-1977 and 
1981-1986. In both periods South Africa experienced serious 
economic and political upheavals, as well as balance of payments 
difficulties. Important changes occurred in both the international 
and domestic economic, political and institutional environment, 
which have affected South Africa's relations with the world 
economy. In particular the problems emanating from the slowdown in 
import-substitution industrialisation, the increase in black real 
wages, the escalation of political resistance to the apartheid 
state, the growth of an active independent trade union movement and 
the development possibilities and problems arising from South 
Africa's heavy use of private international bank loans have 
complicated and rendered less useful and satisfying those earlier 
analyses of South Africa's international economic relations which 
were influenced by the grand teleological approaches of 
modernisation and dependency theory. 
While it is true that South Africa's relations with the world 
economy has affected the pattern and structure of this country's 
development,. it is clear that post-war South African 
industrialisation, supported by foreign capital investment, did 
not fundamentally change the 'irrational' race-based nature of the 
South African social formation, as modernisation theory suggested 
would occur. It is also apparent that these 'external' links have 
not simply or always translated into 'vulnerability' of the kind 
suggested by dependency theory. In some cases the very nature of 
the 'dependency' has changed, reflecting changes in the 
international economic environment. This is most apparent in the 
case of the action of foreign banks in mid-1985, as we shall see 
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in Chapters 5 and 6. In other ways, changes internal to South 
Africa have created both development possibilities and problems of 
a kind' not easily accomodated within a dependency framework. This 
chapter, while not denying the centrality of foreign trade, capital 
and technology in the country's development, and a certain 
dependency on capital goods imports and technology, has tried to 
show that South African capital has also been creative and 
responsive, and that certain historical and institutional 
developments have further strengthened the country, relative to the 
'archetypal developing country', which underpins dependency theory. 
Thereafter the chapter went on to examine the effects of changes 
in the global financial system and in the South African economy 
and political system on the country's international trade, 
technology and investment relations. In summary form, the following 
were the most significant changes :which occurred in the nature and 
character of South Africa's international economic relations since 
the early 1970s. 
First, although floating exchange rates 'freed' the dollar price 
of gold and allowed it to rise to significantly higher levels than 
at any time under the Bretton Woods gold exchange rate regime, 
various factors, including fluctuations in the value of the dollar 
(itself a symptom of the decline of US hegemony), produced highly 
erratic movements in the gold price and introduced an instability 
in South Africa's export earnings - gold being the largest single 
item in South African exports. Thus despite the benefits of a 
generally higher average price of gold to the crisis-ridden South 
African economy and the unique and stabilising value which gold has 
for long afforded the South Af~ican economy, gold's performance 
over the entire period 1970-1987 was also a source of concern, a 
mixed blessing at the very least. South Africa de Kiewiet had 
' , 
argued, 'has advanced politically by disasters and economically by 
windfalls. ,110 In the post~1970 era the windfall of the gold price 
rise was tempered by its volatility, though the political disasters 
went on unchecked. 
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Secondly, inflation and recession in the industrialised countries, 
South Africa's main trading partners, the increase in the oil price 
in 1973 and again in 1979, the virtual exhaustion of new 
opportunities for import-substitution industrialisation, and the 
country's highly inelastic demand for capital goods imports, all 
combined to keep imports at a level which either forced or 
continually threatened to force the current account into deficit. 
Economic recession as well as increasing concern about external 
trade imbalances in the industrialised countries virtually 
throughout the period since 1973, the limited extent of more direct 
state support for, manufacturing production, a relatively high cost 
structure and growing pressure for trade sanctions, were some of 
the external factors which placed limits on the growth of South 
African manufacturing exports. When in the period of this study, 
the country ran current account surpluses (after 1976, and after 
1984), these surpluses were largely induced by the introduction of 
severely restrictive economic policies. 
Thirdly, while the increasing economic and diplomatic isolation of 
the apartheid state forced the country to develop and extend its 
,own technological capacity, international ostracism especially 
after 1976, has acted to cut the economy off from easy and 
unproblematic access to new technological developments. 
Nevertheless, the country has developed, in some cases, has been 
forced to develop, an advanced and sophisticated indigenous 
technological capability. This is particularly true of 
technological developments in the armaments industry. The 
importance to South Africa of its mining industry has also 
stimulated research and technological development in gold and coal 
mining. These developments in armaments and mining are likely to 
have had important spin-off benefits for other sectors of the South 
African economy. 
Fourthly, the gradual decline in the environment of profit-making 
after 1976, and from c1981 in the profitability of many sectors of 
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the economy, as well as increasing political uncertainty and 
instability led to a slow down in the flow of net direct foreign 
investment to South Africa. 111 Some estimates show that there was 
in fact a fall in the return to US direct investment in South 
Africa from 29pc in 1980 to 19pc in 1981, declining further after 
that. 112 The massive injections of US and European direct foreign 
investment, which characterised South Africa's international 
economic relations and changed the industrial landscape of the 
economy in the late 1950s and 1960s, had all but vanished by the 
mid-1970s. 
Finally, the growth of the international financial market (Eurobond 
and Eurocredit), opened up new sources of international loans and 
credit for South African borrowers, both in the state and private 
sector. The massive growth in international lending to South Africa 
owed as much to the absence of more favourable alternative sources 
of bank profit-making opportunities in the industrialised 
countries, to South Africa's impeccable debt servicing record, to 
the country's willingness to pay higher than normal interest rates, 
and to the seizure by the state of the opportunities these funds 
created to bolster its infrastructural and strategic foundations, 
as to expectations of long-term economic development and or 
political stability in South Africa. For international banks in 
this period, the latter considerations, both in regard to South 
Africa and other borrowers, appeared less important than the 
prospects of quick profits to be gained from the recycling of the 
available funds. However, as South Africa's political stability 
further deteriorated, banks first responded by reducing the 
maturity structure of their loans to facilitate quick retreat. But 
all this changed even more dramatically in July and August 1985, 
as we shall see. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE APARTHEID STATE: 1970-1985 
(1) INTRODUCTION 
South Africa, as part of the British Commonwealth negotiating team, 
participated in the Bretton Woods conference on monetary policy, 
and was one of the original twenty-nine countries which signed the 
IMF articles of Agree~ent on 27 December 1945. Thus, South Africa's 
membership of the Fund happens to coincide, except for the first 
few years, with National Party apartheid rule. Smuts, in what was 
to be his last term as United Party Premier had played a central 
role in the creation of the United Nations system, which included 
the international financial organisations, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World· Bank. 
This chapter represents a study of the nature and character of the 
relationship between the apartheid state and the IMF, the main 
focus being on events and changes which occurred in the period 
between 1970 and 1985. The chapter examines these issues by: 
1. noting and commenting briefly on South Africa's status and 
classification at the IMF, 
2. placing South Africa's purchases and drawings (or borrowings) 
from the IMF. in a comparative perspective, in relation to countries 
in Africa, southern Africa, and its present IMF group, 
3. examining the controversy which erupted in the mid-1970s when 
the IMF launched a programme of gold auctions. We shall examine 
its effect on South Africa, ·South Africa's reaction to these sales, 
and the effect, if any, on the nature of South Africa's 
relationship with the IMF. 
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4. analysing South Africa's borrowing requests from the IMF, and 
the controversy over these, in the mid-1970s, and again in 1982, 
5. attempting to examine whether South Africa's membership of the 
IMF, the conditions attached to its borrowing and or other such 
factors, affected or influenced the nature and direction of 
economic policy in this country, and finally, 
6. exam~n~ng the break in 1983 in South Africa's longstanding (and 
mutually beneficial) relationship with the IMF. 
This ensuing discussion will demonstrate that, despite mounting 
criticisms from various quarters, the IMF continued to .support the 
apartheid state, with massive direct financial assistance in the 
mid-1970s and again in 1982, being very accommodative in its 
response to the latter South African application. The South African 
state in fact capitalised on its 'ambivalent' status at the Fund, 
emphasising its 'developed status' as a founder member with a long 
history of .sound relations wi thin the world economy, on some 
occasions, such as over 'external currency convertability'; and its 
'developing status', with an important economic responsibility in 
southern Africa and a large 'underdeveloped' population in need of 
economic upliftment, on other . occasions, most notably in its 
applications to the Fund for financial assistance. IMF 
conditionality on South African loans remained minimal, although 
the Fund did on occasion narrowly criticise some aspects of South 
African economic policy, especially in regard to state intervention 
in restricting labour market mobility, and over exchange rates and 
subsidies to white farmers. 
In general, however the IMF was highly accomodati ve of South 
Africa's requests, and this support, it will be argued, rested upon 
the role which South Africa came to play in the world capitalist 
economy, a role based on its stabilising political influence in 
southern Africa, its value as a supplier of strategic mineral 
resources and its relatively attractive investment potential. For 
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most of the post-war period these considerations appeared to 
guarantee South Africa of the support of international financial 
agencies such as the IMF, which continued to be dominated by the 
US and other western industrialised countries. For this entire 
period, the IMF-South Africa reiation was functional to South 
Africa which benefited in terms of financial support and to the 
western industrial countries which dominate the IMF in terms of 
these political, economic and strategic advantages. 
However, IMF support was abruptly cut off in 19~3, primarily, we 
would argue, to complement changes in US foreign policy towards 
South Africa, cpanges which were precipitated by the rapid 
deteriora.tion in the economic and political stability of the 
apartheid state. The deterioration in the South African political 
economy, . escalating internal resistance and the mounting 
international campaign against apartheid, forced a reassessment by 
South Africa's long-standing western supporters of the tactics and 
policies they should pursue towards the apartheid state. These 
countries wished to encourage some change in a political system 
which was becoming unstable and an embarrassment to support 
unconditionally. Yet at the same time these policies and tactics 
had to stop short of supporting a slide into 'revolutionary 
transformation.' By tying future IMF assistance to certain moderate 
political reforms in South Africa, the US hoped to encourage a 
process of gradual political change in south Africa. The escalation 
in internal and international pressure against the apartheid state 
has, howeve~, complicated the reversal of the 1983 IMF decision. 
(2) SOUTH AFRICA'S CLASSIFICATION AND STATUS AT THE IMF 
Up to February 1980 the IMF classified South Africa under the broad 
heading 'more developed, primary producing country'. Other 
countries in this grouping included Australia, New Zealand, 
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Finland, Greece, Iceland, Malta, portugal, Rumania, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia. In addition, and until changes at the IMF in the second. 
half of the 1970s, these countries were represented on the then 
twenty-person Executive Board of the IMF by one elected 
representative from among them. These countries, through its 
representative Executive Board Director exercised a bloc vote, a 
vote which was weighted according to their collective quota 
contributions to the Fund. In 1975, Australia, then governed by 
Gough Whitlam's Labour Party, expelled South Africa, because of 
its racial policies, from the group of countries it represented at 
that time on the Executive Board. Whether Australia took this 
decision after c.onsulting other countries in the group is not 
clear. South Africa has since then been cut off from official 
representation on the Executive Board. 
In 1976, South Africa's Ambassador at the Fund, Joep de Loor 
unsuccessfully engaged various countries including Belgium, Spain, 
Turkey, Austria, the new Fraser government in Australia, as well 
as some other minor European countries, in discussions, in an 
attempt to regain a permanent voice on the IMF's Executive Board. 1 
However, South Africa's bargaining position on these issues was 
adversely affected by two main developments. First, the 
reorganisation of the Fund's quotas and voting blocs in the wake 
of the 1973 oil price crisis (OPEC I). The Fund had decided to 
accord more power to the Arab oil producing nations - with the 
possibility of granting at least one permanent seat on the 
Executive Bqard to an Arab oil producing country - in order to 
reflect the greater financial contribution to the IMF by these 
'oil-rich' nations. until such reorganisation was finalized there 
was some reluctance by other member countries, who were themselves 
not certain of what the reorganisation held for them, to make a 
firm decision in accepting South Africa. 
Secondly, adverse political developments in southern Africa in the 
form of the South Africa's incursion into Angola in late 1975 and 
the Soweto student uprising in June 1976 briefly raised the more 
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fundamental issue of South Africa's very membership of the Fund. 
Debate at the United Nations following these developments focussed 
attention on South Africa's apartheid policies, and fuelled 
speculation there that South Africa might be suspended or expelled 
from the IMF and the World Bank - the United Nation's specialized, 
yet largely autonomous, international financial agencies. The 
United Nations resolutions to this effect did not, however, come 
to be debated or discussed at the IMF itself. Clearly the anti-
apartheid sentiment at the UN, which led to calls for South 
Africa's expulsion from the Fund, was not shared by the IMF 
Directorate. 
On the contrary, the Financial Mail, reported that a survey of 
sentiments at the IMF 'shows pressure to bring South Africa closer 
into the ,fold. ,2 ' There was apparently some talk of South Africa, 
which itself controlled more than 1pc of the IMF's total votes, 
heading a new grouping within the Fund. (At the time each bloc of 
countries had to have at least 3pc of the total vote to secure a 
seat at the Executive Board.) Thus, the Financial Mail 3 reported 
that there was some talk among South Africa's 'advisors' that the 
country should 'hold out until the current reaction to Angola and 
Soweto dies down in the hopes of forming a Southern African seat 
with South Africa holding the director's chair'. However, this did 
not materialise and the issue was not raised therafter. South 
Africa did not participate in the 1980 regular elections of 
Executive Directors and remains unrepresented on that board. It had 
effectively" as the New York Times put it 'been put at the back of 
the bus,.4 South Africa has not technically been stripped of its 
voting rights, though it remains unrepresented on the Executive 
Board. Until 1983, the apartheid state continued to have full, 
normal borrowing rights, exercising such rights in the mid-1970s 
and again in 1982 on a massive scale. Since 1983, however, its 
borrowing privileges have also been restricted. 
In March 1980 the IMF adopted a new country-classification of its 
members. Australia and New Zealand were categorized with Finland, 
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Iceland and Ireland as 'industrialized countries ", and South Africa 
and six other countries from its previous group were re-classified 
as 'Non-oil developing countries'. within this overall category 
South Africa was placed in a sub-grouping of ten countries 
classified as 'major exporters of manufactures'. The other 
countries in this sub-group are Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Israel, South Korea, Portugal, Singapore and Yugoslavia. 5 
South Africa was not satisfied with the IMF's decision to 
reclassify it in this way, or ~ith the criteria upon which the new 
country classification was based. At the 1980 IMF meeting, the 
South African Gqvernor to the IMF, Finance Minister Horwood, 
expressed 'surprise' at the Fund's decision to abolish the 'useful 
category' of 'more developed primary producing country'. He 
submitted that the new classification gave too much weight to the 
single criterion of per capita income and 
not nearly enough to such factors as the versatility of the 
economy; the degree of industrialization; the sophistication of 
agricultural, industrial and mining technology and of financial 
institutions; the scope and magnitude of imports and exports and 
the dualistic nature of certain economies ... Viewed objectively, 
South Africa's classification in the category of non-oil 
developing countries is quite incongruous. 6 
He urged the Fund, 'in the interests of meaningful economic 
analysis to look further into the whole question of categories with 
a view to finding a more realistic and more satisfactory 
classification of member countries'. 7 It would appear the South 
Africa viewed the reclassification as a downgrading of its status, 
from being one among the few 'more-developed' (albeit primary 
producing) countries including the former Dominion countries 
Australia and New Zealand, to being one among many 'developing' 
countries. South Africa had after all, always regarded itself as 
being a 'major player' as a founder member of the Fund. This is 
evident in its decision to accept IMF Article V111. Despite these 
protestations, South Africa still remains so classified. 
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South Africa was the first country on the African continent to have 
accepted IMF Article VIII, so joining in 1973 only about one-third 
of all IMF members who had accepted the obligations of currency 
convertibility required by this Article, as well as the associated 
commitments in terms of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT). In terms of the GATT charter, South Africa's acceptance of 
Article VIII meant that GATT classified South Africa as an 
'industrial' and not as a 'developing' country.8 
By accepting Article VIII and hence with it the obligation of 
currency convertibility, unhindered payments and transfers on 
current transac~ions (especially for non-residents) and the 
liberalising, anti-protectionist, free trade ideology underpinning 
the GATT, South Africa was clearly attempting to distance itself 
from other less developed and less well-endowed countries; to make 
the point that it saw itself as an integral part of the system, 
traditions and values of the western (world) capitalist economy; 
and perhaps most importantly, to provide a kind of signal to 
international traders, investors and bankers that they could sell 
and lend to, invest in and otherwise deal with her w~thout fear of 
having their payments or loans or investments blocked, nationalized 
or frozen. 
For long the producer of a commodity [gold] which has an 
international monetary attribute, south Africa ••• came to regard 
herself as more wealthy, or 'instantly liquid', than most other 
primary producers. This, and the - associated highly developed 
nature of her financial structure, contributed to the forming 
of an 'attitude' to international monetary matters perhaps more 
suitable to a fully industrialized member of the big league than 
to a relatively less developed small primary producer ••• South 
A~rica. has an imper~tive ..• to a~opt the most acceptable 
f1nanc1al posture poss1ble and to seek to abide by the spirit 
as well as the letter of all agreements. 9 
Although Article VIII obligations mostly affect international 
current rather than capital transactions, its acceptance is 
generally regarded as an important symbolic gesture of a country's 
intentions or policy in regard to all its international 
transactions. south Africa's dual exchange rate system first 
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introduced after the Sharpeville shootings in 1961, being a form 
of control over non-resident transactions, would plainly count as 
a contravention in spirit of its acceptance of Article VIII 
obligations. Nevertheless, neither the IMF nor the international 
financial community, in general, did any more than occasionally 
'frown upon' the system. 
This supportive attitude to the apartheid state, in contrast to 
that of many other non-industrialized countries, lends support to 
the view that South Africa's exclusion from direct representation 
on the IMF Executive Board since 1976 was in fact no more than an 
inconvenience to its operations and activities. As we shall see, 
this 'disability' did not, until partially in 1983, adversely 
affect its borrowing privileges nor did it affect in any serious 
way the . favoured status granted to it by Western capitalist 
countries, most notably the US and UK who dominate IMF policy and 
decision-making when it really matters. 
Furthermore, on certain occasions, South Africa cleverly used its 
IMF status as a 'developing' country to its advantage. In 1982, 
$689m of its $lbillion loan from the IMF was granted under the 
Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF), a special Fund set aside 
for 'low income developing countries' who have little or no access 
to capital markets. At the time South Africa clearly had easy 
access to international capital markets, and other international 
financial agencies did not regard South Africa as a 'low income 
developing country'. The World Bank treats South Africa as a 
developed country, one with a high per capita income, and as such 
South Africa does not qualify for World Bank loans, which are 
mainly to middle and low income developing countries. The Bank for 
International Settle~ents in Basel, lists South Africa among 'other 
developed countries' along with Australia and 'New Zealand.'o Given 
these factors it is not at all clear that South Africa is a 
'developing country'. Yet its formal classification by the Fund as 
a 'developing' country enabled it to receive the $689m CFF part of 
the loan without there being a technical violation of the Fund's 
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criteria. This clearly limited the grounds for objections to the 
loan, which were made at the 1982 Executive Board meeting by the 
Alternate Director for India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Bhutan, Mr. 
AS Jayawardena. 
(3) SOUTH AFRICA'S IMF BORROWING IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
Table 6 shows South Africa's purchases of IMF funds representing 
both borrowing and non-conditional drawings , ie purchases on its 
credit tranches 11 and credit facilities such as the Compensatory 
Financing Facility (CFF) 12 and drawings of Special Drawings Rights 
(SDRs) 13 between 1947 and 1985. 
TABLE 6 

























390,0 (CFF and ordinary credit tranche) 
162,0 
902,2 (CFF and ordinary credit tranche) 
70,0 
Note: Unless indicated all other purchases represented non-
conditional drawings (not borrowing) on the reserve tranche. 




ALL PURCHASES BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES FROM THE IMF: 1947-1984* 
(SDR Millions) 
1947-79 1947-84 % Of Total 
Burundi 36,3 36,3 0,29 
Cameroon 40,8 60,8 0,48 
Central African R 13,0 83,4 0,66 
Chad 15,3 21,8 0,17 
Congo 18,5 24,2 0,19 
E. Guinea 2,8 22,1 0,17 
Ethiopia 43,9 137,7 1,1 
Gabon 17,5 24,6 0,19 
Gambia 12,3 43,3 0,34 
~hana 204,9 702,0 5,61 
Guinea 32,8 54,0 0,43 
IVOry Coast 58,3 722,8 5,79 
Kenya 212,9 631,8 5.06 
Liberia 65,6 293,4 2,35 
Madagascar 28,8 212,3 1,77 
Malawi 35,9 177,0 1,42 
Mali " 35,4 107,9 0,86 
Mauritania 20,7 71,2 0,56 
Mauritius 54,0 187,4 
Morocco 291,1 1416,4 11,33 
Niger 45,2 0,36 
Nigeria 19,5 405,6 3,24 
Rwanda 14,1 14,1 0,11 
Senegal 65,9 288,6 2,31 
Sierra Leone 50,0 140,6 1,12 
Somalia 23,7 140,1 1,12 
Sout"h Africa 980,1 1882,3 15.06 
Sudan 367,1 985,8 7,89 
Swaziland 1,9 16,2 0,12 
Tanzania 138,6 202,3 1,62 
Togo 7,5 71,2 0,56 
Tunisia 78,2 78,2 0,62 
Uganda 66,3 444,9 3,56 
Zaire 284,8 1977,6 "15,82 
Zambia 439,0 1225,7 9.81 
Zimbabwe 313,4 2,51 
African 7,5 13,4 
Purchases 
% of all IMF members 
Note: Benin, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Sao 
Tome/Principe and the Seychelles each with purchases under 0,05pc 
of the African total have been omitted from this table. 
SOURCE: Seidman, 1986, p241 (corrected and abridged); 
International Financial Statistical Yearbook, 1986 
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South Africa's IMF borrowings and drawings are placed into 
perspective when compared to the use of IMF funds by other 
countries, firstly in Africa, secondly in southern Africa, and 
thirdly in its post-198o IMF country classification. Table 7 shows 
the purchases by African countries from IMF between 1947 and 1984. 
South Africa emerges behind Zaire as the second largest African 
borrower from the IMF (15,06pc), its 1982 borrowing of SDR902,2 
significantly raising the African share of world-wide purchases 
from the Fund in that year, as compared to other years shown. 
TABLE 8 






































1. Zimbabwe did not receive any IMF credit under the minority Smith 
regime. 
~. Angola whose application to join the Fund was only considered 
~n July .1989, Botswana which made no drawings on the Fund and 
Mocamb~que which only joined in 1984, are not included here.' 
SOURCE: ~eidrnan, 1985, p 220 i 
Internat~onal Financial Statistical Yearbook, 1985 
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Table 8 shows that between 1947-1984 South Africa's share of IMF 
purchases amounted to nearly 50pc of all purchases of IMF funds by 
Southern African states. 
The IMF clearly regarded South Africa as the key to its plan for 
the ' economic development' of southern Africa. The Fund has 
frequently attempted to influence other southern African states to 
open or increase their dealings with South Africa. In 1980 for 
example Zambia was asked, amongst other policy changes, to re-open 
its trade routes to South Africa in return for IMF assistance. As 
recently as the 1984 IMF-World Bank meeting, official South African 
delegates and Western commercial banks lobbied strongly to boost 
South Africa's role in the economic development of the southern 
African region. Seidman 14 notes that the South African delegation 
was I .del ighted' with the outcome of these discussions. The decision 
by South Africa's major creditor banks to suspend new loans in mid-
1985, appears to have altered this view somewhat. This is suggested 
for example by growing support by some Western companies, banks and 
the British government itself for other regional iniatives, such 
as SADCC, which was established primarily to counter South African 
power and influence in the region. 15 South African monetary and 
financial officials have been at pains to stress the damaging 
effect on regional employment, electricity and transport linkages 
of imposing trade and especially financial sanctions on South 
Africa. 16 Clearly the US, some European countries, the IMF and banks 
could not have been impressed with this line of argument. 
Restrictions on new IMF and bank loans to South Africa continue to 
this day. However, this is not to imply that they would not overtly 
support South Africa's regional policy in the event of the real 
possibility of political upheaval in southern Africa. 17 
The IMF has, as we have already noted, since 1980 classified South 
Africa as a 'non-oil', developing country'. Within this category 
• I 
South Afr1ca was placed in a subgrouping of ten countries 
classified as 'major exporters of manufactures'. South Africa's 
share of IMF purchases and drawings, as compared to other countries 
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in this sub-group, amounted to 10,16pc of all purchases/drawings 
between 1947-1985. It has in that time drawn more from the Fund 
than Greece, Malaysia, Israel and Portugal (see Table 9) but not 
more than Brazil and Argentina (both of whose recent debt problems 
led to large borrowings since 1983), Korea and Yugoslavia. However, 
if one excludes purchases and drawings since 1983, the year in 
which South Africa's borrowings from the Fund were partially 
restricted, South Africa ranked second behind Yugoslavia as the 
largest borrower from the Fund in this sub-group, its 
drawings/purchases making up almost 20pc (19,06) of total IMF 
purchases. 
TABLE 9 
PURCHASES FROM THE IMF: 1947-1985 (SDR Millions) 























% OF TOTAL 
10,16 
NOTE~: * . ~xcludes Hong Kong for which separate statistics are not 
prov~ded ~n the 1986 International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1986 
( 4) THE IMF ' S GOLD AUCTIONS: ITS EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY AND 
POLITICS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (1976-1979) 
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The IMF' s gold auctions of the mid-1970s must be seen in the 
context of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the oil price 
crisis of 1973, widespread recessionary and inflationary conditions 
throughout the industrialized world and the attempts at 
restructuring the international financial and monetary order. 18 The 
Bretton Woods system was based on American economic hegemony at the 
end of World War II. By the early 1970s as we have seen there was 
an undoubted weakening of the US's economic strength, symbolised 
most notably by its balance of payments deficits and the declining 
value of the dollar. 19 But if the US was having serious economic 
problems, there ~ere even worse problems facing some of the other 
major capitalist powers. The British and Italian economies in 
particular were near collapse, the British being forced to turn in 
desperation to the IMF for a $3.9 billion loan in 1976. 20 The 
French economy was only marginally better off. Thus US's attempts 
to reassert its dominance over international economic affairs, of 
which their own Treasury and IMF gold auctions were but one 
instrument, often led it into bitter conflict with its major 
capitalist rivals, especially France. 
These international developments and manoeuverings soon made 
themselves felt in South Africa. As Johnson comments 'gold on which 
so many of [South Africa's] hopes rested, lay at the disputed 
centre of the international financial system'. 21 At the Rambouillet 
conference in November 1975, France, having relaxed its long 
championing ~f the cause of gold, and the USA, having conceded most 
of what the French wanted over fixed exchange rates, agreed that 
an earlier (August 1975) IMF decision on gold auctions should go 
ahead. This agreement formed the basis of the new IMF Articles of 
Agreement proposed at the annual IMF conference in Kingston, 
Jamaica, which significantly altered, though it did not totally 
diminish, the role of gold in world economic affairs. The new 
Articles proposed the abolition of the Official gold price of 
$42.22 an ounce, the ending of the gold quota payment to the IMF, 
and authorised the IMF to dispose of its gold holdings. The US's 
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own gold auctions and then the IMF decision, undoubtedly at us 
insistence, were designed to stop and then reverse the rise in the 
gold price, 'a veritable index of America's economic weakness and 
thus a sort of inverted virility symbol of us Treasury 
secretaries,.22 Rather than trying to prevent the rise in the gold 
price by fixing its value, the US had adopted a strategy of 
flooding the market with gold. The idea was to demonstrate th'at 
gold was unacceptable as a means of payment for international 
transactions. Both a decline in the gold price and its instability 
or fluctuation would, it was felt, achieve this purpose. The dollar 
23 would then once again be 'called upon' to replace gold. 
Alternatively or additionally this function could be given over to 
.the US-backed Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the IMF's instituted 
world currency. 
IMF gold auctions began on 2 June 1976. The ptan was to sell 1/6 
of the IMF's total gold holding (or 25m ounces) over a four-year 
period by holding eight auctions a year at roughly six weeks 
intervals. 24 Though the objective of reducing or demonetising gold 
was no secret, the decision to use IMF gold auction profits for the 
benefit of the developing world (by providing these countries with 
soft loans from the finance so raised) was the carrot at the end 
of the anti-gold stick. The system of bidding and pricing at the 
first two auctions for example appeared not to facilitate the 
maximization of revenue from such sales. Bidders paid only the 
IMF's predetermined, but obviously secret, selling price, even 
though they may have offered more, which supports the view that the 
main objective was something other than that of raising development 
finance. The US also fought hard, though not entirely with success, 
to have the IMF staff (who as we have noted are very amenable to 
the US position on most matters) control aspects of the IMF's gold 
auctions. This move, which was partially blocked by France and some 
other European countries would have increased the US's control over 
the auctions. It was reported at the time of this struggle over the 
control of the auction that the 'us will try to use the IMF 
auctions to create as much uncertainty as possible in the private 
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gold market'. 25 Eventually it was decided that although the IMF 
managing director (and staff) would propose how much gold the Furid 
would sell and at what price after all the bids were in, the final 
decision would rest on the IMF Executive Board, where the Executive 
Directors more directly represent member governments, and hence 
reflect their government's political interests more immediately. 
Although the major thrust of the US-backed IMF gold sales was, in 
our view, directed at restoring the US to the centre of world 
economic affairs, ie o.f restoring US hegemony, the auction offered 
the US the opportunity of using the circumstances to achieve other 
international economic and foreign policy objectives. France, the 
USSR and southern Africa were the countries and regions at the 
centre of these other US ini tiati ves, ini tiati ves which were 
spearheaded by Secretary of the Treasury William Simon and 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. 
Simon and Kissinger were both tough, ruthless conservatives; 
they both perceived the central importance of international 
economic questions to US foreign policy together they 
dominated Gerald Ford and made themselves the leading arbiters 
of the world's political economy, fully exploiting America's 
dominant position in the international agencies ·to which the 
depression (of the mid-1970's) had lent a new significance. 26 
The most important of these 'agencies' was of course the IMF, and 
Johnson remarks that Simon had little difficulty in imposing 
himself almost entirely on the IMF. 27 This was clearly not a 
problem, given the weight of the US's voting strength at the IMF 
Executive Board, the fact that the IMF Deputy-Director has to be 
a US citizen, and that the IMF staff are invariably supportive of 
the US position. It is to an examination of the way the US through 
the IMF (and in particular its gold auctions) attempted to settle 
some thorny issues in its southern African regional policy, as well 
as to the effects of the auctions on the South African economy, 
that we now turn. 28 
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Since Bretton Woods, South Africa's gold production and reserves 
had given her an important,- some would say respected, place in 
international economic affairs. until August 1971 in terms of the 
Bretton Woods gold-exchange system, gold remained the central 
underpinning of international financial transactions, though its 
importance as an international means of payment had declined some 
years before. The effective collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
precipitated a restructuring of international economic relations 
in which gold's importance was significantly reduced. While South 
Africa saw the resurrection of gold as an important part of the 
resolution to the world economic crisis, others such as the US saw 
its shortcomings ,as a principal reason for the crisis and planned 
their strategy, including the IMF gold auction, on the premise that 
gold ought to be demonetised. The US strategy succeeded in keeping 
the price of gold relatively 19W between 1976-1978. The gold price 
was still significantly higher than at any time under the Bretton 
Woods system. As important, however, was the fact that the gold 
auctions had the effect of producing major fluctuations in the gold 
price. After the second gold auction on 14 July 1976 the gold price 
collapsed to $107, and even after a partial recovery, remained at 
just $113 a month later. 29 This instability was to have serious 
consequences for the South African economy and its balance of 
payments at a time when the higher oil price (and oil embargo 
threats) were already placing strains upon her external accounts. 
(The economic and political difficulties which confronted the 
apartheid state in the mid-1970s have already been assessed in 
Chapter 3.) 3~ 
Although the timing of the first three IMF gold auctions broadly 
coincided with the Soweto uprising (June-September 1976) there is 
no evidence that the IMF auctions represented part of a direct 
western 'reprimand' of the apartheid state for the brutal manner 
in which the 1976 student-led protest was put down. However, the 
gold auction and the effect it had on the price of South Africa's 
major export, offered the US the chance to reach a settlement in 
another of southern Africa's troubled countries, viz. Rhodesia. 
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South Africa lay at the centre of the Kissinger strategy for the 
settlement of the long-standing crisis in that country which 
declared UOI from Britain in 1964. The IMF gold auctions and 
related developments were used to pressurize South Africa into 
forcing the minority smith government to accept the principle of 
black majority rule. 
In the wake of the vietnam War syndrome and the Watergate scandal 
of the early 1970s, and given the November 1976 US presidential 
elections, some major foreign policy success was seen as important 
to the Ford Administration. Kissinger saw Africa, especially 
southern Africa, - in terms of the global balance between the 
superpowers, and especially after the debacle of the US 
'involvement' in South Africa's abortive raid into Angola in late 
1975/early 1976, Washingt~n was anxious to push for a peaceful 
transition to moderate black majority rule in Rhodesia and also 
Namibia and so head off th~ possibility of (what it perceived to 
be) Soviet-Cuban intervention there. 31 
Kissinger became convinced that the Vorster government was the key 
to any peaceful solution in the region, a point also made to him 
by several African leaders he had spoken to in his mid-1976 tour 
of Black Africa. 32 However, there were two problems here. First, 
Pretoria was in no mood to do Washington any favours. It felt 
bitter at what it perceived to be US 'treachery' over the Angola 
raid, and the effect of the US-backed IMF gold auctions were 
compounding -South Africa's balance of payments problems. Second, 
it appeared that Vorster had gone as far as he dared in exerting 
pressure on Smith. There were considerable domestic political risks 
for the Vorster government. 'So if Vorster was to lean hard enough 
on Smith, Kissinger would first have to lean on vorster,.33 
As early as June 1976, just before the Soweto uprising, the south 
African government found most long-term capital (bond) markets 
effectively closed. Graham Hatton of the Financial Times reported 
that 
161 
In the run-up to the crucial Kissinger-Vorster-Smith meetings 
in Pretoria (South Africans) suddenly found the money taps ~f 
America and Europe inexplicably being turned off. Although 1t 
has never been officially confirmed, the firm belief here is 
that the American state Department was at work behind the 
scenes. 34 
The effect of all this was to temporarily deprive South Africa of 
access to private internatio~al bank loans which the country so 
desperately needed to see her through her balance of payments 
cr1S1S. Furthermore, the Financial Mail reported that in the 
Kissinger-Vorster talks in Zurich on 4 September 1976 the US 
Secretary of state 'is probably using gold as a lever: deliver on 
South west Africa and Rhodesia and we'll take the pressure off the 
gold price. Only the participants know if the stick had been waved 
so bluntly •.. ,35 Obviously South Africa could never admit to 
'surrendering' white rule in Rhodesia for foreign loans and a 
higher gold price, but the stick must have been waved. On 15 
September, the second day of the Vorster-Kissinger talks in 
Pretoria, the third IMF gold auction took place despite protests 
from the Russians (who, faced with the prospect of paying off their 
trade deficit with the US, was a significant gold producer, not at 
all happy with the falling gold price) and the Italians (whose gold 
reserves, pledged as collateral for a $1,5 billion loan from West 
Germany, fell in value rapidly) • . Consequent upon the auction the 
gold price fell by $13. The IMF announced the date for the next 
auction (27 October) immediately. The pressure on South Africa 
intensified ·further. There appeared little chance of a let-up in 
the immediate future. 
On 24 September 1976 Smith agreed to a transfer of power to 
Rhodesia's six million bl.acks within two years. Kissinger and 
Vorster had made Smith an offer that he could not have refused. 
However 'for all his efforts in helping to force Rhodesia to accept 
black maj ori ty rule Vorster seems determined to maintain white 
minority rule through separate development'. 36 Vorster and South 
Africa nonetheless were to be rewarded despite this. In the days 
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immediately after the Pretoria talks the gold price rose to $115 
and $120 by the end of 'september 1976. London stock-broker James 
Capel in its weekly review of 27 September noted that the US and 
SA had done a deal over the gold price: 'the US would allow the 
price to rise to such a level as to let the South African economy 
off the hook'. 37 And in a surprising move, given his previous 
'uncaring' attitude to possible erratic movement in the gold price, 
William Simon indicated that he would consider more frequent gold 
auctions, which would be less disruptive to the bullion market.~ 
Though such weekly auctions never did occur 'what w~s sensational 
was that Simon should appear to care about disrupting the market, 
that he should talk earnestly of the need for stability in the gold 
market' .39 Furthermore, T. W. Wol fe, a 'renowned anti -gold hawk' and 
former head of the US Treasury's Gold Policy office, was predicting 
a gold price of over $200 an ounce. Thereafter the gol<:1 price 
climbed steadily, if not spectacularly, 'taking the IMF auctions 
in its stride'.~ 
The IMF's gold auctions continued until 1979. The rapid increase 
in the gold price after August 1978, when gold crossed the $200 an 
ounce mark does, however, suggest that the IMF auctions had indeed 
some limited impact in preventing the dollar price of gold from 
escalating too rapidly in the period 1976-1978. 41 But were there 
other political and economic implications for South Africa? 
Three potential problem areas for South Africa will be discussed 
briefly. First, we shall comment upon why South Africa itself in 
the mid-1970s appeared less vulnerable to international financial 
pressure than Rhodesia. Secondly, we shall consider the effects of 
the falling gold price on South Africa's mining production, and 
thirdly the effects, if any, of the IMF gold auctions on the long-
term relationship between the Fund and the apartheid state. 
The gold auctions of 1976-1979 clearly added to the general 
instability of the economy and contributed to the growing crisis 
of the South African political economy. However, South Africa 
appeared confident that it could survive these pressures. Given an 
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economic and strategic importance within the world economic system, 
an importance and role which had evol ved over decades, there 
appeared, for example, little fear at the time that it would be 
forced through financial pressure into making the same political 
compromises as Rhodesia. It was, unlike Rhodesia, an independent 
sovereign state, and it had been received in many international 
forums as a respected member, however distasteful its racial laws 
may have been considered. smith's Rhodesia was both politically 
vulnerable, being a renegade nation; hopelessly dependent upon 
South Africa's favours and hence vulnerable to South African 
pressure; it was landlocked and easily isolated. Furthermore 
despite South Africa's political problems of the mid-1970s, 
resistance to the apartheid state was nowhere near the level of 
generalised warfare which prevailed in Rhodesia in 1976-1979. 
Although ·there are some similarities between Rhodesia and South 
Africa, both being open, primary-producing countries, using foreign 
capital and technology, South Africa has, even after 1985, been 
able to more successfully put off, resist or deflect international 
financial pressures designed to bring about changes in its 
political system. But this may change at some point in the near 
future as this pressure intensifies further. 
In 1976, South Africa's mineral export earnings surpassed gold 
earnings for the first time since the discovery of gold, and this 
gave South Africa hope that it would 'live through the gold price 
slide,42. The uncertainty over the price of gold did not appear to 
threaten gold production. The Economist estimated that most mines 
would still be profitable at $100 an ounce, the average cost of 
production in June 1976 being $72. The twelve highest cost 
producers, were mostly old and marginal in terms of profit and 
output and had inadequate facilities, and would lose if the gold 
price .fell below $100. But the breakeven point for the rest was 
estimated at a low $63. 43 
Finally, the IMF gold auctions do not appear to have represented 
any direct or long-lasting deterioration in South Africa's 
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relationship with the IMF. Although South Africa could not have 
been entirely pleased with all aspects of the IMF's gold auction, 
especially its timing, the bidding method and the dampening effect 
on the gold price between 1976 and 1978, the country emerged at the 
end of 1976, ie after the temporary politically-induced squeeze 
applied on it by the US, with its standing and borrowing rights at 
the IMF unaltered,« as the receipt of an IMF facility in November 
1976. 45 
(5) SOUTH AFRICA'S LOANS FROM THE IMF (1976, 1982) 
South Africa received its first stand-by credit arrangement or loan 
from the IMF in 1957/58. Like the UK's stand-bys of 1957 and 1958 
these arrangemen'ts were agreed to without conditionality 46 or 
phased .disbursals, which even in those early formative years of IMF 
lending were being imposed on other borrowers, mostly notably the 
Latin . Americans. 47 This example typifies the rather cosy 
relationship which characterised SA-IMF dealings throughout most 
of the post-war period. The Seidmans note that by 1972 the IMF was 
providing almost 60pc of all short-term non-direct investment funds 
available to South Africa from the central government and banking 
sector. This (unreferenced) figure appears oddly high. 48 Yet if this 
type of funding was even half of the figure the Seidmans claim, it 
would still reflect 
the supportive role played vis-a-vis South Africa by this 
official financial institution, controlled by the western 
developed nations. In particular, the IMF provided a critical 
source of funds to off-set South Africa's chronic balance of 
payments deficits. 49 
This balance of payments support, provided by way of loan 
agreements in the mid-1970s and again in 1982 best illustrates the 
special nature of the relationship between South Africa and the 
IMF. It should be noted at the outset of this analysis that the 
loans to South Africa will be judged against the IMF's own lending 
policies rather than against any other norm. This will enable us 
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to determine the extent of any preferential treatment received by 
Pretoria in its dealing with the IMF, in terms of the kind of role 
which the IMF has come to play wi thin the post-war global economy. 50 
We will begin by looking at the general background to the mid-
seventies loans, and then at the IMF meetings of January and 
November 1976. 
The IMF provided South Africa with credits of SDR91,2m in 1975, 
SDR390m in 1976 and SDR162m in 1977. These mid-1970 borrowings 
were, according to South Africa ~nd IMF sources in support of the 
South Africa government programme to strengthen the country's 
balance of payments position. The SDR160m purchase from the Fund 
announced on 15 November 1976 51 for ~xample, was made under the 
Fund's Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) with . respect to an 
export short-fall experienced by South Africa during the twelve 
month period ended August 1976. The success of the US policy to 
depress the price of gold in the mid-1970s which was carried out 
partly through the IMF gold auctions, and the resultant instability 
in its price, affected South Africa gold exports and hence its 
balance of payments. Despite South Africa's efforts to counter 
these pressures by introducing the new Krugerrand and cutting gold 
production, with her 'gold crutch', as Johnson calls it 'knocked 
out from under her, South Africa slid rapidly into a deep 
recession' .52 Clearly, the current account of South Africa's balance 
of payments had weakened from about 1974 as a result of the decline 
in the price of gold, the prolonged recession in South Africa's 
main trading partners, increases in the cost of imports because of 
inflation in the West, the increase in oil prices and what the IMF 
called 'expansionary demand management policies'. 53 . 
The case that South Africa put to the IMF thus emphasised mainly 
externally-induced factors, lagging exports, declining reserves 
and a deterioration in the balance of payments. But there were 
other factors affecting the balance of payments as well, such as 
the rapid increases in strategic and defence expenditure which led 
to the budget deficits, and in turn, to increases in money supply, 
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to inflation, to a weakening rand and finally, to balance of 
payments problems. From 1972 to 1975 defence expenditure rose by 
97pc in real terms. 54 The confidential IMF study of April 1977 noted 
that 'defense expenditure has been a major cause of the rapid 
increase in total current expenditure.' 55 
Though defence and law and order expenditure had been increasing 
from the early 1970s, following internal resistance and external 
concerns (mainly the issue of Namibian independence), the sudden 
urgency for funds around January 1976, the month of the first 
application to the Fund in that year, must be placed within a wider 
context. As Johnson dramatically notes 
By January 1976 all eyes in South Africa were fixed upon a 
single object -- the advance of Cuban troops towards the Namibian 
border .•. Beside this all the crises of , the 197 Os paled. The 
thing which Pretoria had so long predicteq, but so little really 
believed, had come to pass. A communist army was marching 
through Angola towards her. 56 
And Soweto, the single word that has come to symbolize the uprising 
of 1976 whose roots were in themselves not unrelated to the 
recession, was to prove a major influence in the further downward 
drift of the economy. In the politically sterilised offices of the 
IMF Executive Board these matters must have loomed large but were 
never raised directly. At the Executive Board Meeting of 21 January 
1976 in Washington DC the first South African loan application for 
that year was opposed on economic grounds by the Executive Director 
for Belgium r Austria, Luxembourg and Turkey, Mr J de Groote, who 
argued that South Africa, wi th one of the world's largest gold 
stocks to back up its currency reserves, might not really need the 
Fund's assistance and might easily be expected to be a net 
contributor to the Fund rather than seek its aid. He was also 
critical of South Africa's conservation policy, ie of cutting back 
production every time the world price rose and of 'keeping gold off 
the market' rather than selling it at lower prices to cover the 
balance of payment deficit. He concluded by arguing that 'the 
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current account deficit expected in 1976 was not entirely beyond 
the control of the authorities,.57 
The application was also opposed by AW Yameogo, the Executive 
Director representing seventeen West African nations who stated 
that South Africa could raise the money it needed by using its gold 
as collateral. Yameogo said that South Africa's problem was 'long-
term and structural, its treatment of the Black population' whose 
'education is not free' and whose ~ages and salaries are 'v~ry low 
relative to those of Whites. The distribution of income and of 
opportunity in general [is] heavily weighted towards the White 
population. In the future when South Africa needed increasingly 
skilled and literate workers to compete in the world markets it 
would not have them,.58 Both these arguments were carefully worded 
in economic terms, the only kind of argument overtly acceptable in 
IMF forums. However, the application was backed by the US and UK 
who both spoke strongly in favour of the request. Peter Bull, 
representing the British Labour government stated at this January 
meeting that the stand-by arrangement 'would give the [South 
African] authorities •.. some feeling of international support which 
they deserved'. 59 The request was approved. 
In November 1976, five months after the Soweto uprising began South 
Africa returned to the IMF with another loan request, this time 
under the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF). Whereas to gain 
approval for its earlier standby South Africa had merely to show 
a need and a programme to correct its balance of payment, for the 
CFF (a temporary export shortfall facility) South Africa had to 
argue that its balance of payment was caused by factors outside its 
control. An IMF staff analysis of South Africa's export performance 
supported South Africa's request for aid. However the staff 
analysis was severely criticised by some of the Executive Board 
directors at the IMF meeting. Executive Director Dini representing 
Italy, Spain, Portugal and Malta accused the IMF staff of rigging 
the Fund's own statistical formulae to favour South Africa's case. 
He found the analysis 'suspect' because its estimate of export 
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earning shortfall happened to coincide exactly with the maximum 
amount South Africa could request from the CFF. The west German 
delegate, Pieske, also found that coincidence remarkable and flatly 
stated that the projected shortfall had been 'tailored to the size 
of the requested drawings'.~ 
However, the US Executive Director found the staff's handling of 
the statistics 'entirely reasonable' and South Africa got its loan 
with US and UK support. Interestingly, (whether true or not) the 
confidential April. 1977 IMF study to S~uth Africa quoted US sources 
as stating that foreign investment in South Africa paid the highest 
return of any foreign investment in the world, a fact that along 
with what was perceived to be the high strategic value of South 
Africa's mineral exports and its stabilising role in the region 
goes far ' to explain the .enthusiasm of Anglo-American support for 
the apartheid regime at that time. 
Over the 40 year history of the IMF it has been extremely rare for 
loan applications which have reached Executive Board level to be 
debated at all. Normally, any request that reaches the Executive 
Board is assured of approval. 61 IMF staffers do not pass on a loan 
application for the Board's formal approval unless they are certain 
that it will be approved. That has been the tradition of the IMF's 
method of operation. Thus while the debate over the South African 
application was unusual, there was no chance of the application 
being rejected. In any event the voting strength and structural 
influence of the US and UK vote on the IMF was sufficient to steam 
roller the South African requests through. 
The continued IMF support for South Africa in 1977 (SDR 162m) is 
evidence that while, on the one hand, the, then Carter 
administration was castigating what it called the 'white 
supremacist South Africa regime' in public, it was on the other 
hand quietly greasing South Africa's palm. ,62 However, as a report 
in the US weekly Nation ~ notes, on certain occasions such as the 
South African and Argentinian requests of the mid-1970s the Fund 
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has come under severe criticisms from its own (non-US) Executive 
Directors but has been supported by the US Executive Director, who 
invariably endorses IMF staff procedures. 
Argentina and South Africa are two of the countries that gained 
by these procedures, according to the obj ecting executive 
directors; Jamaica and Peru are two that lost. The former two 
are among the worst human rights violating regimes in the world 
today, [the 1976 coup in Argentina began the Dirty War] while 
the latter two are at least attempting to follow democratic or 
Populist courses acceptable to a broad majority. Already, even 
without the discretionary power of the Staff, the IMF's general 
rules of conditionality are structured to favour undemocratic 
regimes willing to impose painful austerity programmes on the 
poor majority,. usually by violence. 64 
Gisselquist 65 notes that the IMF loans to South Africa il, November 
1976 and 1977 helped to steady South Africa's foreign bank 
creditors in the face of the Soweto riots. Thus the IMF, and 
especially the US and UK vote within it, played an important 
support role by overriding economic and the obvious but unvoiced 
political and moral objections to support, in times of political 
uncertainty, a member country which was closely integrated into 
its international network of trade, investment and strategic 
interests. In fact the IMF balance of payment assistance to South 
Africa in the two years 1976 and 1977 (when most developing 
countries were experiencing severe external economic difficulties) 
was greater than the combined IMF assistance to all other African 
countries for the same period. In those two years, only two other 
countries, Britain and Mexico were bigger beneficiaries of IMF 
aid. 66 
The years 1977-81 witnessed an increasing deterioration in the 
state of the world economy Which affected most developed and 
developing countries. Problems of stagflation, exchange rate co-
ordination, adjustment procedures to deal with balance of payments 
deficits, and mounting debt were some of the issues which dominated 
international financial discussions. In the wake of the Thatcher 
(1979) and Reagan (1980) electoral successes, a much tougher line 
as regards financial assistance to developing countries was 
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beginning to emerge. This was in line with the emergence of a new 
brand of radical conservatism in these countries. 
South Africa's Finance Minister Horwood however, was able to report 
at the ' annual IMF-World Bank meetings in these years that South 
Africa was doing rather well, having turned . around the 1974-76 
balance of payment deficit. The country ran current account 
surpluses between 1977 and 1980. Horwood attributed the success to 
South Africa's monetary and fiscal restraint. 1979/80 were also the 
years of the brief gold-led boom in the South ~frican economy. The 
gold price averaged $613 (R477) in 1980. 67 However, in 1981 with 
the gold price declining sharply and imports surging, South Africa 
once again ran up a deficit on the current account of the balance 
of payment in the order of a massive $4380m. By mid-1982, South 
Africa, despite numerous denials by top financial, officials,68 
approached the IMF for a stand-by loan of $1,1 biilion.~ South 
Africa had already drawn $122m from its reserve po~ition in the 
Fund and declared its intention to draw an additional $132m through 
the SDR account. These are automatic and non-conditional borrowing 
rights that a member may choose to exercise. 
South Africa's approach to the Fund was made in mid-1982 ro but on 
US advice 71 was not announced until october 1982, a few weeks 
before the IMF Executive Board meeting. The expectation that the 
application would be controversial was to prove correct. Opinion 
ranged from those who urged that the loan not be approved under 
any circumstances n to those who stated that the loan should be 
approved on condition that South Africa abolished 'apartheid 
imposed' rigidities. n Thus the Economist argued that 
the loan should come in the normal way with conditions attached. 
Unfortunately, in its anxiety to avoid trouble the IMF is 
~empted to pretenq that apartheid is economically speaking an 
~rrelevance. That is rather like visiting Cape Town and 
overlooking Table Mountain. An IMF that feels obliged to tell 
other borrowing member countries to raise food prices (eg . 
Egypt); ,to, devalue currencies (eg. Sudan) and temporarily to 
r 7duce l~v~ng standards (eg. almost everybody) should not remain 
s~lent about labour-market rigidities in South Africa. n 
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others such as the Wall street Journal were concerned that any 
moves to deny South Africa the loan would amount to a 
politicization of the Fund. However, the Journal went on to point 
out that it was not 
wild about the idea of an IMF loan to South Africa, or any 
number of other countries for that matter. In our view, South 
Africa has a fundamentally sound economy and it could easily 
bridge its temporary balance of payments problems by going to 
commercial banks for a loan. It would pay a higher interest 
rate, but with world credit already stretched so thin we can 
see no reason for taxpayers to subsidize those who can make it 
on their own. 75 
As is evident from these two quotes, obj ections to the South 
African request took various forms and emanated from various 
quarters. Five IMF Executive Directors lodged strong technical and 
economic arguments against the loan at the Board's meeting of 3 
November 1982. They argued that the South African loan did not meet 
the standard of conditionality imposed on other borrowers, in 
addition to questioning the need for the loan based on IMF 
predictions of a $1,6 billion South Africa trade surplus for 1983, 
and a debt service ratio of 7,9pc, expected to drop to 7pc in 1983. 
It was pointed out that South Africa was creditworthy enough to 
meet its requirements without any difficulty on the international 
capital market. Korner et al commenting on these arguments note 
that it was likely that the 'South African regime was primarily 
interested in the aura of international approval which goes with 
IMF loans and [that this] would thus demonstrate to critics and 
sceptics at home and abroad how ineffective UN boycott calls are' .76 
The loan was only partly drawn upon and repayment, which continued 
until 1988, began earlier than scheduled - considerations that add 
weight to the validity of these arguments. South Africa was able 
to use its status as a 'developing country' to acquire easy IMF 
assistance, for reasons other than 'purely financial' ones. 
It was further argued at the Board meeting: (1) that the loan 
package was heavily front-loaded ie. that South Africa got 80pc of 
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its $1,1 billion before fulfilling any conditions at all; (2) that 
South Africa had exercised inadequate budget restraint, citing its 
heavy defence expenditure; (3) that there was insufficient monetary 
control citing as an example the subsidies to white farmers; (4) 
that the distortions and artificial barriers to employment and job 
mobility created by apartheid had to be among the conditions set 
by the IMF before it approve the loan; (5) that the decline in 
South Africa's interest rate shortly before the meeting and the 
move by the South Africa Reserve Bank to lower reserve requirements 
for commercial banks were contrary to the restrictive monetary 
policies that the IMF would normally insist upon. 
Some western representatives did criticize' the contents of the 'loan 
programme. For example, there was broad consensus on the need for 
South Africa to undertake structural adjustments in regard to 
labour market rigidities but the directors differed on whether or 
not this should be a condition of the stand-by loan. Altogether 
seven Executive Directors representing sixty-eight countries 
refused to support the loan and nine called for a postponement. 
However Executive Directors representing the US, Canada and Western 
Europe backed the loan. This latter group vote added up to 51,9pc 
of the IMF total and the loan was approved. 
Evidence to the effect that South Africa received preferential 
treatment from the IMF in this instance also came from other 
sources. The objections raised by these latter sources (omitted 
here are those already raised by the IMF Executive Directors and 
noted above) include: 
1. that 60pc of the package was a loan under the CFF, which 
normally carries much easier terms of conditionality. This division 
would normally have to be made after ' an analysis of the precise 
nature of the balance of payments p~oblem. But as Professor Richard 
Eckaus of the Massach':1setts Institute of Technology notes the 
question was not addressed, 'it was simply ignored by the IMF in 
its consideration of the financial assistance,.n 
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2. that the Fund at the time had pressure on its resources from, 
and in general favoured, two types of borrowers: on the one hand 
lower-income countries (judged in . terms of per capita income) and 
on the other, countries whose borrowing requirements were much 
larger than South Africa's. Compared to these other (1982) 
borrowers South Africa's debt problems were insignificant and its 
per capita income was much higher. Therefore South Africa's request 
at that time was unusual, coming from a country which was of 
nei ther type. It therefore ought to have had put up a very 
convincing case to secure the loan. However, as the evidence 
suggests South Africa was not forced to make such a strong case. 
3. that the abolition of or even promises to abolish certain 
South Africa policies, for examp~e dual exchange rates and the 
import surcharge, was not made a condition of loan, when these 
policies were generally anathema to the economic philosophy of the 
IMF. 
4. that it was not clear that South Africa was a 'developing 
country' which was necessary for it to qualify for the eFF. This 
eFF was incidentally the largest such loan to any country in the 
Fund's history at that time. This issue has been dealt with in 
Section 2, above. 
These are undoubtedly formidable economic obj ections, applying 
well-established Fund criteria. Yet the loan was approved.~ Though 
by the end of 1982 South Africa's status and borrowing rights at 
the IMF remained secure, this ' special relationship' did not 
survive much longer as we shall see later in this Chapter. 
(6) THE IMF AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
We have seen that the IMF consistently ignored or overlooked major 
economic and political policy issues in granting loans to the 
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apartheid state in 1975, 1976, 1977 and again in 1982. IMF loans 
to most other developing and middle-income countries in this period 
were usually made conditional on the borrowing country's intent to 
eliminate such policies with which the IMF was not in agreement. 
This does not imply, however, that the IMF had no influence on the 
nature and direction of economic policy in South Africa. For 
despite South Africa's importance within the world capitalist 
system it is not exempt from the influence, guidance and even 
discipline of the IMF, for this ability to operate above specific 
national interests and inter-capitalist rivalry is central to the 
IMF's function and role in this system. The way in which the IMF 
performs or attempts to perform, this role varies from country to 
country, according to the changing objective conditions within ·the 
world economy. In South Africa's case, as for most other countries, 
the IMF's influence (at the most generalized level) operates 
through two channels. 
First, that South Africa's membership of the IMF and its high 
degree of participation in and interaction within the world 
capitalist system caused it to drift in the direction of the 
central policies and trends adopted by the dominant member 
countries of the IMF. Secondly, the IMF, despite its reluctance 
until 1983 to adopt a formal position on the relationship between 
apartheid and the South African economy, did at different times 
and in varying degrees attempt to nudge and prod the South African 
authorities in certain economic policy directions. Some aspects of 
South African economic policy were discussed at the Executive Board 
meetings at the time of South African loan applications especially 
in 1982. (These issues which have been noted earlier in Section 3 
will be dealt in more detail shortly.) After South Africa's mid-
1970 loans, the IMF has sent an annual mission of its staffers to 
monitor this country's economic performance. The IMF mission meets 
wi th South Africa's top monetary and Treasury officials among 
others, and it is on such occasions too that South Africa's 
economic policy comes up for discussion and evaluation. In addition 
other formal and informal channels of communication exist, such as 
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through South Africa's representative at the IMF and at the annual 
IMF-World Bank meeting. 
Let us now briefly examine the IMF's influence on South African 
economic policy in terms of both these channels of influence, 
noting the extent of accord, as well as the major concerns and 
problem areas identified by the IMF in South Africa's economic 
policy over the period 1970-1985. We begin with the first of these 
channels. The discussion will be structured into three time 
periods, c1971-1976, 1977-1979, and 1980 and after. US 
international economic policy and st~ategy in the years 1971-1976 
was characterised by an aggressive attempt to restore US hegemony 
in international economic relations. The onus of adjustment was 
placed on Europe and Japan, which were expected to adopt 
restrictive economic policy to cut their growth rates s,? as to 
bring their external balances into equilibrium.~ In the US and the 
FRG, especially, tough monetary and fiscal policies were .adopted 
to combat inflation. The IMF was central to US international 
economic policy and US Tr~asury Secretary William Simon (1973-
1976) moved quickly to reassert US authority on this international 
economic institution and to give it new direction and purpose, 
though not always with great success.~ 
The shift in emphasis towards more restrictive economic policy by 
the US and the IMF was welcomed by some factions in the South 
African monetary and financial hierarchy. South Africa, at the 
time, was itself emerging from a period of heavy spending in the 
early 1970s, which left in its wake rising inflation, unemployment 
and severe balance of payments problems. In attempting to deal with 
these problems (by now fairly generalized in the capitalist 
economies) South Africa took the lead of the US and the IMF in 
adopting much tighter restraint on monetary and fiscal policies. 
Such policies were seen as crucial in turning around the mid-l970s 
balance of payments deficits. Senior Deputy-Governor of the SARB 
at the time, Gerhard de Kock, reported after the 1976 IMF meeting, 
not without some satisfaction that he 
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detected in the speeches this year by leaders such as Mr 
witteveen, the managing director of the IMF and Mr Wi~liam 
Simon, the American treasury secretary, a new found emphasls on 
fighting inflation, on financia~ discipli~e and on the curbing 
of domestic demand through tough flscal and monetary 
policies ••• For the more developed primary producing countries 
the category into which South Africa falls •.• we will be looking 
• 81 for export-led recoverles. 
Restrictive policies to reduce domestic demand and the preference 
for outward-looking trade policies implicit here are clear evidence 
of a shift towards accepting more anti-interventionist positions 
in tackling the problem of national economies in the post-Bretton 
Woods era. These 'policies were designed to roll back the post-war 
welfare capitalist consensus, upon which basis the post-war Fordist 
regime of accumulation had rested. The onset of crisis in the 
industrialised countries led the US and UK in particular to attack 
the basis of this consensus as part of a new approach to the 
resolution of the crisis. Though in general South Africa moved in 
step with the US and UK in this regard, by 1975/6, there still 
remained at least one area of fundamental disagreement between 
South Africa and the most of the international economic community, 
and that was over the emerging trend towards institutional ising and 
legitimizing the system of floating exchange rates. 82 At the 1975 
IMF annual meeting Horwood strongly opposed floating exchange 
rates, arguing that the system 
poses serious problems, particularly, but not exclusively for 
the less 'industrialised countries with underdeveloped exchange 
markets •.• ! believe that we should plan now for the return to 
some system of stable exchange rates, adjustable only in the 
case of changes in basic economic conditions ••• I am convinced 
that ~t would be a retrograde step to legitimize generalised 
floatln~ as a permament feature of the international monetary 
system. . 
The real fear, we would argue, which underpinned Horwood's 
opposition to floating exchange rates, was the potential danger of 
price instability which a floating exchange rate system might pose 
for South Africa's gold export earnings. Despite the potential 
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windfall of a higher gold price which floating exchange rates might 
bring, it was the danger of an erratic gold price which was more 
feared. Neither, given looming IMF gold auctions, was there any 
guarantee that the gold price was headed upwards at all. Combined 
with the effects of the imminent us Treasury and IMF gold auctions, 
the adoption of floating rates, it was feared, may have introduced 
a potentially damaging volatility and instability into the price 
behaviour of South Africa's primary export commodity. The 
stabilizing and counter-cyclical ' role of gold to the sou~h African 
economy would be seriously affected, especially at a time when 
South Africa's balance of payments was running large deficits. By 
the late 1970s, ' after the publication of the interim de Kock 
commission recommendations, the official stance of South Africa's 
monetary and financial authorities favoured the freeing of the 
exchange 'rate, the abolition of the dual exchange rate etc. Though 
some officials, including de Kock, appear to have been champions 
of market-oriented policies in the 1970s, it is clear that not 
until the late 1970s was there more overt support among the major 
policy-makers for market-oriented policies in this area of South 
African economic policy. 
In other areas it would appear that there was greater accord 
between South Africa, the IMF and the new policies of the major 
industrialised countries. Thus for example, in response to an 
attack upon South African economic authorities by the Financial 
Mail in 1976, in which the Mail accused South Africa of profligacy, 
of failing to itself apply adequate restraint and of letting the 
'IMF gnomes' take over South Africa's credit policy, Finance 
Minister Horwood replied that 'the targets set out in the letter 
of intent M in respect of domestic credit expansion and bank credit 
to the government sector are in line with official policy and were 
in fact suggested by the South African authorities and accepted 
without question by the IMF,.M He added that the Fund had after a 
thorough investigation 'expressed its confidence in the fiscal and 
monetary policies and objectives of the South African government', 
and that the 1975 and 1976 IMF missions to South Africa submitted 
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reports which were positive and constructive and which 
substantially vindicated the policies South Africa had adopted. 
While the Financial Mail was probably correct in its assessment of 
the South African situation as it had stood in the immediate past, 
(in the 'years of profligacy') what it apparently had not yet 
recognised was that South Africa had indeed just shifted to a much 
tougher economic policy in an attempt to come to grips with its 
inflation, unemployment and balance of payments problems. If this 
shift was suggested by the IMF, as was probably the case, the South 
African authorities probab~y needed little persuasion. The 
Apartheid state was far from being strai tj acketed by the ' IMF 
gnomes' • 
In contrast to Nixon's international economic strategy, the Carter 
administration attempted to reduce the cost of adjustment 
shouldered by the Europeans and J"apanese and engaged them in 
'concerted action to prop up the ~orld economy. ,86 Parboni has 
argued that the 'Carter years stand out as the only instance when 
the United States tried with serious conviction to solve the 
problems of the American economy in a cooperative spirit. ,87 There 
was in this period a brief revival world-wide of Keynesian demand 
management policies. Witness for example Carter's commitment to 
increased US funding of multi-lateral international agencies such 
as the IMF and World Bank and the Brandt Commission proposals to 
eliminate purchasing power bottlenecks in developing countries. 
The policies of the carter Administration and the appointment of 
Robert McNamara at the World Bank thus did appear to herald a 
'softer' approach to developing countries. Though ironically Carter 
adopted a publicly tougher stance towards South Africa, this was 
not apparent, as we have seen, in the US's attitude to South Africa 
at the IMF. The highly accomodative attitude towards South Africa 
and its economic policies, even where these violated IMF 
philosophy, appeared not to be affected by the changes of 
directions in US international economy policy. Through these years 
(1977-1979) South Africa stuck to its tight economic policies and 
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Horwood proudly announced this fact at IMF annual meetings. 
Escalating political problems, uncertainty about the gold price and 
the need to restore and retain a healthier balance of payments, 
forced the continuance of these restrictive domestic policies, 
whatever grander designs were being debated elsewhere. 
south Africa's major problem in 1977/78 was to counter the growing 
threats of international isolation which followed the Soweto 
uprising. The IMF was at this time very sensitive to south Africa's 
growing political (and economic) estrangement from the rest of the 
western industrial world, and of the impact this was having on the 
country's creditworthiness. The 1978 IMF staff analysis of the 
South African economy recommended that South Africa unpeg the Rand 
from the dollar and put its currency in a managed float both for 
exchange stability reasons and also as a way to 'depoliticize' the 
currency from outside pressure and the 'disturbing' outflows of 
capital from this tinderbox region'.~ This was to prove an 
important signal to international (and especially US) banks which 
at the time were coming under intense pressure to disinvest from 
South Africa. 
As Euromoney noted at the time, 'a signal from the IMF that [South 
Africa's] problem is recognised and can be solved can go a long way 
to stiffen the resolve of the banking community ... ,89 
The IMF. staff reported further that 'they and the South African 
officials agreed that there would be no expansionary policies for 
the present in the South African economy - wage, price and money 
growth restraints would be kept on as a matter of course'.~ The 
only note of disquiet which apparently emerged in an otherwise 
conflict-free 1978 IMF mission, was over rumours that part of the 
illegal flow of funds out of the country after Soweto was 'being 
accomplished with the connivance of some highly placed members of 
the government itself'. 91 The IMF raised with South African 
officials the matter of Dr Robert Smites murder. Smit, a former 
South African representative to the IMF, it was widely rumoured, 
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had uncovered a major currency evacuation scheme involving South 
African cabinet officials and 'had been silenced'.~ South African 
officials were understandably far from pleased about this line of 
inquiry. 
Although the appointment of James Baker as Treasury Secretary in 
the (northern) summer of 1985 marked a small change towards more 
interventionist ideas in US international economic policy, the 
first term of the Reagan administration saw a return to a more 
aggressive stance in dealing with the problems of :the world 
economy. While US policy and strategy appeared to favour, or was 
wary of the growing power of Europe and Japan, it precipitated 
economic collapse among many developing countries. These policies 
were soon to find their way into IMF policy. One immediate 
consequence of the tougher line at the IMF, was a tightening up on 
the terms and conditions of IMF loans to borrowing countries. This 
atti tude was reflected in US Treasury Secretary Donald Rega,n' s 
comment on India's $5,5m IMF loan request that 'we [the US] will 
be asking a lot of questions when this loan comes before the IMF 
board next month'. 93 
However, one year later when a South African loan request of nearly 
SDR1 billion came before the IMF, the US, despite this hard-line 
approach and despite certain economic policies still in place in 
south Africa (the dual exchange rate system for example) raised 
precious few questions. This is confirmed by the evidence of 
liberal Democrat Congressman Julian Dixon to the US Congress 
banking sUb-committee to the effect that 'the US did little to 
question the loan or determine how apartheid contributes to the 
economic problems which beset South Africa and what adjustments 
could be made,.M 
South Africa continued, with some exceptions, to pursue policies 
largely in step with the IMF. In 1982, the Financial Mail 95 
reported that the South African government had undertaken several 
measures to bring it even more closely in line with the Fund's 
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strict financial orthodoxy, and mentioned as examples, the decision 
to let the rand depreciate against the dollar; the increase in the 
rate of interest and the curbing of money supply growth. Where it 
appeared to violate the Funds orthodoxy, for example, in 
maintaining dual exchange rates, high public sector spending and 
in providing huge subsidies to white farmers, it received only a 
mild rebuke, a slap on the wrist from the Fund. 
IMF support for and loan assistance to South Africa was not made 
conditional on the abolition of these policies. However, despite 
the high degree of accord between South African financial officials 
and the IMF over- the broad directions of South African economic 
policy, this is not to suggest that deviations from IMF orthodoxy 
did not form the subject of some degree of disagreement and 
controversy. ~hus, for example, the view was expressed at the 1982 
IMF Board meeting that some of South Africa's economic policies 
impeded free ~nterprise and free trade. Although these appeared to 
be policies which had their basis in the racial form of South 
African society and state, such criticisms were rarely raised in 
such explicit and direct terms. Often they would be couched in IMF 
language such as 'rigidities', or 'distortions', or 'imperfections' 
in this or that market. Until 1983 when the IMF staff prepared a 
document formally linking apartheid to the South African economy, 
the following issues or aspects of South African economic policy 
were raised by the IMF, or its Executive Directors or staff, or by 
other financial commentators sympathetic to the IMF view of the 
world. 
The first of these relate to government expenditure. The IMF in 
its confidential April 1977 study of South Africa noted that 
'defence expenditure has been a major cause of the rapid increase 
in total current expenditure (which in turn led to a) record budget 
deficit of 6,8pc of gross national product in 1975'.% In 1982 at 
the IMF Executive Board meeting, Michael Casey, representing 
Ireland, Canada and the Caribbean countries argued that the South 
African authorities should be 'encouraged in their attempts to 
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focus expenditure restraint on such areas as defence and perhaps 
subsidies' .97 The Financial Times in an editorial urged the IMF to 
take a close look at the large subsidies which South Africa gave 
to white farmers in the form of cheap money through the Land Bank 
and of artificial prices of inputs like ,fertiliser. I This is 
another example', the editorial continued, 'of inflated public 
spending for political reasons, for the farmers who benefit are 
overwhelmingly Afrikaaner (sic) supporters of the ruling National 
party,.98 However, the South African position was defended by Allan 
Whi~tome, the European director to the Fund, who argued that the 
cut in public spending from 27pc of GOP in the mid-1970s to 23pc 
in the early 1980s was 'an achievement equalled by few other member 
countries' .99 
A second ' area of concern which the IMF occasionally 'frowned 
upon ,100 was that of the dual exchange rate system, first introduced 
after Sharpeville in 1960. The Financial Times commented that 'for 
political reasons the South African government persists with an 
exchange rate regime which distorts its international economic 
relations I .101 The IMF never made the adoption of a unitary system 
a condition of its 1976 or 1982 loans but appeared happy to see it 
go in February 1983. For as the Financial Times observed the issue 
of the dual exchange rate 
is one taken seriously by IMF directors While these 
directors tended to limit themselves to welcoming South Africa's 
commitment to end the practice .•. Mr Jaywardena (Executive 
Director)' representing Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh ••• argued 
that South Africa's recent policies had been inadequate and had 
not been conducive to orderly adjustment of the economy. 102 
In the area of exchange rate policy also, the 1982 IMF mission to 
South Africa had apparently urged South Africa to liberalize the 
forward market for the Rand,103 a recommendation which was gradually 
acceeded to by the South African Reserve Bank. Thus writing in 1985 
Gidlow, (al though critical of some of the monetary authorities 
actions in the area of forward exchange rate policy) noted that in 
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recent years a more sophisticated", ma:r:ket ,in f,orward, e~cha~ge 
facilities has emerged in South Afr1ca 1n l1ne w1th mod1f1cat10n 
in the policy of the Reserve Bank which have furnished 
facilities on forward exchange account which are more market-
orientated. 104 
Such a policy was, however, also a recommendation of the de Kock 
Commission and the IMF's view's must be seen as another attempt to 
nudging South Africa's monetary authorities in the direction of 
more free market, or market-oriented policies in this area. 
A third area related to monetarY policy. In response to the 
inflationary pressure in 1981/2, South Africa tightened monetary 
policy, cutting the M2 measure of money supply to an annual rate 
of 2pc in the 4 months to July 1982. In addition the government 
increase~ taxes three times by October 1982. Despite these measures 
however, the IMF mission which visited South Africa in August 1982 
suggested even tougher actions, proposing an increase in sales tax, 
which the government partially agreed to,' and suggesting monetary 
supply growth targets for the future to reduce the existing high 
growth rates of money supply. 105 At the 1982 IMF Executive Board 
meeting which considered South Africa's loan request many Executive 
Directors, though not those representing the US and Canada, were 
worried at the apparent relaxation of restraint shown by the 
decline in interest rates just before the meeting, and also by the 
decision of the SARB to lower the reserve requirements for 
commercial banks. However, these deviations from the IMF's strict 
demand management orthodoxy were obviously not considered serious 
enough even to form the basis of IMF conditionality. The 1982 loan 
request, as we have seen, was acceded to. 
The IMF apparently took a strong line at the 1982 Executive Board 
meetin~, against South Africa's import surcharge policy 'making 
its termination by the end of 1983 a condition of the loan'. 106 
South African authorities argued that the surcharge 'should not be 
seen as an effective and lasting protection against 
competition' and that it 'was designed purely to 
revenue' • 107 The Fund normally 
foreign 
produce 
views such import surcharges as a 
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trade protectionist measure that should be removed. However, South 
Africa, in compliance with the IMF condition, did reduce the import 
surcharge by 2,5pc in the February 1983 Part Appropriation Bill and 
108 abolished it altogether at the end of that year. 
It was in the field of labour policy, however, that South Africa 
came in for its 'greatest criticism' over the last 15-20 years, 
with IMF Executive Directors, financial journals and finally even 
the IMF staff arguing that the Fund should insist on radical action 
to remove 'artificial barriers' to employment and to improve 
training and job mobility for the black majority. The Economist for 
example criticized South African laws and economic policy that 
'condemned so many useful South Africans to useless idleness in the 
Kaffirstans'.'~ IMF Executive Director for France M, Bruno de Maude 
called on South Africa to give much higher priority to programmes 
to relieve the 'shortages of skilled labour (in an economy) with 
an unemployment rate of 7,3 pc among unskilled workers'. 110 In his 
evidence to the US Congress banking sub-committee in 1983, Bradford 
also raised the issue of the so-called labour constraint problem, 
as being an impediment 'to the smooth functioning of the market and 
[the] efficient allocation of economic resources within South 
Africa' • 111 
It was this aspect of South African economic policy which came in 
for the greatest criticism when the IMF staff in 1983 produced the 
first formal analysis of its understanding of the relationship 
between apartheid and South Africa's economic problems. The staff 
analysis argued that 'shortages of skilled labour constitute a 
medium-term constraint on potential growth that is unlikely to be 
eased without substantial changes in policy'. 112 The shortage of 
skilled labour, the staff found, derived from 'long-standing labour 
market ' policies and practices that constitute impediments to 
mobility in the labour market and the optimal use of labour 
resources,.'13 Apartheid restrictions, the report went on 'added to 
inflationary pressures in labour shortage areas and unemployment 
in labour surplus areas'. 114 The migrant labour system was 
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criticized for militating against 'continuity of employment and 
consequently against on-the-job training'. The report concluded 
that 'in order to avoid serious economic imbalances in the economy 
over the medium term, it is essential that the impediments and 
restrictions governing the labour market be eased and that the 
allocation of government expenditure to certain areas of education 
and manpower training, that to date have been inadequately funded, 
be stepped up sharply'. 115 
It is therefore no coincidence that much of this attitude'was soon 
to find its way into (official) South African government thinking 
and policy changes in the area of South African labour and 
urbanization policy. Though surely not the only voice urging 
changes in this direction the 'objective, technically-oriented' 
IMF view 'must have had sUbstantial influence in some quarters ~f 
the state's economic agencies, bolstering the arguments of the free 
market or market-oriented faction at the SARB, Treasury and 
planning and policy departments considerably. 
(7) THE BREAK IN SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE IMF 
In 1983, as international pressure against the apartheid state 
began to mount, and in the wake of the outcry at the United Nations 
and elsewhere against the 1982 IMF loan, but significantly before 
the onset of the generalised political crisis within South Africa, 
this country's longstanding and favourable relationship with the 
IMF was suddenly restricted. At the June 20 1983 meeting of the IMF 
its staff presented a report critical of apartheid on economic 
grounds, the first in the IMF's history. Given the well-known 
strength of US influence on IMF staffers, there is little doubt 
that the report had the support of the US Treasury and may even 
have been instigated at the Treasury's request. The report, found 
that apartheid impeded the optimal utilisation of South Africa's 
resources, especially, as we hav~ just noted, by creating labour 
supply bottlenecks. It went on to note that apartheid had a short-
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term effect on the balance of payment but that its effects were 
felt in the medium and long-term. The center for International 
Policy, a Washington-based research unit, which specialises in the 
analysis of the political implications of international economic 
relations, commenting on this IMF report noted that South Africa 
could no longer count on automatic access to some of the IMF's 
conditional facilities unless it dismantled apartheid. Until then 
South Africa would have available only the low conditionality 
facilities it used in November 1982. However, this would still have 
given pretor~a $1,5 billion. ' 
After much debate at the US Senate and House, and its respective 
banking committees and sub-committees, an anti-apartheid amendment 
to a Bill authorising an increase in the US quota to the IMF was 
agreed upon. The US law now requires that the US oppose South 
African loans unless the Secretary of the Treasury certified in 
person before the banking committees that the loan conditions would 
reduce the distortions caused by apartheid. On request of either 
the House or Senate Banking Committee, the Treasury would have to 
demonstrate: (1) the loan would bring about a 'substantial reduction 
of the pass laws ('restrictions on the geographical mobility of 
labor'); and (2) South Africa could not raise the money elsewhere. 
Furthermore, the administration would have to give a three-week 
public notice of another IMF loan to south Africa. 116 
The amendment left the US with enough 'wiggle room'. US support of 
IMF loans to, South Africa was not absolutely prevented. It was only 
restricted, and restricted significantly in ways that ideally suit 
advocates of moderate reform both in South Africa and abroad. 
Neither the US nor the IMF have since 1983 reassessed their 
positions on IMF loans to South Africa, even though it could be 
argued that the US conditions have been largely met since the 
ending of some 'colour-bar' restrictions on the employment of 
certain grades of black miners, changes in South Africa's influx 
control legislation and the closure in mid-1985 of its previous 
easy access to private international bank credit. Why is this? 
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IMF support for South Africa, we would argue, rested upon the 
strategic and economic contribution and role which South Africa 
had over decades come to play within southern Africa and in the 
world capitalist economy. As long as the apartheid state retained 
its capacity to perform this historically important role, the IMF 
sloughed off criticisms of its support for what came increasingly 
to be seen as a morally reprehensible political regime. This 
capacity in turn rested on the maintenance of political stability 
in South Africa and on an economic performance sufficiently robust 
to ensure the profitability of foreign investment and to minimise 
the probability of revolutionary change in South and southern 
Africa arising out of the ashes of a collapsing economic order. 
Until 1983 such support for South Africa at the IMF was guaranteed 
by the p~werful voting strengt~ and structural and historically-
derived influence of the US and UK at :the IMF's Executive Board. 
In this period the relationship between South Africa and the 
powerful western industrialised countries which dominate decision-
making at the IMF was clearly mutually beneficial. South Africa 
received financial supp'ort and the US and West European countries 
benefited in terms of their economic and strategic investments and 
political interests in the region. 
The role of any particular country within the world economic system 
is not immutable, however, as we have argued earlier in our 
critique of dependency theory, and the growing fear of political 
upheaval and economic degeneration in South Africa, which set in 
since the mid-1970s, but which escalated after the early 1980s, 
forced a reassessment by western industrialised countries of their 
policy of continued unconditional support for the apartheid state. 
It became clear to these countries, and significantly this occurred 
before. the widespread and . internationally pUblicised political 
upheavals of 1984-86, that some pressure should be brought to bear 
on South Africa to move in the direction of deracialising some 
aspects of its social and political system, so as to head off the 
prospects of more radical change. By taking a moderate stance 
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against apartheid, these countries hoped (and still hope) to win 
over segments of the dominated classes to a solution to the South 
African crisis that would ensure the continuation of their 
interests in the sub-continent. 
It was recognised that one channel through which effective pressure 
could be brought to bear on South Africa was through the IMF. As 
we have seen IMF and US support for financial assistance to South 
Africa after 1983, was restricted and made conditional upon the 
country embarking upon political reform. The 'reform' recommended 
did not turn out to be particularly onerous. After all it was not 
the intention to precipitate events which might lead to overly 
rapid and radical change. By 1986 after the abolition of legally 
enforced contoIs over the influx of Africans to the cities and 
other changes, these 'reforms' were largely met. However, growing 
anti-apartheid protest action in the US and Europe which arose out 
of and accompanied the sudden domestic political upheavals of 1984-
86 acted to block any immediate revision of the 1983 decision in 
response to these reforms. 
Though the international community differs about how to bring about 
social and political change in south Africa, about how much change 
is necessary or about the necessity for of 'black majority rule' 
as the solution to the political crisis, they appear to agree that 
not enough has been done to begin a process of 'genuine 
negotiations' or even to dismantle the more objectionable features 
of apartheid, such as the Population Registration Act and the Group 
Areas Act for example, as a means of facilitating the 'orderly and 
evolutionary' change they . favour. These factors have prevented any 
move to reverse the 1983 decision to restrict IMF loans to South 
Africa. The US Congress for one, given domestic considerations, 
would find it difficult to instruct the US Executive Director at 
the Fund to support South African loan applications as long as 
these pressures continue. 
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Despite the IMF staff critique of the economic distortions created 
by apartheid, we would argue that the decision to restrict IMF 
support to South Africa in 1983, was primarily based on revised 
western, especially US, geopolitical considerations at the time. 
After all the 'economic distortions' created by apartheid were much 
greater in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and this did not appear to 
have damaged South Africa's relationship with the IMF. Neither can 
the explanation for the IMF decision be found in the onset of 
economic crisis in South Africa. The IMF is designed to assist 
. countries at times of economic crisis. Unlike private international 
banks, it therefore cannot in terms of one of the very foundations 
for its establishment, in the first instance 'withdraw' its support 
for a country at the onset of economic crisis, except in cases 
where IMF advise or conditionality is persistently ignored. 
However, . the IMF did not suspend its support to South Africa 
because the country failed to meet the terms of IMF conditionality. 
This is illustrated by the following example. Although, it was not 
made a condition of the 1982 loan, South Africa abolished exchange 
controls over non-residents in 1983, an aspect of economic policy 
the IMF had earl ier 'frowned upon'. In general, following the 
pUblication of the interim de Kock commission report on monetary 
and exchange rate policy and the Wiehahn commission report on 
labour policy in the late 1970s, the ideological thrust of South 
African economic policy was gradually being moved away from 
controls (including racially-based controls on labour organisation 
and occupational mobility) and towards the market-oriented 
direction so heavily favoured by the IMF. So whilst, as we shall 
see in Chapters 5 and 6, the decision by private international 
banks to cut off new loans to South Africa was based on a 
cOmbination of directly economic and political reasons, the IMF, 
being a non-profit, public international financial institution, 
came to its decision on the South African question, mainly on the 
basis of pressure exerted on it by the US in support of the 
latter's changed strategies and geopolitical objectives in southern 
Africa. The IMF restriction formed one of the few largely unnoticed 
, sticks' in the otherwise accommodative constructive engagement 
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policy of the Reagan administration, although clearly the pressure 
for this change via the US Congress. 117 
(8) CONCLUSION 
We have argued in this chapter that until the abrupt change in 
1983, the relationship between South Africa and the IMF was cordial 
and beneficial both to the major industrialised countries which 
dominate the IMF and to South Africa. This greater symmetry in the 
relationship between western industrialised countries and the IMF, 
on the one hand, and South Africa on the other in this period 
appears to conflict somewhat with the propositions of dependency 
theory. Although South Africa may have technically qualified for 
IMF loan~ both in 1976 and 1982, the Apartheid state additionally 
used its contradictory classification and status at the IMF with 
sufficient skill in order to more easily qualify for large amounts 
of IMF financial ' assistance. Its 1976 loans from the IMF for 
instance were exceeded only by those to Britain and Mexico. The 
IMF's 'bounty' contrasts sharply with its response to the, equally 
serious external economic difficulties of other developing 
countries. This difference is placed into sharper perspective when 
seen in relation to the point made in Chapter 2, that aggregate IMF 
balance of payments lending fell far short of the pressing demands 
of an unsettled and volatile post-1973 international economy. 
Though South Africa appeared to keep in step with the broad trends 
in economic policy pursued by its major trading partners, it 
retained some policies which would normally be regarded as anathema 
to the IMF. Yet these differences appeared not to affect the nature 
of the 'special' relationship. The IMF and South Africa differed 
over the issue of gold auctions, both in terms of the merits and 
the timing of such a scheme. IMF gold auctions in the mid-1970s 
were a US-led exercise aimed at addressing the problem of the 
flagging dollar at a time when the long post-war domination of the 
US appeared to be coming to an end. The South African authorities 
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narrowly criticised the scheme as an attempt to demonetise gold as 
an international monetary asset. These gold auctions together with 
the official adoption of floating exchange rates in 1976 and the 
economic uncertainties created by the political upheavals in South 
Africa in 1976, introduced serious instability into the price of 
South Africa's major export earner and economic stabilizer, ie 
gold. Gelb has shown that the fluctuations in the gold price were 
an important avenue through which the growing crisis in the 
international economy were transmitted into the South African 
economy. 118 
By the early 1980s the increasing potential for political turmoil 
in South Africa, created by the maintenance of the central features 
of apartheid policies in the face of escalating internal resistance 
and a g~owing outcry by popular, student, church and even 
governments in the US and Europe, forced a reassessment by the 
leading industrialised countries, most notably the US, of its 
policies towards South Africa. While maintaining its conciliatory 
policy of 'constructive engagement' towards South Africa, the US 
finally bowed to pressure, which came mainly through Congress and 
in the wake of an earlier and critical IMF staff analysis, to 
restrict IMF financial assistance to the apartheid state. 119 The 
principal motivation behind this relatively punitive measure was 
to hasten the South African government into adopting reforms which 
were timorous and significant enough to head off the prospects of 
a sudden, and even more 'destabilising', transition to a radical,' 
populist or even socialist black majority government. 
Given its past record, ideological baggage and fear of (far) right-
wing electoral successes among other factors, the South African 
government, however, appeared at the time to be in no hurry to bend 
to int~rnational pressures exerted through the IMF, or to the even 
more damaging implications of the 1985 decision of the banks to cut 
off credit lines, an issue which will be discussed in the following 
chapter.
120 
The change in attitude to South Africa since 1983 has 
had implications for US, UK and IMF support for South Africa's 
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southern African policy (in Namibia and Mozambique for example 121) 
and there is some evidence of growing western support for 
alternative southern African initiatives, such as SADCC. South 
Africa's role as a regional power, exercising economic and 
political stability here in support of US and west European anti-
Soviet strategy, a dominant theme of South Africa's relations with 
the west since the second World War, has become less important in 
recent years. The apartheid state's regional policy has in certain 
respects, such as in its support for Renamo in Mozambique, even 
become counter-productive to regional stability. 
The fact that South Africa has not had recourse to IMF assistance 
since 1983 and has h~d to payoff its outstanding debts to the IMF, 
debts which fell outside the debt standstill, has seriously 
affected the freedom to manoeuvre of the South African monetary 
and financial authorities. These restricticpns have undoubtedly 
affected the capacity of the South African economy to regenerate 
and maintain a robust growth rate, and in · this sense they do 
illustrate the power of this form of international financial 
pressure. Yet the fact that the apartheid state fully paid its 
outstanding debt to the IMF is no mean achievement, as its monetary 
and financial authorities often like to boast. 122 However, as even 
(then) Reserve Bank Governor de Kock admitted, the fact that South 
Africa had met some of these daunting challenges with 'astonishing 
success', is a 'balance of payments adjustment success story, not 
a growth success story. f As de Kock pointed out in September 1987, 
the performance of the economy between 1984 and 1986 was poor to 
say the least. 123 Real economic growth slowed down, imports were 
compressed by as much as 30pc, unemployment increased, the 
quarterly rate of inflation increased from 12,8pc in the fourth 
quarter of 1984 to 26,Opc in the first quarter of 1986, real 
disposable income per head fell by an average of 5,6pc, and real 
private consumption fell by an average of 4,2pc in 1985 and 1986. 124 
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CHAPTER 5 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL BANKS AND THE APARTHEID STATE: 1970-1985 
(1) INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we examine first South Africa' s relations with 
private international banks, and in particular trace the changing 
nature and structure of loans and bonds raised, managed or 
underwritten by these banks in the international financial markets 
on behalf of South African borrowers in both the private and state 
sectors. Secondly., we examine the circumstances, both domestic and 
international, which led to South .Africa's foreign exchange and 
debt crisis, a crisis precipitated by Chase Manhattan Bank • s 
decision · of mid-1985 to call in its outstanding South African 
credit, and to deny this country its normal roll-over credit 
facilities as well as most forms of new loans and credit. 
Numerous clarifications and qualifications about the precise terms 
of this discussion need to be made at the outset. The analysis, 
which covers the period 1970-1985, concentrates almost exclusively 
on direct lending or foreign capital inflows of the loan variety, 
ie interest-yielding capital inflows. These loans include short-
term Eurocurrency loans, short to medium-term Eurocredits (usually 
in this period denominated in dollars or Deutsche Marks) and 
1 longer-term Eurobonds arranged and managed by private 
international (transnational) banks. It is not within the scope of 
this thesis to specifically analyse direct foreign investment to 
South Africa, ie profit yielding capital flows; this has in any 
event been covered in other studies. z Financial flows from public 
international financial institutions, such as the IMF have been 
examined in detail in Chapter 4. International banks with branches 
in South Africa, such as Barclays and Standard, have been important 
sources of loan funds to the South African government, parastatals 
and private sector. 3 However, as these banks have considerable 
South African shareholdings and accept large amounts of South 
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African deposits, these (internally-generated) loans have for the 
purposes of this study not been defined as foreign and are 
therefore excluded from the present analysis. 
Comprehensive, comparable and reliable data on South Africa's 
relations with private international banks are not easy to come 
by. The international banking world is notoriously conservative 
and tight-lipped, banking transactions most often confidential and 
reporting and disclosure requirements vary from country to country. 
South Africa's ventures into the international financial market are 
often conducted in conditions of secrecy in order to protect 
institutions lending to this country. Thus for example in 1975, an 
investors' newsletter commented, '[i]n conditions of strict secrecy 
South Africa is raising substantial amounts of short-term 
•.• money '.4, and in 1982 the Financial Mail quoted a senior 
government official as saying that '[t]here is no need for bankers 
to be embarrassed's by the public disclosure of their interests in 
South Africa. The element of secrecy intensified further in the 
years leading up to the 1985 debt crisis and became almost total 
after that date. 
Whereas during the period 1946-1973 the main sources of foreign 
capi tal investment in South Africa were in the form of direct 
investment (risk capital, which was profit-yielding), non-direct 
investment (dividend-yielding, share purchases and short-term 
credits), there has since then, and until 1985, been an increasing 
reliance on direct lending or loan capital, including syndicated 
loans and credits on the Euromarket and public bond issues on the 
Eurobond market. The private international bank lending portion of 
international credit for example represented just 15pc of total 
foreign investment in 1974, but an estimated 32pc in 1976. These 
figure~ exclude bond issues managed or guaranteed by these banks. 
These loans and bonds have been made or managed or underwritten by 
some of the largest international banks, including National 
Westminister, Barclays PLC, Midlands, Hill-Samuel and Hambros in 
the united Kingdom; Deutsche, Dresdner and Commerzbank in West 
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Germany; Union Bank of Swi tzerland; and increasingly, though 
unevenly, between 1975 and 1985, Citibank and Chase Manhattan in 
the us. These and other banks extended large quantities of credit 
to South Africa since the early 1970s, especially between 1972-
1976 and again after 1981. Loans from most of these banks were 
abruptly halted in mid-1985 for reasons which will be examined 
later on in this discussion. Table 10 shows medium and long-term 
bank credits to South African borrowers, and the heavy borrowings 
in the early to mid-1970s and again after 1981 is apparent. 
TABLE 10 
MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM FOREIGN BANK CREDITS TO SOUTH AFRICAN 




























It is to a more detailed and nuanced picture of these developments 
in South Africa's relations wi th international bankers in the 
period .1970-1985 that we now turn. South Africa's borrowings from 
the international banks and its bond issues in this time are 
discussed within the limits of four periods, between each of which 
economic and political conditions differed vastly. The main issues 
and trends which .emerge in each of these periods are summarised 
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first. The years, 1970-1973, were indisputably the last years of 
the long boom phase in the South African economy. The economy 
remained relatively strong and in a climate of political stability, 
South African bond issues in particular, were highly successful. 
The period 1974-78 represent the mid-1970 crisis years in the South 
African political economy. The balance of payments ran into severe 
deficits in the early part of this period, for reasons which will 
be set out more fully later, and only severely restrictive economic 
policy turned around this situation in 1977. Despite these economic 
problems South Africa borrowers, especially the state and the 
parastatals, continued for some time to receive massive amounts of 
international credi t from the banks and through bond issues, 
al though there were increased costs to take account of South 
African heavy exposure and weak balance of payments. The flow of 
international credit (loans and bonds) to the state and 
parastatals, especially in the period 1972-1976, but also in 1980-
1982, in support of the state's strategic and infrastructural 
development programme, represents one of the most dominant features 
of South Africa's international financial relations in the post-
1970 years, as the following discusion will demonstrate. However, 
the political climate deteriorated markedly after 1976, under the 
pressure of student and worker protest, and this more than any 
other factor, made international holders of South African bonds so 
, jittery' 6 that the Eurobond market was effectively closed to 
South African borrowers for some years thereafter. International 
banks loans to South Africa slowed down and the terms of such loans 
tightened after the Soweto uprising, although at the time this form 
of international credit appeared less politically sensitive than 
the raising of bonds, and was in any event, still cheaper than new 
bond issuance. 7 
As political stability was gradually reestablished in South Africa 
and the balance of payments deficits eliminated through restrictive 
economic policy and in the wake of global developments such as the 
flood of petrodollars in search of recycling and deteriorating 
investment opportunities both in the advanced industrialised 
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countries and in most of the early NICs, the flow of private 
international bank loans to South Africa was resumed. Under 
pressure from a growing international campaign for disengagment 
from South Africa, some major banks, attempted to justify their 
loans on the grounds that they would be used for the social 
advancement of urban black communities. By 1979-1981, the flow of 
loans had turned into a flood, although the maturity period 
(structure) of loans shortened sharply. And there is evidence of 
South African bond issuance in Europe again. Furthermore the 
slowdown of risk and equity finance after 1973, placed upward 
pressure on local interest rates. This together with SARB support 
in the area of forward exchange cover, encouraged local borrowers 
to look abroad for funds. As a consequence and in contrast to the 
mid-1970s borrowings, which were significantly more medium to long-
term and used for the state's strategic and infrastructural 
investments, most of the post-1979 loans were taken by the private 
sector and were heavily trade-related. 
By 1982, fears of an international debt crisis, the rapid fall in 
the gold price, mounting economic difficulties, and gathering 
political tensions in the wake of the widespread schools boycotts 
of 1980 and 1981, were beginning to further adversely affect the 
terms, if not by that stage the availability, of bank loans to the 
apartheid state. With the balance of payments (basic balance) 
moving into deficit again between 1981 and 1983, the economy deeply 
in crisis, and resistance to the apartheid state by unions and 
political oganisations rising to unprecedented levels, raising the 
possibility 'of a black majority government, private international 
banks called in their loans and cut-off new credit to South Africa 
in mid-1985. Their decision, was, we shall argue, based on a 
combination of changed economic and political perceptions, which 
severely downgraded ' their assessment of the risk of further or 
continued exposure to the apartheid state. 
The relationship between international bankers, the international 
financial market and South Africa which will now be discussed in 
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detail, may be characterised by examining the lenders (which banks, 
from what countries, the extent of their South African exposure); 
the South African borrowers (by sector, and uses of international 
finance and their impact upon accumulation); the terms of the loans 
(maturity, costs) and the types of credits (Eurocredits, Eurobonds 
etc). These and other factors will be examined against general 
economic and political developments in South Africa, the state of 
the world economy and in particular of the international financial 
market and the changing perceptions of South Africa's place within 
the world capitalist system. 
(2) THE EARLY YEARS: 1970-1973 
The 1970l:? opened dramatically for South Africa's international 
financial market dealings, when in October 1970 Pretoria made its 
first attempt since 1959 to raise a loan on the London market by 
offering bonds ~orth $5 million. The issue was oversubscribed in 
advance so that when the market officially opened it closed after 
ten minutes, sold out!s The government-backed bond was (like most 
others in this period) guaranteed by some of the major private 
international banks operating out of England and Europe. So heavy 
was the borrowing in the early 1970s that already by June 1971 
there were signs that in the view of European lenders, South Africa 
was reaching its borrowing peak in Europe. 9 However, the 
international currency crisis leading up to Nixon's August 1971 
decision to suspend the dollar's convertability into gold, so 
effectively ending the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, 
also adversely affected South Africa's borrowings on the 
international financial market. In addition, American congressional 
hearings on US investment in South Africa in May 1971 turned the 
spotlight on companies, banks and governments doing business with 
the apartheid state. Charles Hightower's evidence to the effect 
that 'American investment in South Africa has provided the most 
advanced techniques for an automated police state, ,10 (whether 
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entirely accurate or not) highlighted the political and moral 
aspects of financially supporting the Apartheid state. 
These developments appear to have affected both ESKOM' s 11 and 
ISCOR's Deutsche mark bond issues in early to mid-1971, both of 
which were not fully subscribed to, and which soon after official 
trading in them began were changing hands at 1,5pc below the issue 
price. 12 Similarly, the South African government's privately placed 
60m guilder issue brought in only 48m guilder. Nevertheless these 
appear to have been temporary and minor hi tches. The hugely 
successful Johannesburg loan of DM80m managed by Berliner Handels-
Gesellschaft-Fra~kfurter Bank (BHF) and underwritten by powerful 
banking consortia, as well as the Republic's over~ubscribed DM100m 
bond issues on the west German foreign bond market, both in the 
second half of 1971, are evidence of the continued and strong 
support for South Africa in the international financial market. '3 
However, there appeared to be some concern in South African 
business circles in 1971 that foreign loans were not being used 
productively, raising (as early as this) the question of South 
Africa's ability to service its international borrowings. For 1970 
alone a high 17, 7pc of South Africa' s export revenue went to 
service foreign borrowing, compared to 5,7pc in Canada, 5,9pc in 
New Zealand, 6,1pc in Yugoslavia, 9,9pc in Argentina, 11,1pc in 
Israel and 17,9pc in Australia. 14 
The first two years of the 1970s therefore witnessed a high though 
sometimes erratic, level of activity in the international financial 
market, especially by the South African government, growing foreign 
indebtedness and significant support mainly from the major West 
German, Swiss and British banks and banking consortia acting as 
managers and underwriters of South African bond issues. South 
Africa , was clearly more active on the Eurobond market rather than 
the Eurocredit or loan market, so that private international banks 
played more of a management and underwriting role in these years, 
as distinct from a direct lending function. In part this was a 
reflection of the dominance of the Eurobond market over the 
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syndicated loan sector at the time. The government itself appeared 
to be the most visible borrower, private South African borrowers 
being apparently affected by the government's policy of 
discouraging all but longer than five year capital loans for 
housing, exports and strategic industries. IseoR, ESKOM and other 
parastatals which were later to become major borrowers were not yet 
household names in European investment and banking circles. With 
local capital markets already extended these parastatals were soon 
to turn forcefully to Europe. Almost all of ISeOR's financing needs 
for Saldanha and other projects were planned at the time to be 
funded through foreign loans. 
In the first half of 1972 easier conditions in the European 
markets, greater clarity on the question of the revised 
internati.onal currency situation and an improvement in South 
Africa's foreign reserves, all contributed to the sentiment that 
the government, the parastatals and other public sector borrowers 
would have little difficulty in raising pr·ivate international 
loans. Among private sector borrowers foreign loans were made by, 
among others, Anglo-American on the Eurodollar market (the lead 
bank being N • M. Rothschild); useo, a straight bank loan from 
Kredietbank NV of Belgium; and Shell (SA). The Post Office with 
three foreign loans; the South African government, with two; the 
Johannesburg municipality, with· two; and ESKOM were the major 
borrowers outside the private sector. Short and medium-term foreign 
bank credit continued to be freely on offer to South Africa, but 
there was some disquiet that the country was overborrowed in the 
long-term, a factor which, it was feared, might affect the 
country's credit rating in this important end of the market. New 
South African foreign borrowings may also have been held back 
slightly by the uncertainty caused by speCUlation over the possible 
devaluation of the rand, a factor that would have affected the rand 
value of debt repayments. 15 By July and August 1972 concern over the 
consequences for international exchange rate stability arising out 
of the weakening dollar seriously affected the confidence of 
operators in the international financial market and, among other 
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consequences, forced a four week closure of the west German foreign 
bond market. 16 This led to the temporary shelving of the South 
African governments long-term borrowing of DM100m, ESKOM's DM100m, 
and the Johannesburg municipality's DM80m borrowing.
17 
South Africa's international borrowings in 1973 were dominated by 
the foreign loans of the South African Railways and Harbour (SARH). 
In April SARH raised a seven year DM100m bank consortia loan 
managed by west Germany's BHF; in May it successfully floated a 
DM100m bond issue on the West German capital market managed by 
Deutche Bank to finance the Richards Bay scheme; and a $45m 
Eurodollar medium-term credit became effective on 4 June 1973. 
Plans were already being made by SARH for a further R90m to be 
raised in the .form of medium-term credits over the following four 
years for the Richards Bay project. 18 However it should be pointed 
out that South Africa's ability to raise foreign loans with a 
maturity of over seven years (ie long-term loans) appeared to 
become increasingly difficult by 1973. As we shall see this only 
began to change again in the early 1980s. 
Between 1974-1976 international bank lending to South Africa more 
than doubled, both in volume and as a percentage of total foreign 
investment. 19 Direct foreign investment, especially from the US 
which represented the major part of increases in foreign investment 
in the early 1970s was thus gradually losing its place and 
importance to loans and credits from international banks. Given 
developments at the time in the international financial market, 
which have already been described, international banks were eager 
to mobilize the international finance required to meet Pretoria's 
pressing needs. South Africa's dealings in the international 
financial market and in particular its relationship with 
international banks will now be examined for the period which has 
come to be characterized as the mid-1970s crisis, 1974-1978. 
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(3) THE MID-1970S: 1974-1978 
The transnational banks eagerness to lend funds to South Africa 
in the mid-70s constituted an integral feature of their response 
to the re-emerging general crisis of capita~ism. ~aced wit~ a 
pervasive economic slowdown, coupled w1th 1nfl~t1onary pr1ce 
increases that threatened to wipe out profits at interest rates 
prevailing at home they sought new, more profitable areas in 
which to invest their mounting accumulations of surplus 
investable funds. 20 
' By mid-1974 with balance of payments problems emerging and tight 
conditions prevailing in the local capital market, the South 
African Reserve Bank's (SARB) decision to allow South African ' 
companies to, borrow abroad more freely was an early indication that 
foreign borrowing was going to be both encouraged and necessary and 
would be a crucial source of funding South Africa's finance needs, 
for balarice of payments, strategic, defence, infrastructural and 
developmental purposes. We have already noted that the local 
capital market was well developed in terms of institutional 
sophistication especially for a country of South Africa's size and 
development. However despite this there was not sufficient depth 
in the local market to meet South Africa's finance needs if 
economic growth rates were to be increased, even maintained, and 
other objectives too realized at this time when the long post-war 
boom was coming to an end. The capital shortfall was particularly 
acute in 1974-76 for the combination of reasons mentioned above, 
forcing South African borrowers to turn to the international 
capital market and international banks. 
There followed in early 1975, a desperate scramble for foreign bank 
loans and bonds, particularly by 'the public corporations resulting 
in a totally unco-ordinated approach to the international financial 
market. The major part of the finance needed for projects such as 
SASOL ' II, Sishen-Saldanha, ESKOM's Matla, Duvha and Koeberg 
(nuclear) power stations, the SARH expansion programme and the SABe 
(for the new television service) had to be raised abroad at about 
the same time and it was reported at the time that 'in their 
eagerness to find funds, the corporations are falling over each 
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other's feet. ,21. In addition the central government, which borrowed 
both for itself and on behalf of several other bodies such as the 
Uranium Enrichment corporation, some local authorities (notably 
Johannesburg) and private companies such as Anglo-American, South 
African Breweries and De Beers were in the queue for foreig!, 
loans. 22 Already by 1975 South Africa ranked among the top ten 
borrowers in the international financial market and it was 
'planning' (or was forced into) an even deeper involvement in the 
years thereafter. 
The South African government often pledged security for repayment 
of such loans at rates of interest well above those available most 
elsewhere, and it backed its pledge with some of the world's most 
valuable minerals.~ It was not surpr1s1ng therefore that 
international banks were queueing up to lend to south Africa. Even 
US banks began to participate more actively in loans to South 
Africa by early 1975, although at the time some banks asked for 
their identities to be kept ' secret. 24 In November 1975 citibank 
discontinued its personal cheque and savings account operations in 
South Africa in order to concentrate more on its international 
financing and corporate banking activities. citibank, commented the 
Financial Mail was 'particularly well placed to assist in raising 
foreign loan capital for South Africa'. 25 ci ticorp, ci tibank' s 
parent holding company, had then recently established a worldwide 
merchant banking group, whose London subsidiary ci tibank 
International Bank Ltd (CIBL) had been one of the largest 
syndicators of Eurodollar medium-term loans since it was 
established in late 1972. CIBL had already raised foreign loans for 
both the public and private sector in South Africa. In addition to 
playing a leading role in foreign fund raising for South Africa's 
public corporations, it had managed a $37m five-year loan for 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investments early in 1975 and was a co-
manager with Barclays in the $60m AECI loan of the same year. 
Another indication that US banks were playing a more active role 
in providing loans and financial assistance to South Africa, was 
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to be found in Chase Manhattan's decision to reestablish an 
official representative office in Johannesburg in 1975. The world's 
(then) third largest banking group explained that their aim was 'to 
assist multi-national companies in obtaining the best possible 
local and off-shore financing, ••• provide customers with 
comprehensive intelligence on South Africa and counsel overseas 
customers on South African legislation'. 26 Although the involvement 
of US banks in lending to South Africa declined noticeably for a 
few years after 1976, there is little doubt, despite some attempt 
at secrecy, that US banks came to play an important role in loan 
financing for South African clients and multinational companies 
operating in Sou~h Africa in the years 1974-76. 
But US banks were not the only (or even the biggest) ones assisting 
South Africa by lending to it or managing its bond issues on the 
international finance market. In all thirty-six banking groups 
participated in mobilising Eurocurrency credits for South Africa 
between 1972-1976. 27 In addition to the US banks, .most of the major 
institutions in the international financial market from Britain, 
west Germany, France, switzerland and Luxembourg, were the most 
active lenders or bond managers. Table 11 shows those banks which 
provided international credits to South Africa between 1972-76, as 
well as the number of commitments in which they participated. The 
involvement of west German and British banks is particularly 
prominent. with the growth of the syndicated loan market, 
international banks often organised consortia for particular loans, 
with one of the larger private banks acting as lead banks (or lead 
manager of a bond issue) and they brought in several other banks, 
not necessarily from the same country as participants. South 
Africa's 1976 international borrowing, for example, got off the 
ground with a massive $200m medium-term syndicated loan for ESKOM, 
for which the lead managers were the heavyweights of the 
international financial community: Citibank, Chase Manhattan, 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust and Barclays Bank International Ltd 
amongst others. 28 
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TABLE 11 












INSTITUTION NO OF COMMITMENTS 
Westdeutsche Landerbank Girozentrale 
Commerzbank AG 
Dresdner Bank AG 
Deutsche Bank 
Berlmar Hendels und Frankfurter Bank 
White Weld Securities 
Hill Samuel 
Strauss Turnbull and Co 
Delta Trade Co Ltd 
Barclays Bank International Ltd 
Hambros Bank Ltd 
Credit Commerciale de France 
Credit Lyonnais 
Societe Generale (Belgium or France) 
Paribas 
Banco Commerciale Italiana 
Banco de Roma 
Kredeitbank NV 
Bondtrade 
Algemene Bank Nederland NV 
Kredeitban Luxernbourgaise SA 































SOURCE: Seidman and Makgetla, 1980, p220 
But all this is not to suggest that south Africa did not also 
experience problems in its international financial market dealings 
in this period. Both the decline in the health of the balance of 
payments from 1974 and political uncertainties arising out of the 
pre and post-independence struggles in Angola and Mozambique and 
South Africa's raid into Angola appeared to affect the terms, if 
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not the quantity of loans and bonds in 1975 and early 1976. This 
resulted both in a 5-7 year limit on syndicated loans and South 
Africa's almost total absence from the international bond market 
in the first three months of 1976. 'Jitters among private bond 
investors have practically closed the Eurobond market to South 
African borrowers [and] the prices of South African issues have 
been dropping like stones', commented the Economist.~ Thus even 
though South Africa borrowed more in the first three months of 1976 
(excluding its IMF loan) than the whole of 1975 30 these were medium 
rather than long-term syndicated loans in the main pl~ced with a 
small group of twenty to fifty banks in most cases, all of whom 
were sophisticat~d lenders, and who in their dealings with South 
Africa would a+ready have discounted the political risk. In the 
case of a public bond issue investors or potential investors are 
generally more widespread, less sophisticated and more likely to 
be affected by political upheavals. Thus despite the boom on: the 
international bond market in the period, reflected for example in 
Spain's easy access to, and good performance in, the market '( and 
Spain at the time was not without its own share of political 
problems) South African bonds was being dumped on the secondary 
bond market. New issues were not undertaken for some time 
thereafter. At the height of the Angolan adventure the government 
decided to test the international bond market, its last foray for 
a few years. Despite an attractive yield to maturity of 10,28pc, 
the $25m issue, as the Financial Mail pointed out 'failed 
dismally' .31 The reason for the flop according to London bond 
dealers was the concern among potential investors over the 
implications of South Africa's attack on Angola. 
The Soweto student revolt in June 1976 had the effect of shortening 
loan maturities. And with non-bank investors subscribing less and 
less to South African bonds and notes, private international banks 
began to play a greater role as lenders rather than, as in the 
early 197~s, as managers and underwriters of bonds to South Africa. 
But these banks were demanding and getting extra compensation. A 
leading London merchant banker noted that whilst the general margin 
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over the London interbank offer rate (LIBOR) was coming down, on 
South African loans it was going up.32 The spread (or percent 
interest over LIBOR) was then just after Soweto running at 1,75pc 
over LIBOR for South Africa, compared to New Zealand, a much less 
attractive prospect, which was paying only 1,25pc. Front-end 
management fees for South African credits were also on the up and 
maturities were shortening. 33 The situation was summed up by Dr 
Hans Mast, Credit Suisse's chief manager, who commenting on the 
effect of the Soweto uprising noted that, '[i]n the Euromarket loan 
terms are immeditely adjusted to changed political conditions, the 
ba~ance of payments and the volume of outstanding loans. By all 
three criteria So~th Africa's position is not as strong as it used 
to be. ,34 
In 1976 ·immediately after Soweto matters changed somewhat. It 
seemed that direct bank lending was not easy to arrange. Apart from 
a loan of R25m raised in Germany and an export credit of R110m 
arranged by Hill Samuel, the only significant loan apparently 
raised in 1976, and this after considerable difficulty, was one of 
$110m from a consortium of US banks. 35 However it is possible that 
South Africa's international borrowings may have been larger than 
the publicized figures and information reveal, because banks were 
reluctant to publicize their loans to South Africa as a result of 
the delicate political situation in southern Africa around 1975/6. 36 
US banks especially were raising finance for South Africa in this 
period, as we have already noted, without too much publicity. There 
were for example rumours in London in September 1976 that South 
Africa having been turned down by the Shah of Iran in a bid to 
borrow a massive $500m approached US banks for the money.37 There 
may easily have been other loans, even of this magnitude, which 
received no publicity. Euromoney reported that • South African 
borrowings in the syndica~ed Eurocredit market have not been widely 
publicized in 1976 ••• the leading banks have maintained a low 
profile' .38 
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Anti-apartheid campaigns against bank lending to South Africa may 
have contributed to tightening the conditions and later even 
reducing the volume of private international bank loans to South 
Africa. At a US Senate sub-committee hearing citibank executive 
vice-president George votja was closely questioned about citibank's 
South African connection. In further evidence before the 
subcommi ttee Tim Smi th of the Interfai th Centre of Corporate 
Responsibility in New York added that US bank loans subsidize South 
Africa's military capability and are thus a direct resourcing of 
machinery for the oppression of the Black majority.39 This kind of 
publicity, at a time of changed political conditions in South 
Africa, does appear to have altered banks' assessment of their 
South African risk and this negatively affected South Africa's 
international financial market dealings. Banks appeared less 
willing to extend medium to long-term credit. In 1977 for example 
South Africa's medium and long-term international bank credits had 
dropped to zero (see Table 10). However, the possibility that banks 
may have responded by tightening up on the publicity of their South 
African loans, cannot be entirely ruled out. By the end of 1976 
there was great concern that the loan squeeze expected in 1977 was 
going to threaten some vital South African infrastructural 
projects. Thus New York's Business Week magazine suggested in 
November 1976 that 'several big projects launched in the euphori~ 
of the (early) 1970s may have to be mothballed' 40, and named SASOL 
II as a possible candidate. 
Thus before . turning to South Africa's international financial 
market operations and its relationship with international banks 
after 1976, operations which occurred under different economic and 
political circumstances, let us look at the type of uses to which 
private international credit was put to in the period up to 1976, 
more especially 1974-76; their importa~ce to capital accumulation 
and economic and political stability in South Africa. 
The gradual relative decline in direct foreign investment after 
1976 (ie plant, factories in which there was foreign control) does 
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indicate that at least some investors were beginning to scale down 
their previous optimistic longer-term .view of South Africa. At the 
same time South Africa's dependence on international loan finance 
and on the behaviour of participants in the highly volatile 
international financial market undoubtedly increased. However, for 
South African borrowers and especially for the state and public 
corporations private international credit has distinct advantages 
over both direct foreign investment and public international 
credit, such as IMF loans, in the sense that they were (and are) 
usually 'untied'. They 'do not imply any ownership or control or 
any political leverage •.• ' .41 IMF loans usually come with conditions 
attached, although this was not always true of South Africa's IMF 
borrowings, and direct foreign investment occurs at the discretion 
of foreign investors motivated by their own views on the 
profitability of different sectors or industries in the economy. 
In contrast private international bank loaris and funds raised from 
bond issues in the international capital market can be determined 
(in terms of their amounts, timing etc.) and utilized according to 
the economic and political priorities and judgements of borrowers 
themselves, provided their credit rating holds of course. It is 
worth repeating Lipietz's comment that 
in the case of bank loans, the bank prevalidates the borrowers 
future income. More specifically, when the loan is advanced to 
finance the import of capital goods, the bank prevalidates a 
given strategy for industrialisation, but it is the firm or 
State which choses the strategy. 42 
In South Africa's case, as we shall see, it was the apartheid 
state's chosen policy of strategic and infrastructural development 
and industrialisation, much of which necessitated large amounts of 
capital good imports, which international bank credit in the mid-
1970s bankrolled. However, it may also be argued that the 
selective, 'uncontrolled' industrialization consequent upon large-
scale direct foreign investment in the 1960s and early 1970s 
compelled or at least necessitated some of the large amounts of 
complementary infrastructural investments undertaken by the South 
African state and parastatals in the 1970s. For South Africa this 
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change in the nature of its foreign capital inflows in favour of 
bank loans, bonds and credit, as opposed to direct foreign 
investment, intensified a contradictory and ambiguous condition of 
'dependence on, yet growing autonomy from' the diktats of the 
international financial community. 
In the mid-1970s government and public corporation loans appeared 
to be relatively· more important than private sector borrowings, 
although it should be pointed out that the government parastatal, 
the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), obtained some 
international bank credit for private south African business 43 and 
that transnationa.l banks seldom publicized information about their 
loans to private south African borrowers. South African government 
and parastatal borrowing in the international financial market in 
the early to mid-1970s was used primarily to fund large scale 
capital projects, paying for imported capital goods and equipment, 
and to meet the cost of building up its energy and defence 
capabilities, to upgrade and expand its transportation and 
telecommunications network, as well as finally to finance its 1974-
76 balance of payments deficit. By 1976 private banks had begun to 
scale down their general purpose loans to South Africa, forcing the 
south African government and parastatals to rely on 'proj ect 
finance', either in the form of export credits or syndicated loans 
tied to specific projects.« 
The Standard Bank Investment Corporation reported in 1976 that 
[d]uring the past five years the authorities invested large sums 
principally in administration, post and telegraphs, railways and 
harbours and strategic research. Fixed investment by the public 
. corporations was concentrated on mining and manufacturing, with 
emphasis on projects to exploit and beneficiate natural 
resources. Substantial sums were spent on oil exploration, 
~hospha~e d~velopment, colliery expansion and mining of 
~ndu~tr~al m~nerals and metals. In the manufacturing field semi-
publ~c se~tor projects ~ere i~t7nded primarily to strengthen 
South Afr~ca's strateg~c pos~t~on by concentrating on oil 
technology, steel production, aluminium and uranium reserves 
pe~r? ,refining and developing electricity, gas and wate~ 
ut~l~t~es. 45 
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International credit, as a US Congress report on South Africa 
pointed out, was critical to this investment by the parastatals in 
the period up to early 1976. Table 12 makes this apparent. Even in 
1976, 60pc of ESKOM's total financing or credit requirements were 
filled by foreign borrowing.~ The fact that 40pc of this finance 
was obtained from South African sources is, however, significant 
for a country of South Africa's size, and this fact should not be 
allowed to escape the notice of those who posit a crude 
'dependency' argument in relation to South Africa's links with the 
world economy. Table 13 illustrates that the volume of government 
borrowing (from private international sources) increased markedly 
between 1972-1976. At a time when South Africa was becoming 
increasingly isolated politically and with the possibility of 
economic isolation as well (disinvestment and sanctions threats) -
the apartheid state was able to use 'untied' private international 
credit for its political-economic policy of strategic and 
infrastructural investment'. As Clarke comments, the funding of the 
investment programmes of the public corporations by the 
international banks has been 'an act of major political as well as 
economic significance, supporting South Africa's attempts to 
prepare a more solid foundation on which to resist domestic and 
foreign opposition to apartheid.'u 
But the South African government had, especially in the mid-1970s, 
to allay fears of political instability in South and southern 
Africa, so as to keep this kind of foreign credit flowing in. Thus 
for example, Finance Minister Horwood, who was often called upon 
to play this role, made the following points at an international 
seminar in Dusseldorf in November 1976: 
1. that the tensions between South Africa and Angola had eased 
considerably, 




PUBLICIZED PRIVATE SOURCE INTERNATIONAL CREDITS TO SOUTH AFRICAN 
PUBLIC BORROWERS : 1974-1976 ($ Millions) 
Republic of South Africa (RSA Bonds) 
Electricity Supply Commission (ESKOM) 
.Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) 
South African Railways and Harbours (SARH) 
Other 
Total (Government Entities) 
Private Sector (South Africa) 
Total Recorded 
NOTE : Figures rounded to nearest million . 










PUBLICIZED PRIVATE SOURCE INTERNATIONAL CREDITS TO SOUTH AFRICAN 
PUBLIC SECTOR BORROWERS: 1972-1976 ($ Millions) 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 
1972 277 
1973 477 
1974 819 668 
1975 944 803 
1976 1758 1613 
SOURCE : US Corporate Interests in South Africa, 1978, p53 
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3. that 'South west Africa' (Namibia) was well on the way to 
independence (1), 
4. that South Africa's economic and military strength made it 
'improbable that violent change in other parts of Africa could be 
looked at as a prelude to revolutionary change here'.~ 
A significant portion of private international credit in 1974-76 
went towards reducing South Africa's heavy dependenc~ on other 
countries (notably Iran) for its energy requirements, described by 
private banking sources as the 'fundamentally weak link in the 
economy,.49 SASOL ~as at the time reaching its second stage (SASOL 
II) and it was expected that export credits would finance some 20pc 
of the total finance needed. Other energy projects included a $1,3 
billion uranium enrichment plant and the $1,1 billion Koeberg 
nuclear power station. A portion of the financing of these projects 
were expected to be prov:ided by a syndicate of French Banks. 50 
Foreign private credit in the mid-1970s was also linked to SARH's 
Richards Bay project, to upgrade port and containerization 
facilities, and to the Saldanha Project (to produce semi-finished 
steel) among other plans. These and other projects related to South 
African harbour and transport links were critical to overcome 
export bottlenecks. And expanding such infrastructure and hence 
exports and foreign exchange earnings were crucial to South 
Africa's need to maintain its international creditworthiness. It 
had after all to reassure its international creditors that it was 
both stable (politically) and able to meet its foreign debt 
obligations. 
Direct evidence of private international credit being used for 
South Africa's defence requirements are understandably hard to come 
by, and this arises largely out of the very nature of such credit 
and is one of its central features and advantages. But the massive 
increase in the defence budget from $688m in 1973 to $1,9 billion 
in 1977, as well as the various new schemes launched by the 
government to raise money for defence (such as the issue of defence 
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bonds in 1976) are clear evidence of the desperate need for funds 
for defence purposes. It was estimated that two-thirds of the 
increased defence spending (1976 rand increase) was made abroad, 
thus indicating the extent of foreign exchange and possible 
international credit needed. 51 The US Congress report calculated 
that oil and defence import costs between 1973 and 1976 appear to 
have increased 500pc. 52 
The availability of private international credit arising out of of 
developments on the international financial market and in the 
nature of and balance of forces within the world capitalist 
economy, was in ,short crucial 'to finance the rising costs of 
(South Africa's) continued oil imports, its expan,ding military 
purchases and its strategic economic development programs',53 all 
of which , was designed to increase the self-sufficiency of the 
Apartheid state. South Africa's ability to meet this objective 
would have been seriously (though perhaps, given its internal 
resources and resilience, not fatally) impaired without the support 
it received from private international banks and investors in the 
European capital market and from the IMF as well. Without such 
financial support the nature, course and development prospects of 
its economy and perhaps even the process of change in its racially 
based society, may have assumed a very different character. 
Given all this the question arises as to the extent or degree to 
which, international credit in these years came as well to be 
utilized by" and added to, the productive sectors of the economy, 
as op~osed to consumption or replacement of existing capital stock. 
In other words did such private international credit contribute 
directly to economic growth and capital accumulation? In order to 
answer these questions one would need to know the precise total 
amount , of international credit extended to South Africa, the 
identity of each borrower, the utilization of or purpose of each 
credit, and then trace its complex multiplier path through the 
economy, at the very least. (A sophisticated econometric model 
would also be essential.) However, even the US Congressional 
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Research team, which produced the report on US corporate Interests 
in South Africa (197S) with all the resources at their disposal 
were not able to come up with precise data on these issues. Seeking 
answers to these same questions, and using the data in Table 14, 
they were able to point out: 
1. that an estimated $6,36b in new international bank lending was 
extended to South Africa in the period 1974-1976 (Section A), 
2. that the net inflow of long-term capital to public corporations 
and local authorities in the period 1974-1976 was substantially 
greater than that to the private sector (Section B). 
3. that the public sector overtook the private sector as the major 
investor in the economy, accounting for 47pc of Gross Domestic 
Fixed Investment (GDFI) in 1971-73 and 51pc in 1974-76 (Section C), 
4. that estimated new international bank lending "" increased in 
relation to capital goods imports (CGI) from 31pc in 1974 ,to 4Spc 
in 1975 to 62pc in 1976 and in relation to GDFI from 13pc in 1974 
to 19pc in 1975 to 30pc in 1976. Further CGI increased trom an 
average 3Spc of GDFI in 1971-73 to an average 43pc for the years 
1974-76 (Section D), 
5. that net capital inflow as a percentage of GDFI almost doubled 
between 1971-73 and 1974-76 in each of the major sectors, central 
government and banking, public corporations and local authorities 
and the private sector (Section E), 
6. that long-term capital inflows of public corporations and local 
authorities as a percentage of their GDFI increased from 9,6pc in 
1971-73 to 15,9pc in 1974-76 (67pc increase) as compared to figures 
of 7,7pc, Si6pc (a 14pc increase) respectively for the private 
sector, (Section F). 
Together these figures and " logical deduction, suggest: 
1. that the South African economy was becoming more capital 
intensive and clearly mOore reliant on international credit. 
2. that long-term international capital markets had become more 
important to the public rather than the private sector, as the 
former became the majority annual investor in the economy, and 
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TABLE 14 
INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING AND SOUTH AFRICAN DOMESTIC 
INVESTMENT: 1971-1976 ($ Billions) 
1971-73 1974-76 
A. Total bank lending outstanding at year end 
Estimated new bank lending 
Estimated lending to SA govt 
and public corp 
B. Net Capital Inflow* 
Central govt and banking sector* 
Public corp and local authorities* 
Private sector* 
C. Gross Domestic Fixed Investment (GDFI)* 
Public corp and local authorities 
Private business enterprises 
Public corp and local authorities 
as % of GDFI 
'Private business enterprises 
as % of GDFI 
D. Capital Goods Imports (CGI) 
Estimated new bank lending 
as % of CGI 
(1974= 31; 1975= 48;1976=62) 
CGI as % of GDFI 
E. Net capital inflow to central govt 
and banking as % of GDFI 
Net capital inflow to public corp 
and local authorities as % of GDFI 
Net capital inflow to private sector 
as % of DFI ' 
F. Long-term net capital inflow of 
public corp and local authorities 
as % of their GDFI 
Long-term net capital inflow of private 
business enterprises 









































Note: * T~tal short- and long-term, net. 
* F~gures for Sections Band C do not add up to the total. 
SOURCE: US Corporate Interests in South Africa, 1978 
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3. that (as the report concludes) '[t]he close relationship between 
international credit and public and private sector infrastructure 
and development projects is shown most clearly thorugh the 
importation of capital goods. Implicit is the critically important 
transfer of technology, which contributes to the modernisation of 
South Africa's plant and its ability to compete in world markets 
as well as contributing to increased productivity,.54 
Suckling 55 has demonstrated that 60pc of the increase in South 
Africa's GDP between 1957-1972 originated from exogenous technical 
change and technology. Thus by contributing to the critical 
transfer of such ~echnical change and technology via capital goods 
imports, international bank credit could be said to have been an 
important factor in South Africa's economic growth in this period, 
up to at ·least the early to mid-1970s, as it grew in relation to 
other forms of foreign capital inflows. 
The analysis now shifts to the years 1977/78. By 1977 two factors 
combined to change the pattern of private international bank loans 
to South Africa. Firstly, the Soweto uprising of mid-1976 led some 
international bankers, especially in the US to question the 
political stability of the regime. The Soweto unrest also resulted 
in an intensification of the anti-apartheid campaign overseas in 
which international banks such as Citibank, Chase Manhattan in the 
US and Barclays International in the UK came under heavy criticism 
for providing loans and other financial assistance to the apartheid 
state. Seconqly, South Africa's balance of payments (badly affected 
in the period 1974-76 by the rising price of oil, arms and other 
imports and by the falling price of its commodity exports arising 
out of the world-wide recession) began to improve following the 
adoption domestically of stringent monetary and fiscal policies. 
The South African authorities in 1977, going by the 1977-78 budget, 
made adjustments for a sharply reduced access to medium and long-
term private international bank credit and Eurobond capital and 
accepted that this placed or would place a financial squeeze on the 
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economy in the year ahead. Given the continuing need for 
infrastructural development, increased defence expendi ture, 
expendi ture on its 'homelands" programme etc., the government's 
1977/78 budget was designed to reduce the deficit on current 
account, reduce the rate of inflation and try to meet its financing 
needs through an enforced channelling of domestic saving into the 
public sector (via the mechanism of prescribed investments) to take 
the place of the expected decline in international bank lending of 
a medium to long-term variety. 
In this assessment they were correct. As Table 10 indicates South 
Africa received ~o medium to long-term international bank credit 
in 1977. Its credit rating declined and the interest rate it paid 
for its short-term loans increased. In 1978 both Chase Manhattan 
and Citibank agreed not to lend additional funds to the South 
African government directly, though they would continue to lend to 
the private sector. First National Bank of Chicago and Continental 
Illinois had by 1978 already cut off all credit to the South 
African government and parastatals, the former bank adding that it 
would not rollover any of its existing credits to South Africa 
when they fell due. 56 In England, Midland Bank 'modified' its 
lending policy to South Africa in a way that affected mainly direct 
loans to the South African government and parastatals. 57 Nigeria 
ordered all 'public sector agencies' in that country to withdraw 
their accounts from Barclays Bank Nigeria, because of Barclays · 
South Africa's decision to purchase South African defence bonds, 
and Barclays International Ltd came under heavy pressure at its 
April 1978 annual general meeting to reduce its South African 
holding. For South Africa, the most damaging news was the decision 
of the European-American Banking Corporation (EAB) of October 1977, 
which took the form of an assurance to the World Council of 
Church~s that only funds for the financing of trade transactions 
would in future be lent to South Africa. As the Financial Mail 
pointed out 'EAB was the lead manager for many for the biggest 
foreign loans floated by South African borrowers, including the 
SARH, ISCOR and ESKOM in the boom years 1972-1974,.58 As a 
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consortium bank, the funds from the EAB came ultimately from 
varying combinations of its seven shareholders: Deutsche Bank; 
societe Generale, Banca commerciale Italiane, Midland Bank and 
Kredit Anstalt Bankverein (Austria), Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank and 
Societe Generale de Banque·. EAB justified its decision on both 
political grounds and its (then) already heavy exposure to South 
Africa. 
This is not to imply that South Africa did not receive any loans 
from private international ba~ks in the years 1977 and 1978. As 
Peel has observed, the disinclination of the international 
financial markets to advance more long-term money to state bodies 
in south Africa has been expressed 'not so much by withholding 
funds as by limiting the terms of any loans to no more than three 
years and insisting on a clear premium'. 59 The South African 
government was an important borrower· of short-term funds to ease 
pressure on the balance of payments, which itself began to improve 
in 1977. Trade-related international bank credit continued to be 
available to south African exporters and importers, and there were 
unconfirmed reports of some financing of specific industrial 
development projects. There were strong indications in mid-1977 
that Citibank was arranging a $60m loan for the development of 
Black Mountain Mineral Development's lead, zinc and copper desposit 
near Aggeneys in the North West cape.~ The loan believed to have 
had a 7-10 year maturity was to be guaranteed by Phelps Dodge of 
New York which it was claimed had a 49pc stake in its operations. 
The SARB obt.ained a DM35m loan through a private placement, 61 that 
was lead-managed by Berliner Handels Und Frankfurter Bank (BHF), 
with five other banks (not all German) participating. The cost of 
the loan was higher than that available to other borrowers at the 
time to compensate for what the Financial Mail called 'the current 
unpopularity of South African borrowers' 62 The SARB loan of July 
1977 was reported to have been the first publicized foreign bond 
issue by a South African borrower since the unsuccessful RSA bond 
issue of February 1976. There was also an unconfirmed report to the 
effect that the City of Johannesburg had obtained a DM50m four year 
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loan which was handled by BHF, Richard Davis and Co., Bayerische 
Hypotheken und Wechsel Bank and Dean witter Reynolds. Thus despite 
South Africa's political instability the country was not entirely 
abandoned by private international bankers and other international 
financiers and institutions. As the west German finance and trade 
journal Handelsblatt declared in June 1978 '[i]n banks and stock 
market circles, the talk is of great faith in the future of the 
country [South Africa] which cannot be simply dropped overnight by 
the Western world for political and strategic reasons'.~ 
By the end of 1978 there were clear signs that South Africa's 
temporary international financing drought was over and that 
circumstances were changing in the country's favour. There were at 
the time strong suggestions that the South African government which 
had (as far as can be ascertained) not raised or been able to raise 
loans on the international financial market since Citibank lead-
managed a $110m credit in 1976, was negotiating a $150m syndicated 
credit with one Swiss (Union Bank of switzerland) and two West 
German banks (Dresdner and Deutsche).~ It appeared that there was 
still some concern, that the market was still a 'little bit 
worried' 65 about the Namibian situation, how PW Botha would perform 
as the new Prime Minister and the effects on the South African 
economy of the rapidly 'deteriorating' political situation in Iran. 
In December 1978 the Urban Foundation's secured a foreign loan of 
R28,7m which marked a further milestone in South Africa's return 
to the international financial market. The loan according to the 
Financial Mail was 'earmarked for urban Black housing, came from 
three giant US banks which had in the [then] recent past kept an 
ultra-low profile on their South African business t .66 They were 
Chase Manhattan, Bank of America and Morgan Guaranty. 
There were several reasons for the improvement in South Africa's 
standing in the international financial markets from late 1978. 
There was firstly greater confidence in South Africa's political 
future following the state's t success' at suppressing popular 
struggles. Soweto and Angola were fast fading from being a factor 
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in the calculation of international bankers. Botha's reform 
initiatives particularly in labour relations and the granting of 
ninety-nine year housing leases to Blacks also contributed to the 
increased confidence of international bankers in South Africa's 
political stability. Secondly, South Africa's balance of payments 
had improved substantially, following the adoption of tighter 
monetary and fiscal policies and the increase (ableit at times 
erratic movement) in the price of. gold, which rose from $125 an 
ounce in 1976 to $193 in 1978 and $307 in 1979 on average. 67 The 
country's ability to successfully service its foreign ?ebt was 
therefore enhanced. Thirdly, in 1979 the second major oil price 
increase (OPEC II) in the decade brought more funds into an ~lready 
liquid international financial market and South African borrowers 
were being eagerly sought by international bankers keen to recycle 
these funds, an important function for the stability of the 
international economic system, at a time when lending to many 
industrialsied countries was becoming less attractive due to the 
slowdown in economic growth there. Fourthly, increasing concern 
about the ability of some developing countries to repay the vast 
quantities of international bank loans unloaded upon them between 
1973 and 1978 after OPEC I, was making South Africa an increasingly 
attractive proposition to international bankers especially given 
the turn-around in the country's economic and political situation. 
It is to an examination of South Africa's international financial 
market dealing between 1979 and 1985 that we now turn. The analysis 
will be split into two periods viz. 1979-1981 and 1982-1985 for 
reasons that will become apparent. 
(4) THE YEARS 1979-1981 
From late 1981 and clearly from 1982, South African borrowers in 
both the public and notably the private sector, went on what may 
best be described as an orgy of borrowing from private 
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international banks directly and from the international capital 
market via bond issues. This massive upsurge in foreign borrowing 
culminated in the dramatic developments of August 1985. This 
frenzied period of South African international financial market 
activity, which will be examined next, was however, preceded by a 
term of consolidation in which South Africa rebuilt its credit 
rating after the uncertainties following the Soweto uprising and 
downturn in the economy. The global and domestic background to this 
period (1979-1981) has already been noted in Chapters 2 and 3. 
These were in the main the liquidity of the international financial 
market, the relative stability of the South African political 
landscape (broken, only by the 1980 schools boycott), the favourable 
balance of payment position (until 1981) and most notably the 
remarkable surge in the ' price of gold which peaked at over $800 an 
ounce in ' 1980. This last factor was in itself related to the 
seemingly intractable world inflation problem, the dollar's own 
woes, foreign exchange instability, sluggish growth and the 
recession in the main capitalist countries, the 1979 oil crisis 
(OPEC II) and growing concern about the debt servicing capacity of 
some developing countries especia'lly in Latin America, and Eastern 
Europe as well. 
The boom in the price of gold reduced South Africa's need to borrow 
funds on the international financial market. Major projects such 
as Saldanha, Richards Bay, the extensions to ISCOR, the 
improvements to harbours in Durban and Cape Town, the 
containerization of ports, the television service etc., were either 
complete or nearing completion. ESKOM (for Koeberg) and Sasol (for 
phase II) remained the major potential parastatal borrowers. South 
Africa also repaid some of its earlier debt in 1979/80 taking 
advantage of the healthier balance of payments position. However, 
changes in South Africa's foreign exchange regulations following 
the pUblication of interim report of the de Kock Commission' of 
Inquiry into monetary policy made foreign borrowing more 
attractive. All South African and multinational companies became 
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eligible for forward cover on foreign loans for renewable periods 
of one year.~ Foreign trade finance also became cheaper.~ 
Despite its reduced need for international credit, especially in 
comparison with its 1974-76 requirements, South Africa continued 
to borrow from abroad. In September 1980 for example the country 
received a $250m seven-year syndicated Eurocredit, which was led 
by Dresdner Bank, Barclays (UK), Credit Commercial and Union Bank 
of switzerland and citibank. The maturity of seven years was 
notable. For the previous 3-4 years South Africa's economic and 
political situation had tended to limit loan horizons to between 
three and five y~ar periods. The loan carried a spread 0,875pc 
above LIBOR for the first two years and 1pc above for the last five 
years. Private international banks set Eurocurrency interest rates 
at LIBORi the London interbank offer rate plus a spread ie an 
additional percentage determined by the bank's evaluation of the 
risks involved in making loans to a particular country. Seidman 
calculated that in 1981 'oil-rich Nigeria paid a spread of 3/4 to 
7/8 above LIBOR. Newly independent Zimbabwe paid 1 1/8 to 1 3/8 
above LIBOR. South Africa in contrast, despite its apartheid 
policies and the growing liberation struggle paid (on average) a 
comparatively low 5/8 to 3/4 above LIBOR,.70 South Africa's 
borrowing terms were thus most competitive and the government made 
numerous forays into the international financial market in this 
period. ESKOM too was a major borrower. In September 1980 it raised 
a $50m, five-year loan on favourable terms, at an even lower spread 
than the (above mentioned) RSA loan. The loan was lead-managed by 
a 'European bank' and the Financial Mail speculated that the 
National Bank of Dallas also participated despite the build-up of 
anti -apartheid pressure in the USA. 71 
Although some of these South African loans from the international 
financial market were used to repay earlier debt and to build up 
reserves it would appear that 'prestige' rather than 'money' was 
the motive behind much of South Africa's international financial 
market activity in this period. 'South Africa's reputation on the 
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international market was tarnished by the 1976 Soweto race riots, 
which [some] foreign bankers saw as ' a sign of instability that 
might create repayment problems', commented Newsweek, ' ••• now the 
government is striving to re-establish its credibility as a stable 
borrower,.n Finance Minister Horwood was quoted as saying that 'we 
are technically not in need of ~arge amounts of foreign loans',~ 
and Secretary of Financ~ de Leor informed the Financial Mail that 
South Africa wished to keep up relationships with the banks, 
" ••• though loan offers have been rolling in 'there are a few we 
can't refuse.' .. 74 
The South African government and private international banks 
continued in their attempts to weaken anti-apartheid criticism by 
claiming to use loan funds for projects that would 'benefit 
blacks'. The September 1980 RSA loan of $250m from a syndicate of 
twenty-five banks included a provision that the 'funds will be used 
for projects to benefit blacks. ,75 Citibank, which had stopped 
lending to the South African government in the previous four years 
cited the new provision as a justification for its participation. 
'Our loan is for projects that will benefit all the people of South 
Africa', stated Citibank spokesperson Robert Brannon. 'Specific 
monies are to be used for housing, hospitals, and educational 
facilities. Those terms were requisite for signing the agreement •• 76 
Private international bank loans to the Urban Foundation were 
allegedly to help South African blacks to acquire ninety-nine year 
leases, not outright ownership, on homes in their segregated 
townships. 'American loans of some R30m enabled black borrowers to 
pay interest rates reduced from 10, 5pc to 8,75 pc'. n The loans 
covered a five-year period and the banks hoped that rising black 
incomes would 'permit borrowers to pay the going [South African] 
interest rate without undue hardship.' 78 The number of such 
leasehold properties • purchased , and applied for remained 
insignificant, yet the banks claimed that their loans 'now 
contributed directly to social advance'.~ Government income, 
including loans, generally go into a general revenue account before 
allocation to specific projects and it would be difficult to 
231 
determine whether or not they were used to the 'benefit of blacks'. 
The foreign funds, critics said, could simply free $250m for 
Pretoria to spend on something else. At best, say some analysts, 
the new provisions might guarantee that certain black programs will 
not be curtailed if the government decides to reduce spending'.~ 
The period under review saw South Afrca's 'homelands' or 
'independent' states raising foreign loans. In 1978 Ciskei raised 
a R5m foreign loan which was guaranteed by the South African 
government. In January 1979 Bophuthatswana raised a loan for a 
similar amount. The lenders were a ' consortium of swiss-based 
banks, the funds being intended for general infrastructural 
purposes,.81 Namibia (South West Africa) obtained its first foreign 
loan of SwFr9,5m over five years in 1979. The loan was negotiated 
by a Cape Town finance house, Law Fin Ltd., in association with 
Crea Fin of Zurich, a wholly owned subsidiary of Rothschild Bank 
AE of Switzerland. Law Fin had earlier negotiated two international 
loans totalling SwFr19m for a Transkei housing project. In later 
years international banks advanced more loans to Bophuthatswana 
(1982, 1984) and to the Transkei (1984). 
By mid-1981 there were already signs of the sharp increase in South 
Africa's international financial market activity which became 
apparent, visible and indisputable in 1982. In the second half of 
1980 the Financial Mail commented that South Africa was 
'comfortably underborrowed'.~ Yet in early 1982 the Mail announced 
that South Africa was 'borrowed to the hilt'. 83 The spate of 
Eurobonds and project-related loans raised abroad by South African 
public corporations represented merely the 'tip of the iceberg of 
the country growing ••• indebtedness' .84 Net long-term capital inflows 
to public corporations and local authorities jumped from R161m in 
the first six months of 1981 to R202m in the fourth quarter. 8S Far 
outweighing these long-term loans and bonds were short-term credits 
raised through the "banking sector, including the SARB. These 
included short-term loans for balance of payments 'smoothing t 
facilities, import credits and book-balancing exercises. 
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International loans raised by the SARB, the majority with 
maturities of between three and six months had increased from zero 
. at the end of 1980 to · over R1,3 billion in January 1982. Inflows 
to the private sector reached a net of R1 billion during 1981, 
compared with net repayments of short-term debt of R1,7 billion in 
1980. 86 According to The Banker '[t]he growing demands on the 
capital markets stem from South Africa's recordbreaking boom of 
1979-80 and severe balance of payments strains caused by soaring 
imports and the drop (after 1980) in gold and other commodity 
earnings' • 87 
The rapid fall i~ the gold price from an average $613 an ounce in 
1980, to $460 in 1981 and $376 in 1~82, ~ and the deficit in the 
country's balance of payments in 1981 (basic balance of +R2340m in 
1980, and -R3547m in 1981) were two of the major changes which 
determined the nature and structure of South Africa's international 
credit in the years after 1981. However, as The Banker observed, 
'South Africa is fortunate that its present appetite for foreign 
loans has coincided with a period of relative stability at home and 
turmoil in some other countries far more heavily in debt to the 
banks,.89 It was also pointed out at the time that South Africa was 
on good terms with international bankers. 'It has never defaulted 
on a foreign loan, nor has it asked for a renegotiation of debt 
repayments. South Africa's debt servicing payments are still less 
than 10pc of total export earnings'.~ 
By the thir~ quarter of 1985, however, South Africa's enviable 
record on the international financial market lay in ruins. It is 
to an examination of the circumstances which led up to these 1985 
developments that the next section is devoted. 
(5) THE YEARS 1982-1985 · 
By 1982 the gold-led boom was clearly over. The South African 
economy had moved into an almost continuous recessionary phase from 
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1981, except for a sudden and brief consumption led surge in 
activity between the end of 1983 and the second quarter of 1984. 
On the international front the world economy was itself in a state 
of decline for much of the period, unemployment remained a major 
problem in most Western capitalist economies, though most of these 
same countries had greater success in bringing down the inflation 
rate through the continued use of tough monetary and fiscal 
measures. International capital markets were in a parlous condition 
because of the South American debt crisis and the erratic movement 
of the US dollar. New lending to most developing countries by 
private international banks came to a virtual end in 1982 forcing 
new initiatives to be devised to address the international debt 
problem, 91 most of which had at its core an expanded role for the 
IMF in international economic supervision and lending. 
At the beginning of this period South Africa's credit rating 
remained good. In a survey conducted by the international banking 
magazine Euromoney in september 1982, South Africa's credit rating 
was upgraded to No 20 in the table of sovereign borrowers compared 
to No 38 in September 1981 and No 60 in 1980. 92 The upgrading arose 
largely because of the debt crisis in some middle-income 
developing, and East European countries. The Rand Daily Mail 
announced proudly that 'the main reason for South Africa's change -
in spite of the deterioration in the balance of payments - is that 
the average international banker has realized that South African 
borrowers not only honour their Obligations but sometimes repay 
loans ahead of time,.93 So conditions for South African activity on 
the international financial market were undoubtedly favourable. 
Early in 1982 the SARB, by lowering marginally the premium for 
forward cover on loan of three months or longer, further encouraged 
foreign borrowing. 94 An increasing proportion of international loans 
made in th~s period were by the private sector and loans from all 
types of borrowers were increasingly short-term. On both counts 
these represented significant changes in the nature and structure 
of South Africa's international borrowing as compared to the mid-
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1970s borrowings. 'South African borrowings in the mid-seventies 
were undertaken mostly by the authorities. Government had then 
anticipated a gold price above $200 per oz to finance its ambitious 
capital projects. When the price failed to rise as expected, it was 
forced to look abroad for long-.term loans, eventually bumping 
against the country lending limits of its creditors, as well as 
international political sensitivity to financing it'.~ 
Indicative of the surge in private sector international loans was 
AECI's seven year credit of $100m in December 1981, which was the 
largest medium-term foreign loan raised by a South African 
corporate borrow~r. Private sector investments were financed 
largely from retained earnings in 1980/81 but the scale of projects 
notably in pulp, paper and chemical industries, under conditions 
of tightening cash flows made international borrowing essential 
thereafter.% But the government and parastatal sector and ESKOM 
especially were not insignificant borrowers themselves. In 1982, 
ESKOM was in the process of building four large coal-fired power 
stations with a further two plants in the pipeline. ESKOM had 
become the biggest borrower of medium-term funds abroad, its 1982 
borrowing, including export credits being close to R2 billion. 97 
ESKOM was at the time involved in the erection of South Africa's 
first nuclear power plant at Koeberg near Cape Town, thus obtaining. 
nuclear capacity without being a signatory to the non-
proliferation treaty. Koeberg also now plays a significant role in 
south Africa's efforts to decrease its dependency on oil and to 
develop other means of energy. In April 1984 ESKOM arranged a 
unique $50m loan, its first which did not carry the guarantee of 
the South African government. As Euromoney pointed out, 'not many 
public sector borrowers even in the OECD area have been able to 
achieve that successfully. ,98 The three-year loan at 5pc to 8pc 
over LIBOR was lead-managed by Guiness Mahon. Late in December 
1983, when the South African army was operating deep in Angola the 
apartheid state secured a DM200m loan, the largest the government 
had raised on the West German capital market in one go. The loan 
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was also notable for its .eight-year maturity period, the first time 
in years that a South African borrower had been able to exceed the 
previous (post-1978) seven-year limit. Some 70-80 international 
banks and financial institutions participated in the issue which 
was managed by eight financial organisations, with Deutsche Bank 
at the head of the management group.w The issue was led by (the 
local bank) Nedbank which was beginning to borrow on behalf of the 
state and state bodies from about mid-1982. 
In general, over this period there was a rapid increase in the 
short-term component of South Africa's borrowing, resulting both 
from the nature of South Africa's borrowing requirements, which 
given the balance of payments problems were mainly trade and 
accommodation credits, and the decision of US banks in particular 
to reduce the maturity period of their South African loans" The 
latter factor became especially apparent after the township unrest 
which began in september 1984, and facilitated a quick retreat in 
adverse political or economic conditions. By mid-1982 short-term 
debts amounted to some 46,4pc according to the Bank for 
International Settlements, rising to 53,5pc in end-1981, 59,6pc in 
mid-1982 100 and 66pc in 1984. 101 The falling rand vis-a-vis the 
dollar, (by end-1984) not only increased the country's debt burden, 
as most of the debt was then denominated in dollars, but led to a 
further increase and bunching in the short-term component of the 
debt as more and more importers held off repayment in the vain hope 
that the rand would recover. 102 
Wi th no shortage of private international loan sources, South 
Africa's R1,24 billion IMF loan in November 1982 appeared to be 
related to and directed at reassuring its private international 
creditors. 'International bankers', commented the Financial Mail, 
'will be happy because there will be less pressure on South Africa 
to borrow abroad and they will be reassured that South Africa's 
economic progress is being monitored by the IMF'. 103 More than this, 
however, a UN study on South Africa's IMF loan application charged 
that the loan to South Africa 'demonstrated to the world financial 
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community that, despite increasingly violent confrontations between 
the majority black population and the white minority government in 
South Africa the IMF would continue to support the status quo and , ' 
the white authorities'. 104 Militz 105 observed that in 1983, after 
the IMF loan to South Africa was approved, private international 
banks provided South Africa with an unprecedented amount in 
credits, showing clearly the value and role of the IMF in the new 
conditions of the international economy.1~ 
At the same time as South Africa's application to the IMF was being 
made Finance Minister Horwood announced that South Africa was 
looking ,to the ~ar East for loans to form the capital of the 
Development Bank of Southern ,Africa. He hoped, he stated, that at 
least two major Far Eastern banks would invest money in the planned 
Development Bank, adding that one major Far East bank had by then 
already been part of a syndicate which made a major loan to South 
Africa. 107 
On 7 February 1983 South Africa abolished exchange controls (and 
with it the financial rand) over non-residents and received 
plaudits from the IMF and some of its major international creditor 
banks. A senior IMF official commented that 'we are very happy to 
see the last of the financial rand. We had never made an end to it 
a precondition to the [1982] loan nor did the South African 
government promise it. It was more a case of having always frowned 
on such artificiality. ,108 And a Commerzsbank spokesperson in Munich 
was reported to have stated, '[a]ny move into a free market is to 
be welcomed especially this one which seems to be an 
acknowledgement that Pretoria now has enough self-confidence to 
take the step.' 109 
There was within South Africa at the time little public criticism 
of these measures. It was only after the mid-1985 debt crisis broke 
that internal criticism of these liberalisation measures began to 
surface. Volkskas Bank managing director, Danie Cronje and 
Trustbank's Chris van Wyk both expressed opposition to the moves. 
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'The liberalization of the forex markets may have been the right 
system for South Africa but the timing was wrong', noted Cronje, 
adding that the speed of liberalisation was too fast. 11o Despite 
this criticism from the two major indigenous (non-British) banks 
and other mainly Afrikaner businessmen, the key SARB officials 
remained committed to the progressive liberalization of exchange 
regulations. 
While South Africa's standing on the international financial market 
and in financial centres was undoubtedly upgraded following the 
abolition of the' financial rand, the South African monetary 
authorities were by late 1984 becoming increasingly concerned about 
the capital losses and diverted resources flowing from investment 
by South African companies seeking profitable outlets abroad. In 
the face . of the domestic recession and despite the restrictive 
exchange controls on r~sidents, and the falling rand, '[Slouth 
African controlled subsidiaries are rising like mushrooms in 
Europe, Australasia and the US, in sectors ranging from 
construction to stationery' .111 Whatever the economic logic of these 
decisions on their own merits, it is clear that the decision to 
invest abroad was at least partly to remove 'a good number of their 
eggs from the politically unstable South African basket'. Soon 
international banks were to reach a similar conclusion. 
Another factor which ought to have caused South Africa's monetary 
authorities some concern (but which until it was too late did not 
appear to) was the unsound international financial practices of 
some large South African banks. The big South African banks had 
from about 1982 been borrowing heavily abroad. Charles Grant gave 
the following foreign currency exposure for the main south African 
banks: Standard Bank $2,5 to $3 billion; Barclays National $2 
billion; and Nedbank $1,6 billion. 112 According to the Euromoney 
Bank Report of October 1985, of the maj or South African banks 
Nedbank as a wholly owned South African bank 'was freer to expand 
overseas in contrast to its bigger rivals, Barclays National Bank 
and Standard Bank of South Africa, whose British controlling 
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parents took charge of their overseas operations. ,113 The problem as 
the Financial Mail noted was that 'Nedbank which has been borrowing 
short-term in New York at lower inter-bank rates and turning these 
credits into long-term interest loans in South Africa (often to the 
government and parastatals) had been thought by US banks to be 
travelling in dangerous financial waters for some time.' 114 
By July 1984 at the time of the collapse of the Rand, the South 
African economy was in the midst of the worst and longest running 
recession, perhaps including the depression of the 1930s. Foreign 
debt was increasing and becoming ever more short-term in nature. 115 
But given the state of the international financial market from 
c1982, characterized by reasonably high liquidity and a shortage 
of 'good' borrowers, and South Africa's exceptional 'and enviable 
record of debt repayment, talk of a debt crisis, of debt 
rescheduling or debt moratoriums and the like was noticeably 
absent. In a special survey in June 1984, Euromoney noted that 'the 
last two years have been an extremely difficult period for South 
Africa's economy. For the first time in living memory the country 
had experienced two consecutive years of negative growth.' However, 
the report added that 'the worsening economic situation has not yet 
dented South Africa's creditworthiness in international markets. ,116 
In the first half of 1984 the South African government carried out 
its first European Currency Unit (ECU) and its first floating rate 
note (FRN) issue. 
It took the upheavals in South Africa's townships and factories in 
September 1984 'onwards to concentrate the minds of international 
bankers and local monetary authorities alike. These developments 
have been discussed in Chapter 3. In July 1985 the apartheid state 
responded to this increasing political resistance by declaring a 
partial state of emergency, in itself an admission of the 
seriousness of the situation. Thereafter the underlying tensions 
and crisis in the South African political economy could no longer 
be hidden under talk of 'polit,ical stability'; the risk of 
investment and loans to South Africa became apparent, some banks 
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and analysts arguing that the . 'trend of current events suggests 
that South Africa may be facing social breakdown within the next 
two or three years', anti-apartheid and disinvestment pressure on 
US corporations and banks increased sharply. South Africa's foreign 
exposure, with well over 50pc of its debt scheduled for payment 
within a year and with large amounts due for repayments between 
1985 and 1987, at last began to appear problematic when seen 
against political instability and declining economic prospects, no 
longer hidden behind the 'security' provided by the gold price rise 
in 1979-1980. citibank in March 1985 wrote of South Africa's 
external finances as being in 'absolute chaos'. Worse still the 
bank report went on, 'no regard whatsoever has evidently been paid 
to the maturity structure of this debt - with the startling result 
that, according to the Bank for International Settlements, no less 
than 66pc of the debt is due to be repaid within one year. The 
report, an important one given its source, went on :to suggest that 
South Africa's main problem seems to be that it is facing 
rapidly rising expectations among the Black workforce 
expectations which are now being expressed through increasingly 
militant union organisations, at a time when the economy's 
capacity to produce has been severely eroded by low gold and 
commodity prices, domestic drought, disinvestment by foreign 
corporations and gross financial mismanagement on the part of 
the Finance Ministry and the Reserve Bank. 117 
US banks, in particular, from the last quarter of 1984 began to 
reduce their exposure as a result of the political 'unrest' which 
began at this time. US banks, at the time, had a proportionally 
higher perc~ntage of their total lending to South Africa in the 
form of short-term credits (85pc, compared to 57pc and 31pc for UK 
and west German banks, respectively). Because of this the liquidity 
of the South African economy was very sensitive ·to the decision of 
US banks regarding the roll-over of this debt. 118 UK banks, however, 
were still involved in almost half of the total of direct bank loan 
channelled to South Africa in the period mid 1982-1984, with the 
Hill Samuel Group No 1 among the Top 10 lenders. 
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South Africa was also heavily dependent for short, medium and long-
term syndicated loans and for bond· management and underwriting to 
a small group of west German and Swiss banks, viz. Dresdner Bank, 
Union Bank of Switzerland and Swiss Banking corporation, and given 
South Africa's heavy borrowing during the years 1981-84 even these 
banks who were very supportive of the financial needs of the 
apartheid state for long, were beginning to bump up against their 
internal credit limits and controls on exposure to this country. 
By August the international magazine south reported that rich 
individuals (the new and old 'international rich' who invest 
heavily in Eurobonds) 'often political supporters of apartheid who 
buy up South African bond issues (were) •.• getting cold feet. ,119 
Bondhoiders thus 'appeared to react in much the same way they did 
in the mid-1970s, by (temporarily) dumping their certificates and 
turning their backs on new South African issues. This new mood 
toward south African issues was noticeable in a $100m bond issue 
for ESKOM in July 1985. Although the yield was 11,5pc, almost 2pc 
higher than a US Ford Motor Company issue in the same we~k, the 
issue was poorly received and sold slowly.1~ 
Although initially Swiss and German banks took up the gaps left by 
the reduced US exposure, the continuing violence in the townships, 
the disinvestment campaign and the underlying weakness of the South 
African economy increased the reticence of these banks to raise 
their exposure to this country. The changed perception of the 
future potential 'of the South African economy by banks and other 
investors is important to underscore. As the Financial Mail pointed 
out the South African economy was increasingly perceived as not 
being able or equipped to cope with the world of the 1980s and 
1990s, as it appeared ~n the 1970s at the time of that earlier 
explosion of foreign borrowing. Whereas that burst of loans 
appeared to contribute to productive and infrastructural investment 
and technology inflows and increased productivity, and in all these 
ways enhanced the strength, resilience and potential performance 
of the economy, the ear~y to mid-1980s loans were overwhelmingly 
short-term, trade and balance of payments-related credits, and 
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reflected if anything the weakness and vulnerability of the economy 
121 rather than strength. 
When inflation was high and everybody . expected an energy crisis, 
an economy which produced the greatest proportion of the world's 
output and produced and exported vast quantities of coal was bound 
to do well. So it was believed in the 1970s. But at a time of low 
world inflation, a depressed oil market and an increasingly hi-
tech led growth syndrome, South Africa's traditional comparative 
advantage and exports appeared much less valuable in the 1980s. As 
the Financial Mail almost ruefully noted, '[a]ll the old faithful 
standbys no longer apply'. Later the same report continued, 'the 
unrest is now so ' ser.ious that any decisions to lend or to invest 
in South Africa are not just based on moral scruples - they are 
hard to justify by any measure of risk and reward.' 122 
Under these scenarios the fact that South Africa's foreign debt 
and interest commitments were still moderate in relation to its 
current GOP and export revenues or that its debt appeared to 
compare relatively favourably with those in other (comparable) 
developing countries, offered little comfort. But the question of 
whether a country is actually, in a strict technical sense, in a 
financial crisis or not is not the only crucial factor. As Portes 
and Swobada point out most developing country's after 1980 
may still have been 'solvent' on a suitable long-run 
calculation, but with uncertain expectations [and political 
instability] the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity 
for a sovereign debtor is both theoretically imprecise and 
politically untenable~1n 
However, Holden has shown that at the time of the crisis South 
Africa's debt-service ratio (122,5) was not significantly better 
than that of Brazil (132,6), Chile (153,3), Mexico (161,8) and 
Argentina (214,9) These figures suggest that South Africa, given 
its fragile political climate, was overborrowed in relation to its 
exports, raising fears on the part of its creditor banks about the 
country's ability 'to meet current commitments on debt out of (its) 
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export revenue. These high ratios also meant that if new lending 
was either reduced or curtailed that a debt rescheduling could not 
be avoided'. 124 
On 1 August 1985, a report appeared in the New York Times that 
Chase Manhattan Bank, the second largest US lender to South Africa 
had ceased extending credit to South Africa. 125 The report 
precipitated a rapid withdrawal by other US banks during August of 
about $400m, as part of their refusal to roll-over short term debt 
due for payment. 126 Some of this was taken up or offset by 
additional lending from other banks, including some Japanese (and 
European) banks, according to Lind and Espaldon. 127 The value of 
the rand continued to fall (reflecting these tensions) dropping to 
a (then) record low of $0,353 on Tuesday 27 August 1985. Finally 
on 1 September, as other foreign banks 'presumably indicated that 
they could not continue to counter-palance the US bank withdrawals, 
South Africa unilaterally proclaimed a moratorium on payment of the 
principal of the short-term debt. ,128 The moratorium was originally 
to last until 31 December 1985, but was later extended through the 
first quarter of 1986. 
South Africa's long and mostly favoured relationship and status 
with private international banks and the international financial 
market in general, had reached its nadir. 
Private international bank lending and credit to South Africa's 
Apartheid regime expanded rapidly in the period 1981-1984 given 
the liquidity of the international financial market, the shortage 
of good borrowers among developing and middle income countries in 
the wake of the Latin American and E~st European debt crisis and 
the relative political stability of the South African state. The 
panic brought upon the internationa.l financial community when South 
Africa's black townships exploded into a sustained and organised 
resistance to the apartheid state form, raising the prospects of 
a 'revolutionary transformation' to black majority rule, acted to 
strip away South Africa's remaining comparative advantages within 
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the world economic system. Its enormous short-term debt could no 
longer be 'discounted' by virtue of its 'political stability', 
economic prospects or enviable debt servicing and repayment record. 
The underlying weakness· of the South African economy was exposed 
as was the gross financial mismanagement of its banking and 
monetary authorities. In the longer term its growth and development 
prospects were perceived to be limited by its inability to match 
developments in the newly industrialising economies. For foreign 
investors and international bankers the liability of political 
instability and economic lethargy, even backwardness, finally 
became too heavy to bear. The causes of the crisis in south 
Africa's international financial relations were thus not simple or 
linear. They arose out of a complicated set of factors w~ich 
affected the international financial system as a whole, south 
Africa's .standing within that system as well as both economic and 
political developments and changes within south Africa itself. 
(6) CONCLUSION 
South Africa received large amounts of international credit from 
private international banks and through publicly and privately-
placed bond issues virtually throughout the period of this study. 
The enormity of state and parastatal borrowing for strategic and 
infrastructural investment in the early to mid-1970s is one of the 
most significant features of the involvement of private 
international banks and bondholders with South Africa in the years 
since 1970. This credit enabled South Africa to build up a strong 
infrastructural, strategic and (to a lesser extent) productive 
foundation and despite the growing economic crisis of the post-1973 
period, this foundation formed an important bulwark for the 
apartheid state, enabling it to resist, even if it is not likely 
to indefinitely put off, the demands of internal and international 
pressure for a restructuring of its racially- based political and 
social structure. Despi te the problems these and other large 
borrowings were later to create, clearly the South African state 
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and private sector, were for some time also able to utilise the 
opportunities created by their integration into world financial 
markets. 
In two periods, the two years following the Soweto student revolt 
in 1976 and the years immediately after the more generalised 
political crisis set in in 1984, banks and bondholders responded 
by either reducing loans, changing the terms of lending or cutting 
links altogether for some time. In both periods, private 
bondholders appeared to react in a similar way, ie by dumping their 
South African holdings to financial institutions in the' secondary 
bond market wherever possible. Although private bondholders 
supported South 'African issues', notwi thstanding the country' s 
racial policies, they are, in general, more susceptible to sudden 
changes in political conditions in issuing countries, having 
neither the resources nor the analytical sophistication of banks 
or other financial institutions to back them. Whereas the latter 
can adopt strategies to discount or reduce or manage some 
percentage of political risk where they believe political tensions 
to be temporary , private bondholders cannot. It is thus not 
surprising that for some time after 1976, new South African issues 
were, as far as can be publicly ascertained, entirely absent from 
the European bondmarket. From about 1980, however, South African 
parastatals were back in the bondmarket. In the wake of the 
political problems after 1984, however, it is apparent that new 
South African issues were again poorly received, stopping 
altogether in the second half of 1985. 
Private international banks, on the other hand, responded to the 
mid-1970s crisis in three ways. First, by reducing the maturity 
period of their loans to South Africa, secondly, by reducing their 
loans ,to the state and parastatals or by making such loans more 
covertly, and thirdly, by claiming that their loans were directly 
linked to programmes of black social advancement. Following these 
responses, short-term bank loans to the private sector in the main 
increased rapidly after 1979 as compared to the predominantly state 
245 
borrowings of the mid-1970s, especially as memories of Soweto and 
Angola faded, the gold price rose to heady levels and international 
condi tions turned in ways . which improved the relati ve 
attractiveness of lending to South Africa. 
However, the depth and intensity of internal political resistance 
to apartheid, mounting international pressure, the increasing 
dangers of overexposure arising out of the (then) current levels 
and maturity structure of their loans, the fall in the gold price, 
and the limited economic prospects of a mineral and primary 
exporting country in the international economic conditions of the 
1980s, as compare~ to global conditions in the 1960s and 1970s, all 
combined to turn South Africa's relations wi th private 
international banks into crisis by mid-1985. This time banks, went 
beyond their mid-1970s response, by not only cutting most forms of 
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CHAPTER 6 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL BANKS, THE IMF AND THE RESCHEDULING OF SOUTH 
AFRICAN DEBT: 1985-1987 
(1) INTRODUCTION 
Both the South African apartheid state and private sector for long 
prided themselves on the country's exceptionally high credit rating 
in international financial markets. Especially at the time (c1979-
1985) when Latin American and East European countries were 
constantly on the verge of default or desperately seeking debt 
relief, South Afr'ica' s debt servicing record ~as a source of pride 
in official circles. ,And despite the fact that the South African 
state, especially in the early to mid-1970s, and the private 
sector, especially after the second oil-price hike (1979) increased 
their international borrowing from the banks of the US, UK, FRG, 
and Switzerland in the main, there did not appear to be any reason 
to panic. In comparison to the problems of other debtors, South 
Africa's debt appeared inconsequential. Talk of debt crises and of 
possible rescheduling seemed almost laughable. 
And yet as we have seen, on 1 September 1985, within a month of 
Chase Manhattan Bank's decision to call in and not rollover its 
South African debt, the South African Finance Minister announced 
a four month stand-still on the repayment of the country's foreign 
debt. Furthermore, the Minister announced that in terms of 
'accepted international practice, the South African authorities are 
in the process of acquiring the assistance of a reputable and 
independent international financial expert to assist in negotiating 
a programme for the resumption of debt repayments ,1 In short, the 
South Africans had begun, what for them, was the traumatic business 
of rescheduling their debt repayment. Following the crisis of mid-
1985, the nature and character of South Africa's international 
financial relations were in the process of being fundamentally 
transformed from those which prevailed in an earlier era. 
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We have already examined the background to the South African debt 
crisis. 2 This chapter seeks to examine events immediately 
thereafter. The changed and changing nature of South Africa's 
international financial relations is examined through a study of 
South Africa's debt rescheduling arrangements which culminated in 
the second interim debt agreement of 24 March 1987. , While debt-
rescheduling arrangements are in themselves not unusual these days, 
South Africa's took place against a backdrop of mounting 
international economic, political and diplomatic pressure against 
the apartheid form of the South African state, as well as both 
growing resistance and repression internally. 
It was argued in Chapter 5., that beside the important economic 
factors qf the country's deteriorating economic performance and 
its declining credit-worthiness (ie its high debt-service ratio), 
it was the fear of rapid, destabilising and radical political 
change which underpinned the actions of Chase Manhattan Bank, 
Security Pacific Corporation, citiBank .and others in mid-1985. The 
possibility of political collapse and of the imminence of black 
majority rule, and the fears of nationalisation, socialisation and 
civil strife these prospects seemed to conjure up in the minds of 
bankers and financiers, weighed heavily in bankers' reassessment 
of the risk of their South African exposure in mid-1985. 
However, it would appear that any thoughts that may have been held 
in mid-1985 ~hat the regime was about to fall, so jeopardising the 
possibilities of banks recovering their loans to South Africa, had 
been mostly dispelled by certain political and economic changes 
which were in place by mid-1986. These changes included the 
restoration of a greater degree of political stability in South 
Africa ., albeit by extremely repressive measures such as the 
declaration of a state of emergency and the banning and restriction 
of political and worker organisations. Others included the 
implementation of a moderate package of political reform and the 
'successful' adjustment in the balance of payments brought about 
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by a combination of deflationary policy and the effects of the low 
dollar value of the rand on exports. 
These economic and political changes since 1986 appear to have 
reduced the need to pressurise the apartheid state with the 
intensity (and consequent added risk of precipitating a South 
African default) that appeared to characterise the actions of 
private international banks in mid-1985. The regulation approach 
underlines the importance of political factors as an element in 
the decision-making processes of banks, investors, the IMF and 
other global actors, especially since 1982 when the debt ,crisis 
emerged as a seri~us threat to global economic stability.3 We would 
argue in terms of the regulation approach that both political 
destabilisation and economic de~erioration combined to produce the 
banks' dramatic gesture of calling in their loans in mid-1985, but 
that the restoration of some degree of political stability after 
mid-1986 contributed to a somewhat revised, though differential, 
assessment by creditor banks of their attitude and new lending to 
South Africa as well as their stance on rescheduling South Africa's 
debt. 
What is argued in this chapter is that although South Africa 
remained economically weak and in crisis judged in terms of its 
failure to generate robust and sustainable increases in growth, 
employment and investment, and was nowhere nearer a more just 
socio-political order, its international financial relations were 
not as badly off in March 1987, at the time of the second interim 
agreement, as they were in August 1985. Foreign bankers, who 
increasingly came to recognise that their bargaining power vis-a-
vis South Africa was slipping away, were gradually forced by 
changing economic and political factors to adopt a more 
conciliatory attitude in their debt rescheduling talks. Although 
differences between banks in the US and Europe were undeniable and 
the IMF in contrast to some private banks continued to limit 
financial assistance to South Africa, the outcome of the debt 
rescheduling was more favourable to South Africa than many expected 
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or hoped for. By late 1987 there were signs that some European 
bankers were providing South Africa with small, though irregular 
amounts of loans. Trade credits which were exempt from the 1985 
restrictions on new foreign loans, continued to be available. 
All this is not to suggest, however, that South Africa's 
international financial relations had returned to normality. On 
the contrary restrictions on the inflow of new loans and on IMF 
balance of payments assistance continued, placing severe strains 
on foreign reserves and limiting a sustainable cyclical upswing., 
The existing restrictions on loans still, by 1989, represent a 
major obstacle to the smooth transition to a new regime of 
accumulation and mode of regulation and the subsequent restoration 
of the conditions for renewed capital accumUlation. 
(2) THE RESCHEDULING: AUGUST 1985-MARCH 1987 
It is important at the beginning of this analysis to recapture 
briefly the economic and political climate and events of the period 
leading up to the Chase Manhattan Bank decision, the unilateral 
declaration of the debt moratorium by South Africa and the 
subsequent rescheduling talks. These events have been described in 
more general terms in Chapter 3. The year beginning" September 1984, 
represented one of the most dramatic periods in south African 
political and economic history. Events moved fast. The township 
'unrest' set off a twelve month period of turmoil, during which 
time the apartheid state declared a partial state of emergency in 
order to reassert its control " over the activities of political 
organisations and trade unions and so to control the pace of 
, change'; debate over the imposition of sanctions and disinvestment 
began increasingly to be translated into action; and the economy 
was more regularly characterised as being 'in crisis'. The 
institutions and structures which ensured the conditions for the 
unproblematic (though perhaps less than virtuous) cycle of capital 
accumUlation in the 1960s, appeared to be breaking down, and 
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nothing short of fundamental restructuring of the political 
economy, it seemed, would succeed in restoring conditions 
favourable for accumulation. Both within and without the country, 
there arose a 'feeling' that .a turning point had been reached in 
the struggle against apartheid, and that with just a little more 
pressure all round the liberation of South Africa would be won. 
Obviously differences emerged about what this would imply for the 
post-apartheid political economy. A survey conducted by stock 
brokers Mathison and Hollidge among European and American money 
managers in mld-1986 for example, indicated a widely held 
perception that 'white rule will end', that 'time was short', and 
that investment in south Africa thereafter would be pointless. The 
fear among bankers of 'black majority rule' in South Africa, is 
most evident here. Pulling-out and not reinvesting in South Africa, 
as a way of expressing displeasure against apartheid, did not 
appear to be uppermost in bankers' assessment. The majority of 
respondents felt that South Africa would be a place from which it 
was prudent to stay away.4 The Wall Street Journal, in our view 
accurately, described the mood in 1985/6 as follows: 
In 1985 and 1986, when pictures of rioting blacks and rampaging 
white policemen filled television screens around the world, the 
perception was that South Africa's white-dominated government 
was losing its grip. The economy wasn't given a chance. 
International banks were pulling their credit, foreign debt was 
unpayable, economic sanctions were being applied ever more 
widely against Pretoria's race-separation policies, and 
multinational companies were disinvesting in droves. 5 
Following Chase Manhattan Bank's decision of 1 August 1985 and the 
'Rubicon' speech of the South African State President on 15 August 
of that year in which he quashed prospects of a move towards 
moderate reform, the run on the already embattled rand accelerated. 
International bankers and investors, we would argue, would have 
been hoping for some minimalist political concessions Which would 
have pricked the near-insurrectionary bubble which prevailed at the 
time and created the political stability and climate for 
controllable and evolutionary change. This is particulary true, 
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given the domestic pressures they faced, of US banks. It is less 
true for Swiss and German banks, whose stance towards the apartheid 
state over the years, suggests that they would have been more 
narrowly interested in POlit~cal stability than in political 
change, especially one in the direction of black majority 
government. In any event the Rubicon speech did little to appease 
either of these' camps at the time. 
Thereafter South Africa's foreign exchange reserves fell to 
dangerously low levels. Net gold and foreign exchange reserves fell 
by R480m in August and R1126m in September 1985. 6 There was 
considerable uncertainty about South Africa's ability to meet its 
short-term foreign debt obligations. In these circumstances the 
country's monetary authorities were faced with some combination of 
the foll~wing unappetising options: effect further gold swaps (ie 
pawning gold for foreign currency), re-introduce exchange controls 
over non-residents (which had been discontinued in February 1983, 
with much fanfare), or declare a moratorium on the country's 
foreign debt. The last of these, even at that stage, appeared more 
of an academic rather than a real option. The Financial Mail 
commented that 'short of an immediate and major political policy 
announcement- which would have the most dramatic and positive 
effect,7 the above three options were the only ones left to save 
the day. 
On the 27 August the South African monetary authorities announced 
the closure of the foreign exchange market and the Stock Exchange 
from 28 August to 1 September 1985 in order 'to assess the 
situation and to decide on a policy strategy that would cause the 
least disruption for both the international lenders to South Africa 
and the South African econ~my. ,8 On the next day (then) Reserve 
Bank Governor Gerhard de Kock set off on a thirteen day tour of the 
US and Europe, during which time he visited nineteen bank chairmen , 
four central bankers as well as the IMF and the US State 
Department. According to de Kock, the objective of the mission was 
not to ask banks to restore credit lines. However, it was widely 
• 
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believed that it was his failure to get banks to agree to restore 
credit lines which forced south Africa to impose the standstill. 
However, de Kock stated that he had decided on the standstill on 
27 August, before he left and that the visits to the financial 
centres was the 'only honourable thing to do-to explain face to 
face what we were going to do and ask advice. ,9 De Kock did 
indicate that he knew little about rescheduling, and was not going 
to apologise for this fact. In New York, he apparently found in 
citiBank's Bill Rhodes, his 'mentor and teacher. ,10 
De Kock's mission was to prove rather unsuccessful, even in terms 
of his view of it~ objective. The m~n who was soon to be appointed 
the .debt mediator, Fritz Leutwiler, described de Kock's visit to 
switzerland at that time as 'not a very successful trip, to say the 
least. ,11 .Bank of England Governor Robin Leigh-pemberton refused to 
see de Kock, so thwarting his face-to-face ta1k. In France, 
Rothschild's chairman, a director of de Beers, only met with him 
discreetly. Swiss National Bank's Pierre Languetin went 'to the 
extraordinary length of officially denying a report that he had 
seen (de Kock) , • 12 
With de Kock still in the middle of his tour, the Minister of 
Finance, Barend du Plessis 'unilaterally announced a four-month 
standstill or freeze on repayments of South Africa's foreign debt, 
so becoming the first sovereign debtor to renege on its short-term 
interbank lines. 13 Furthermore the financial rand was reintroduced 
to avoid the stock exchange being used as a conduit fo the evasion 
of the debt freeze. Non-residents wishing to buy or sell South 
African assets would thenceforth have to use a special currency, 
the financial rand. Other transactions would continue to be made 
through the commercial rand, which would now be insulated from 
foreign disinvestment pressure. The mechanism for determining the 
value of the rand was also altered. Up to that point the rand had 
been 'floating', its value determined primarily by market forces . , 
under which system it had lost nearly a third of its value in the 
preceding month. The South African authorities decided to intervene 
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more directly in the market for the rand, converting the system for 
determining the rand's value into a 'managed float'. 
It was also announced that South Africa would acquire the services 
of an independent financial expert to assist in negotiating a 
programme for the resumption of debt repayments. Various types of 
foreign debt were exempt from the standstill, ie. they fell outside 
the standstill net as it were. These included public bond issues, 
loans guaranteed by foreign governments, repayment on South 
Africa's 1982 loan from the IMF, the South African government's own 
debt, forward foreign exchange contracts and most forms of trade 
credit or finance. These exemptions were not always easy to 
understand howeveor, and banks interpreted the measures, especially 
in regard to trade finance in various ways, thus forcing the 
Reserve Bank to issue a long series of memoranda in order to 
clarify the rules. This obviously did not endear it to local and 
foreign financiers. The general manager of a local bank is quoted 
as saying that 
the Reserve Bank should have stopped all payments, and then 
relaxed the situation as necessary - rather than just go half 
way, and let a lot of money escape. They've blundered in and 
messed everything up. They should have closed the markets for 
longer and consulted bankeors in south Africa and abroad, which 
they didn't do. Overseas bankers haven't been impressed by the 
weird logic of what's been included in the net.1~ 
The South African authorities were from the very beginning set on 
dealing with the crisis in terms of the orthodox rules of 
international finance. Their stated objective was to normalise 
south Africa's international financial relations as soon as 
circumstances permitted, to regain the confidence of foreign 
bankers and to reestablish the country's creditworthiness. Unlike 
other countries facing debt problems at the time, south Africa did 
not press for changing the rules of addressing the international 
debt crisis. It continued to see its problems as a short-term 
aberration, caused by the overhasty actions of a few US banks. 
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Thus the standstill measures were designed, in the language of the 
monetary and finance officials, to achieve an orderly management 
of the gradual reduction of the country's foreign debt at an 
affordable rate; to create th~ scope for the relaxation of the 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies then in place; to 
discourage disinvestment by non-residents; and finally to 
facilitate an early resumption of economic growth. In more direct 
language the obj ecti ve was to convince governments and bankers 
overseas that South Africa would be able to maintain political and 
economic stability, while proceeding with reforms. Finance Minister 
du Plessis concluded his 1 September statement with these words: 
'The government has the political will and management resources to 
achieve these objectives. South Africa .has the economic means and 
human potential to meet this challenge while continuing to play its 
historic .role as a regional power in the development of southern 
Africa. ,15 The last point was meant to remind bankers and western 
governments of the important function it had previously played in 
southern Africa, in the hope that they would not want to jeopardise 
this special relationship. 
The South African authorities then set up what became known as the 
Standstill Co-ordinating committee (SCC) in the third week of 
September in order to deal with their side of the debt negotiating 
process. The committee was headed by Chris Stals, then Director-
General of Finance, (and presently Reserve Bank Governor), who 
Euromoney described as a 'less passionate and more pragmatic' 16 
free-market~er than Reserve Bank Governor de Kock. Stals is in fact 
a protege of (the giant Afrikaner insurance conglomerate) Sanlam's 
late chairman Fred du Plessis, who was one of the foremost 
spokespersons of the interventionist school of economic thinking 
in South Africa. Stal~ stressed the technical nature of the SCC, 
claimi!lg that its task was not in any way to deal wi th the 
political aspects of the crisis. That task, he believed, may later 
be handled by what he referred to as a 'political team' once the 
technical matters were sorted out. 
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What remained unresolved was the way in which the foreign banks 
would be represented at the rescheduling talks. By one account the 
creditor banks had set up a committee of twenty-nine of the biggest 
creditor banks immediately after the South African debt moratorium 
declaration, in order to renegotiate repayment terms. 17 On the other 
hand, Euromoney was informed that these creditor banks were not 
prepared to set up a rescheduling committee as 'none of them wanted 
to be seen as dealing with apartheid. ,18 How true this was is hard 
to say as the banks had had little trouble for decades dealing with 
the apartheid regime. Perhaps it is more accurate to argue that 
they now doubted the long-run profitability of dealing with a 
politically unstable South Africa in which the overthrow of the 
apartheid state and its replacement by a black majority government 
seemed at the time, a distin9t possibity. Furthermore, since the 
IMF's 1983 decision ' to restrict lending to South Africa, the banks 
had to make decisions on their South African exposure without · the 
overt and complementary support of the IMF, especially as the 
Fund's supervision of South African economic policy is likely to 
have declined somewhat after this date. 
To overcome the problem of bank representation de Kock resolved to 
persuade an internationally respected financier to represent the 
banks and to act as a mediator in the rescheduling talks. Fritz 
Leutwiler, the former head of the Swiss National Bank, and the 
chairman of the international finance firm Brown Boveri, was chosen 
above two other possibilities, Gordon Richardson and Jelle 
Zjilstra. De Kock apparently asked Leutwiler to take on the task 
'not for south Africa, but out of a sense of responsibility for 
the international banking system. ,19 Leutwiler checked out his 
participation with the Swiss President, in case his involvement 
(in his words) 'harmed or embarrassed the Swiss government',20 and 
agreed to do the job on condition that all the major creditor banks 
agreed. They did. Price Waterhouse and Partners, a London~based 
firm of accountants, who were paid by the South Africans, agreed 
to provide the support services for the rescheduling talks. It was 
a happy coincidence for South Africa that Leutwiler was an old-
261 
time friend of former Finance Minister Owen Horwood, who knew de 
Kock well into the bargain. Leadership described Leutwiler as a 
'tough, no nonsense character, with a fortuitous liking for South 
Africa. ,21 He had to deal not only with the stubbornness of the 
South Africans, but also with the tensions among the creditor 
bankers, the views of various European governments as well as the 
Americans, and not least with the implications of his position for 
his company, Brown Boveri. Antony Sampson makes the point that 
Brown Boveri had important contracts with China and that the 
Chinese had apparently politely informed Brown Boveri that they had 
noticed that the chairman was 'involving himself with white South 
Africa. ,22 
In October South Africa had the opportunity to meet with more 
international bankers and governments at the annual meeting of the 
IMF and World Bank, which was being held in Seoul, South Korea. 
There they argued that the decision of the banks in recalling their 
South African loans and refusing to extend new credit would most 
harm South Africa's blacks and its black neighbours. South African 
officials stressed the importance of growth in their country for 
" the development and stability of the region and du Plessis warned 
of the threat to the 'integrity of the present international 
financial system,,23 ' brought about by the actions of its creditor 
banks. 
As far as IMF assistance to South Africa was concerned, this 
appeared ou~ of the question according to Stals. As we have seen, 
in 1983 the IMF had partially restricted further IMF assistance to 
the apartheid state, and tied future lending, outside automatic 
reserve tranche borrowing, to vaguely defined political and 
economic reforms. However, as Stals (arrogantly) pointed out, it 
was not this that prevented south Africa from receiving IMF 
assistance. He was confident that South Africa could get past the 
political obstacle as the IMF staff had 'always been very much on 
South Africa's side. ,24 The problem was that South Africa was 
running a current account surplus (itself largely a reflection of 
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the low value of the rand) and that there was no precedent for the 
IMF to assist a member with a balance of payments surplus on 
current account. South Africa's external problems lay in the 
capital account. 
However, we would argue that Stals was wrong in his assessment of 
possible IMF support · for South Africa. Short of a change in US 
foreign policy towards South Africa, itself dependent upon some 
political reform acceptable to the US in the main, it is unlikely 
that the country will receive IMF financial assistance in the eve~t 
of the current account of the balance of payments running into 
deficit. As l~ng as anti-apartheid pressure on the US 
administration, from Congress which has since 1986 taken a more 
bi-partisan approach to south Africa, from the black Congressional 
caucus and from students, church leaders and some corporate 
shareholders, persists, there is little likelihood that the 
administration will instruct the US Executive Director to the Fund 
to support South African loan applications. The IMF, given its 
domination by the US and its wide supervisory role within the world 
economy, comes under more direct political pressure than private 
international banks who are more narrowly concerned with financial 
risk. In the long post-war years this role translated into support 
for South Africa. In the unstable global and south African context 
of the 1980s, this situation has been reversed. We would argue that 
it will take political change and an economic restructuring package 
which meets with the approval of (at least) the US and the IMF 
before this situation reassessed. It should not be surprising that 
the IMF and banks, being very different institutions, may have 
different responses to specific and unusual cases such as the South 
African one, in which both economic and polit.ical factors are 
present. However, banks in different countries may also come under 
varying degrees of pressure from their governments and 
shareholders, as the varying and sometimes conflicting demands and 
responses of US, and say German and Swiss, banks to South Africa's 
post-1985 problems indicate. 
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Leutwiler was in the meantime attempting to get the creditor banks 
together. Eventually a meeting was arranged with the twenty-nine 
major creditor banks who had in the wake of the debt moratorium met 
for discussions. It would appear that these banks had after all 
overcome their opposition of 'dealing with the apartheid state'. 
These banks, who among them, held some 70pc of the ~outh African 
debt represented South Africa's 233 creditor banks at the meeting 
in London on 23 October 1985. This first meeting between the banks 
and South Africa took place under conditions of great strict 
secrecy. 
Anti-apartheid pr~ssure groups, as well as South African churchmen 
including Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the Rev. Beyers Naude had 
asked the banks to 'make rescheduling of South Africa's debt 
conditional upon the resignation of the present regime and its 
replacement by an interi~ government responsive to the needs of all 
South Africa's people. ,25 Not unexpectedly, the banks despite their 
public stand against apartheid, and the linkage of their earlier 
decision on the South African loans to the apartheid system, made 
no demands on the South Africans that would threaten their ability 
to recover their loans and to get out with minimal losses. In the 
still unsettled political climate of late 1985, financial rather 
than political or moral, considerations were foremost in bankers 
calculations. 
However, because of - pressure from their own deposit holders and 
institution~l investors such as churches and universities, the US 
banks in particular were obliged to ask for some positive political 
signals from Pretoria. Continuing political violence within South 
Africa made it difficult for the political factor to be totally 
ignored. The Financial Mail reported that foreign bankers were 
'appalled at the recent police action in the Cape and the execution 
of Ben Moloise •.• ,26 But there is some validity in the Mail's claim 
that, if anything, these actions merely confirmed the existing 
perceptions of the bankers about the South African political 
situation, rather than worsened it. For no matter how 'appalled' 
264 
they were at the actions of the apartheid state thereafter, it is 
difficult to see what more banks could do in response, without 
jeopardising their own economic interests. Somewhere at this point 
the balance of power began to shift out of the hands of the 
bankers. Their ability to squeeze South Africa in their own best 
interests (let alone for the sake of the South African oppressed) 
began to bump up against the risk of precipitating default by the 
South Africans. Later, some members of the creditor banks' 
technical committee readily admitted this decline in their relative 
power vis-a-vis South Africa. 27 
Leutwiler was himself not keen that the political factor be raised 
openly at that meeting. The South African delegation again stressed 
their point that the outflow of capital from South Africa would 
negati vel'y affect development and that this would fall 
disproportionally on blacks ~ They also argued that it would be 
impossible for them to repay $14,3 billion within a year. It would 
appear that South Africa offered to repay interest only in the 
following five years, and to begin capital repayments only at the 
end of this period. This rescheduling plan was not even considered 
feasible by Leutwiler in view of the political situation in South 
Africa, which according to him distinguished the South African case 
from the way they could have proceeded with a Latin American 
country. 
America~ banks were particularly opposed to the plan as a higher 
proportion of their loans were caught inside the net than Swiss 
and German banks. Inter-bank tensions were also heightened by the 
obvious displeasure of the Swiss and German banks at what they 
regarded as the overhasty actions of Chase Manhattan and other US 
banks. These tensions no doubt were useful to Leutwiler. The 
meeting ended with not even the most basic issues settled. No one 
apparently knew the full extent of South Africa's foreign debt, or 
of what was or was not included in the debt standstill. 28 
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The next meeting was scheduled to take place on the 26 November 
1985. Stals was pessimistic that an agreement could be reached 
before the 31 Decembe~ 1985, which was the date at which the four-
month standstill came to an end. It also appeared that some banks, 
including significantly the US banks, had begun to accept the 
inevitability of a further extension of the standstill. The 
Financial Mail noted that 'American banks believe legal factors 
and political pressures will make it impossible for them to sign 
a rescheduling agreement quickly ••• ,29 European banking sources 
were also understood to have revealed that South Africa would be 
wise to offer some amount of repayment of the principal or capital 
at the next meet~ng. One foreign banker was also quoted as saying 
that ' .if there was a statement of a confederal constitution that 
had some integrity South Africa could find foreign creditors 
approaching rescheduling with a different attitude. ,30 Clearly 
moderate reform by undermining the threat of revolutionary 
transformation, would have given the banks a greater feeling of 
security about the country's political future. This would have 
allowed them to reschedule South Africa' s debt on easier, and 
perhaps no less favourable, terms and provided them with some 
ammunition to defend themselves against the anti-apartheid movement 
abroad. 
As it turned out the 26 November meeting was postponed amid 
speculation that this was designed to give the South Africans 
breathing space to ~arry out or at least announce some moderate 
yet meaningf~l political reform. 31 This was strongly denied by Stals 
who claimed that the decision was taken by Leutwiler and the South 
Africans for purely technical and tactical reasons and that the 
banks were not even consulted and had no influence on the decision. 
·Nevertheless it was true that expectations were building up over 
the South African State President's speech at the opening of 
Parliament in late January 1986. 
In late November, Leutwiler was persuaded by the South Africans to 
submit their 'very ambitious programme for a multi-year 
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rescheduling' (MYRA) 32 to the creditor banks. Leutwiler himself 
reported that he agreed to this only on condition that the 
proposals go out as a South African proposal, and not his, although 
he declared that he would not oppose it publicly. The reaction of 
the banks was 'disastrous' to use Leutwiler' sword. The banks 
thought it was arrogant of the South Africans not to offer any 
capital repayment. But as Leutwiler put it, 'maybe with hindsight 
it was useful to send out such a proposal because when I came up 
with my own it was received rather more positively. ,33 
Not surprisingly, as it suited both parties though for different 
reasons, the standstill was extended to the end of March 1986. In 
January 1986 Leutwiler made a low key visit to South Africa, to 
tell the South Africans of the banks' reaction to their MYRA, to 
set up th~ details for the next meeting and to meet with President 
Botha. The South Africans were becoming worried that Leutwiler was 
bringing political factors to the forefront of the negotiations, 
and there were even some doubts expressed about his suitability as 
the mediator. Leutwiler made it clear to the see that they would 
have to offer a token capi tal payment as a demonstration of 
goodwill, as well as a generous interest rate to compensate for the 
political 'background'. The Americans more so than the Swiss and 
German banks needed this financial inducement in order to accept 
the plan, which Leutwiler was to propose. But Leutwiler also felt 
that the 'high' interest rate was justified on the grounds of South 
Africa's economic situation. 'You can argue about whether it should 
be three quarters or one percent. But it could not have been less 
than three quarters of a percent in South Africa's position. I'm 
not talking about the political situation there, but the economic 
situation. ,34 
Leutwiler was also assured by BOtha that reform was on the way. He 
left South Africa optimistic over the question of political change. 
However, as the Financial Mail put it 'things that may sound 
poli tically acceptable to him may not be acceptable to the US 
banks. ,35 He then returned to Europe, finalised his plans and sent 
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it out to the bankers, with a take it or leave it option. 'I didn't 
see a future role for myself if those proposals were rejected 
either by South Africa or the banking community or both.'~ Most of 
the banks were in favour of his proposals, which included a five 
percent capital repayment, although some wanted more. The Americans 
wanted to see more by way of political reform given the greater 
pressure which they faced from their institutional clients. 
Significantly, the Financial Mail reported that some continental 
banks were likely to be unhappy if even some of the (moderate) 
political reforms demanded by the Americans were conceded by South 
Africa. 'They believe these reforms would only further threaten the 
security of their money. ,37 For these European banks even the 
prospect of some black political represent~tion was not welcome for 
this reason. 
In the meantime the South African rand which had not responded 
favourably to the debt standstill or the 23 October meeting began 
to rise slowly. No one though was sure th~t this was going to be 
sustained, nor was its rise obviously related to developments on 
the debt reschedul ing front. There were reports in some South 
African newspapers that in the event of no agreement being reached, 
South African assets overseas, including SAA aircraft, might be 
seized. This was strongly denied by the Americans, who argued that 
such action would only be used as a last resort. They still hoped 
to reach an agreement by the 31 March 1986. The South Africans were 
keen to portray themselves as being serious about political change. 
On 31 January 1986, President Botha announced the scrapping of the 
pass laws with effect from July of that year. The act was repealed. 
He also announced a proposal to incorporate black South African 
into a negotiating forum to be called the 'National Statutory 
Council' (NSC) and conditionally promised to release the gaoled 
black political leader, Nelson Mandela. 
The NSC was widely rejected, even by moderate black 'leaders' such 
as the KwaZulu leader Chief Buthelezi and Mandela remained in 
Pollsmoor prison. Furthermore there was dismay, even on the part 
f 
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of Leutwiler, at the South African President's slapping down of pik 
Botha, his Foreign Minister, for daring to concede in a speech that 
it was not impossible that South Africa might one day have a black 
President. Similar concern was expressed at the implications for 
meaningful reform of the resignation of the leader of the 
Parliamentary opposition, Frederick van zyl Slabbert. The 
Commonwealth team of 'three wise men' arrived in South Africa in 
late January, and Tutu, Boesak and Naude repeated their earlier 
call to the banks to take a tough political stand against South 
Africa, demanding the resignation of the South African government, 
before agreeing to reschedule its debt. 
At the next meeting in London on 20 February 1986 South Africa and 
its creditor banks reached an accord, so bringing a technical end 
to the repayment freeze imposed unilaterally in September 1985. The 
agreement also stated that the moratorium would end on 31 March 
1986. The South Africans were more than satisfied with the 
agreement, Stals hailing it as a major step on 'the very long road 
to normality' for the countrY.~ In brief the terms of the 
agreement, which Stals described as 'very advantageous', were that 
South Africa would make a down payment of 5pc or about $500million, 
in four phased payments beginning 1 April 1986, on the 
approximately $10billion in loans maturing by 1987. Futhermore 
interest rates would be increased by 1pc on unpaid principal due 
in this period. The major creditor banks agreed to rollover the 
unpaid balance for the one year period. Leutwiler was to telex the 
agreement t~ the other 233 creditor banks, though he expected no 
significant change in the plan. A technical committee of twelve 
major banks would supervise the agreement. (See Table A, Appendix 
1) 
South Africa had argued in the talks that the 5pc capital repayment 
was too high. It was also the South African view that part 
($l,5billion) of the estimated $2, 3billion balance of payments 
surplus for 1986 would be used to pay for debt not covered by the 
freeze, including an amount to the IMF. Stals had stated that the 
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extra $500m would be an 'additional burden' that would leave little 
over for growth purposes. However, the banks felt that there had 
been an improvement in the South African economy, and insisted on 
a mid-term review of the agreement to establish, if in fact, South 
Africa could pay more. 
Despite their reluctance to accept the terms of the agreement, the 
South Africans were by no ~means displeased by its implications. 
Stals went so far as to maintain that the agreement 'paves the way' 
for new western bank loans to South Africa, and added that South 
Africa would soon begin the task of further encouraging this 
process. However, Stal ' s optimism was not shared by others, 
including Leutwiler who said that there had been 'no discussion of 
fresh money', adding that 'the South Africans know that there is 
no question of new money at this time. ,39 
Leutwiler also revealed that there had been no direct reference to 
the South African political situation, but that this had always 
been in the background. Even the more pressurized US banks, claimed 
Leutwiler, were more concerned that South Africa continue servicing 
the ,debt. 'They don't want to lose their money. ,40 Significantly too 
and in order to deflect the politically-based criticisms to the 
agreement, Leutwiler referred to the agreement as a consensus, 
rather that as a rescheduling. 'The consensus reached ,by the 
banks', he told a news conference following criticisms from anti-
apartheid quarters, 'is of a shorter nature .•• It is an interim 
arrangement., ,41 The agreement left many issues still unsettled. Were 
there political conditions implied or not? Would there be new 
money for the apartheid state? Was it a 'settlement, a quasi-
settlement, a non-settlement, or just a broad consensus •.. ,42 
Al though South Africa was by no means out of the woods, the 
agreement did represent, in our view, an improvement in the nature 
of the apartheid state's international financial relations. The 
agreement was far better than the uncertainty of the previous seven 
months. 
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within a month of the agreement, however, a major creditor bank, 
Barclays PLC, announced tha't it would not entertain new loan 
requests from South Africa, or formally reschedule existing debts 
of just under $1.2 billion, until South Africa showed it could ~ut 
its foreign debt and confirm the scrapping of Apartheid. The 
announcement came on the eve on a secret meeting of multinational 
companies and South African businessmen at Leeds Castle in Kent, 
England, in early March 1986. Barclays chairman Sir Timothy Bevan 
did not spell out the political changes Barclays envisaged, but 
cited the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela as a 'useful first 
step. ,43 Barclays may have been genuinely concerned about political 
reform in south Africa, but the bank was also coming under enormous 
pressure from students, churches and local councils in Britain to 
cut its South African links. Barclays share of the strategic 
stUdent market had declined from 27pc in 1983 to 17pc in 1985 and 
the bank had just lost its status as Britain's preeminent bank to 
National westminister. 44 Barclays was also planning a major drive 
into the US banking market at the time and would not have wanted 
the burden of its south African links added to the difficulties of 
successfully penetrating this market. Weighed against these wider 
considerations, the Barclays decision to reduce or qualify its 
south African operations and activities, appeared very sensible. 
An IMF routine delegation v,isit to South Africa did little to 
enhance the prospects of new loans. The Financial Mail observed 
that with the economic and ' political situation deteriorating, 
discussions with the four-person delegation led by Helen Junz of 
the Nederlands, 'will be miserable •••• any idea that the IMF will 
grant additional finance is wishful thinking, and this is not the 
object of the delegation. ,45 
In the meantime, the debate over the imposition of sanctions, 
especially in view of the Commonwealth and ' impending US 
legislation, intensified and spilled over into the debt repayment 
negotiations, with the (then) South African Ambassador to the UK 
Denis Worrall, threatening that the further implementation of 
271 
sanctions might force South Africa to consider not paying its 
foreign debt. He warned of the danger such action, if forced upon 
South Africa, could pose for the international financial system. 
Worrall stressed the harmful effect of sanctions on black workers, 
and on the economies of the neighbouring black states. He also 
indicated that the 'South African state is strong and 
determined .•. South Africa is not on the brink of revolution. ,46 
Finance Week was, however, quick to warn Worrall that such action 
as reneging on the debt could easily worsen South Africa's 
international standing, and damage the prospects for growth. In 
the meantime, Finance Week pointed out that South Africa's debt 
agreement ran un~il end-June 1987 and 'wi~l be honoured whatever 
happens on the sanctions front in the meantime. ,47 
South Africa had a few weeks earlier on 12 June 1986, imposed a 
nation-wide State of Emergency to replace the partial State of 
Emergency which had expired in March of that year. There is little 
doubt that the imposition of the State of Emergency was at least 
partly for the benefit of those more conservative European bankers 
especially the Swiss, whose continuing interests in and warm 
relations with South Africa were largely dependent on their 
perception of the political stability of the Apartheid state. For 
while US banks in particular appeared to require of South Africa 
a combination of political stability and moderate political reform 
of apartheid policies, as a precondition of easing up on their 
demands, the more conservative Swiss bankers, appeared to more 
narrowly st~ess the need to restore political stability. 
In a departure from tradition, SARB Governor de Kock also 
emphasised the need to restore political stability and make 
political reform, as necessary elements of any solution to the 
country's economic difficulties.~ In a speech to the South Africa-
British Trade Association on 8 September 1986, Reserve Bank 
Governor de Kock set out the basic requirements for South Africa 
to create a lasting solution to its economic difficulties. These 
were: 
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1. an appropriate short-term monetary and fiscal policy. 
2. the formulation and publication of the state's long-term 
economic strategy, including such 
industrialisation, export promotion etc. 
3. the maintenance of law and . order. 
policies as inward 
4. comprehensive further political and constitutional reform. 
These goals must, however, be seen in the context of his closing 
comment that 'progress on these four fronts will contribute greatly 
to the normalisation of South Africa's relationships with .foreign 
banks and capital markets ••• ',49 a view which clearly illustrates 
the extent to which South Africa's international financial and debt 
problems were a determinant of .and central to the apartheid state's 
economic .and political agenda in both the short and longer-term. 
In this context and at the time, the State of Emergency, the 
state's response to the breakdown of law and order, must be seen 
as an integral part of its solution to its economic and 
international financial difficulties. 
By the end of 1986 there was still continuing pressure on South 
Africa's international financial relations, with Malcolm Fraser, 
the co-chairman of the ill-fated Commonwealth mission to South 
Africa earlier that year, calling for the denial of access to trade 
credit, as well as the freezing of all overseas bank accounts held 
by South African individuals and corporatons. 50 The mood of foreign 
bankers remained cool, and there was' little indication that new 
loans were coming in from foreign bank sources at this stage. 
Manfred Schutte of Standard Bank, for example, argued that the 
fundamental issue that would determine whether South Africa 
received new loans was political. He did not believe that the rest 
of the world was satisfied on that score. Whether the banks wanted 
political progress in the direction of a movement to a non-racial 
democratic society or rather political order and stability is a 
moot point and one that we shall again return to. 
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Estimates of South Africa's foreign debt in the meantime were 
periodically being revised upwards as rand-dollar-mark exchange 
values ran against the South African currency. The rand's weakness 
against third (non-dollar) currencies in particular was largely to 
blame for this, although by the end of the year the dollar's 
erosion against third currencies also meant that foreign debt, 
denominated in dollars, was not much reduced. The Reserve Bank 
provides scant estimates of the non-dollar proportion of South 
Africa's debt, and also does not disclose whether or not and in 
what ways, if at all, any part of the debt is covered again~t 
exchange rate fluctuations. 51 However, it is not unlikely that the 
South African authorities denominated increasing amounts of new 
debt in non-dollar currencies at some point after 1984, when US 
pressure on South Africa started to build up in the wake of the 
township unrest. Although in mid-1985 the greatest portion of debt 
still remained denominated in dollars, it is significant that at 
the time 80pc of the debt of the giant parastatal South African 
Transport Services (previously SARH) were denominated in swiss 
francs and Deutsche marks. 52 
Early in 1987 Stals visited bankers in the US and Europe. There he 
learnt that some of South Africa's creditor banks would soon be 
pushing for bigger up front payments on certain debts, (perhaps as 
much as 10pc or $10 billion) when the two sides met to reconsider 
the February 1986 arrangement, as was then agreed to. This demand 
was apparently based on the banks' estimates of a $3 billion 
surplus on the South African current account in 1987. The Financial 
Mail speculated that a meeting between the creditor banks and the 
sec was postponed from 26/27 January to 9/10 February, and that 
there were signs that the banks now wanted to go over to a multiple . ~ . 
reschedull.ng arrangement (MYRA). The effect of such an arrangement 
would have been to reduce the original time for the repayment of 
the debt. However, there was disagreement between the banks over 
the period which such an arrangement would cover, with UK creditor 
banks being prepared to settle for a ~even year period, but US and 
French, and surprisingly also German banks talking of three to four 
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years. Either way as the Financial Mail put it, there was pressure 
on South Africa to bend more on capital payments. 54 
US banks were apparently keen to clear up the issue of South 
Africa's debt before their annual general meetings around mid-
year, to 'avoid the embarrassment of on-going negotiations with 
South Africa. ,55 By the end of January, however, it was still not 
clear when the two sides would meet, although it looked as if the 
meeting would only take place after the general elections for the 
dominant white H~use of Assembly which, it was expected, the 
President would announce at the opening of Parliament at the end 
of January. In the event this did not turn out to be the case. When 
it was announced on 25 March 1987 that South Africa had struck a 
three year deal with its creditor banks, on very favourable terms 
as well compared to the uncertainty of the previous twenty months, 
the news came as a surprise to many observers. 
In terms of the agreement, which runs for three years until 30 June 
1990, South Africa will pay a total of 13pc of the outstanding 
capital amount of debts caught inside the standstill net during 
this period. This was estimated to amount to $1.42 billion. South 
Africa's total debt was believed to be $23 billion at the time of 
this agreement. As the Business Day reported, 'the London meeting -
held behind · a veil of secrecy ••• and its unexpected success is 
likely to substantially boost confidence in the [South African] 
economy, effectively containing the capital haemorrage.,56 Reserve 
Bank Governor de Kock was delighted with the deal, claiming that 
'this is a good deal for [S~uth Africa] and the creditor banks. 
Both sides are very happy. A three year agreement, as opposed to 
a one year agreement, is of enormous significance,.57 He added, in 
the dubiously optimistic fashion that has come to characterise 
South African monetary and financial officials over the years, that 
South Africa was in his view underborrowed, and made reference to 
the rising dollar value of exports, the rise in the country's 
reserves of gold and foreign exchange and continued current account 
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surplus, as factors that would allow South Africa to meet the terms 
of the agrement without difficulty. 
Finance Minister du Plessis spelt out the details of the agreement. 
These were: 
1. that South Africa will pay all interest due on outstanding loans 
at a rate roughly 1pc higher the going rate. 
2. that the Public Investment Commissioners (PIC) will continue to 
absorb loans which are not rolled over. 
3. foreign creditors will retain the right to cede their claims on 
debt inside the , standstill net to other foreign creditors or 
persons, under certain conditions. 
4. payments on loans inside the net will be made as follows, 
4.1 a down payment of 3pc of the debt on 15 July 1987, and a 
further 2pc in December 1987, making a total for 1987 of $508 
million. 
4.2 in 1988, 2pc of the outstanding balance on 15 June of that year 
and 1,5pc on 15 December, making total of $400 million. 
4.3 in 1989, a further 1,5pc on 15 June and on 15 December, a total 
of $346 million. 
4.4 a final payment of $166 million on 15 June 1990. 
5. that foreign creditors had the right to convert short-term 
claims inside the net into long-term claims outside the net. Claims 
converted in this way would be repayable over 10 years, in a 
prescribed manner.~ 
Business Day noted that the bankers were initially reluctant to 
commit themselves to a three year agreement, but that 'confronted 
by a Third World debt problem that is threatening to run off the 
rails, international bankers, particularly those in the US, decided 
to knuckle under to 'the inevitable criticism which would follow a 
longer term agreement.' 59 
Significantly, neither this nor the previous February 1986 interim 
agreement, compelled creditors to enforce repayments inside the 
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net, and given the attractively· higher rates of interest, (1pc to 
1,25pc above LIBOR) banks would be tempted to roll-over even these 
payments. As Hirsch points out, by October 1987, the German 
Deutsche Bank, unlike most US and UK banks, had received no 
repayments at all, obviously choosing not to enforce their rights 
under the agreements.~ Furthermore when South Africa announced its 
unilateral debt moratorium in mid-1985, it excluded trade credits 
from the standstill net; and when the banks decided earlier to end 
loans to South Africa, the declaration specifically excluded trade 
credits from the ban. In other words the important category of 
trade credits, which was critical in facilitating external trade, 
continued to be made available to South Africa. 
(3) THE AFTERMATH OF RESCEHDULING: APRIL 1987-DECEMBER 1987 
This section examines the response to the second interim debt 
arrangement as well as developments which followed in its wake. 
criticisms of the political implications of the deal, ie its soft 
approach to the apartheid state were not the only ones which 
followed the announcement of the debt rescehduling. Cees 
Bruggemans, a South African-based economic analyst, pointed out 
that the agreement was no cause for fanfare, noting that the 
interest South Africa was required to pay was still higher than 
that paid by the world t s biggest debtors, which, he argued, 
reflected overseas perceptions of the South African political and 
economic situation. 61 Opposition finance spokesperson Harry Schwarz, 
believed that the government did not deserve any credit for the 
agreement as the crisis was of their making in the first place and 
further noted that a significant portion of South Africa's debt was 
still not part of the agreement, and that some of the loans were 
in Deutche marks and Swiss francs, currencies which had hardened 
against the rand in recent months. The country was furthermore 
still not attracting new bank loans, he claimed. 62 
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South Africa's enthusiasm for paying the debt in this way and its 
determination to conform to the rules of financial orthodoxy in 
settling the problem, in order to return to normalcy and 
respectability in the international financial world, was out of 
step with other debtor nations, ~ where the tendency was to write 
off large sections of the debt or engage in large scale debt-
equity swaps or some other scheme with the IMF/World Bank. In other 
words, other countries were arguing for a change in the rules for 
addressing the intern~tional debt crisis. Brazil had only a month 
before the south African deal (February 1987) declared its decision 
(short-lived as it turned out) to suspend interest payments on its 
$109 billion debt. In addition Brazil, Chile and the Phillipines 
had resorted to the use of debt-equity swaps as a partial approach 
to their debt problems. That is in exchange for debt relief the 
d~btor hands over the ownership of a tangible asset, the basic swap 
involving shares of local companies instead of debt payments.~ In 
April 1988, Stals announced that South Africa had come to a debt-
equity swap arrangement with the creditor banks. According to the 
scheme banks could switch debt into the financial rand, which could 
then be used for equity investment. The conversion into the 
financial rand would be made at a discount of some 30pc. Banks 
showed little interest in the scheme, preferring i~ the more stable 
political climate to hang in rather than take such a 10ss.65 By 
April 1988, no more than $10m had been moved in this way.M The 
February 1987 agreement made provision for one other scheme. It 
allowed for the conversion of debt inside the net to longer term 
debt outside the net'. By the beginning of October 1987 about R1 
billion of debt had been converted in this way.67 
Perhaps South Africa's decision, to follow a fairly orthodox way of 
dealing with its debt crisis lies in the fact that, as MacEwan M 
and others have shown for some Latin American countries, the debt 
crisis serves the interests of the ruling class in some fairly 
important ways. In South Africa for example, the tough austerity 
measures that were justified on the grounds of the country's 
international financial position, and the need to return to 
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respectability within the world community of nations, served to 
create the conditions, certainly the atmosphere, under which a 
significant restructuring of economic relations, the move towards 
the long term economic strategies of inward industrialisation, 
privatisation and deregulation was being introduced, debated and 
planned. 
It may also be argued that the South African monetary authorities 
were well aware that the important political dimension of the 
country's debt crisis was something that was not likely to be 
addressed in the near future, ie. that some 'unacceptably' close 
variant of apartheid was going to be the order of the day for some 
time to come, and ' that given that their only hope to return to some 
respectability in the international financial market was through 
followin9 the fairly orthodox rescheduling route, admittedly after 
a rather 'naughty' exercise in declaring a unilateral standstill 
in September 1985. 
Ironically, two days after the deal between South Africa and its 
creditor banks was announced, the Institutional Investor 69 reported 
that South Africa had fallen from 29th place in September 1984 to 
57th place in 1987, in the list of the world's most creditworthy 
nations. (See Table B, Appendix 1) South Africa's plunge was the 
biggest recorded in the survey of that year. This assessment is, 
however, unlikely to have taken into account the latest agreement, 
which whatever the criticisms may be, represented an improvement 
in the country's international financial standing. As the 
70 . 
Independent commented South Africa's status as a defaulter has 
been officially blurred by a medium term, carefully structured 
plan. That was an improvement, by any standard, over its renegade 
debtor status of two years ago. 
By June 1987 Auditor-General de Loor, proudly announced that 
European banks were 'looking more benevolently at [South Africa] 
as a borrower.' 71 He declared that these banks were once again 
prepared to consider extending general credit to South Africa to 
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finance further projects of a capital nature. There is some 
evidence that despite the debt crisis, some small amounts of new 
finance has entered South Africa, though under conditions of great 
secrecy.n As early as 1986 it waS announced that ESKOM was looking 
for some $120m abroad and that it was not unlikely to have any 
problems rai'sing this sum. 73 Some small banks in Switzerland, 
Germany and the Benelux countries were reported in 1987 to be 
involved in raising finance for South Africa through complex and 
hidden deals.~ But even more reveal~ng was the apparent attitude 
of the banks to the use tq which funds lodged with the PIC were 
being used by the apartheid state. A substantial portion of the 
state's deficit spending in 1987 would, the Business Day 75 claimed, 
be financed by funds placed with the PIC. In normal circumstances 
such funds would be used to service the country's foreign debt, the 
PIC being used as the investment link between the debtor and 
creditor. 
That this is now not being done, and that a substantial amount 
is to be used to finance increases in security and defence 
expenditure, is unlikely to stir any reaction overseas, 
officials confidently predicted •. Croeser [Chief Executive, 
Policy, in the Finance Department] maintained that the creditor 
banks had been fully briefed as to what use the PIC funds were 
being put to and no adverse reaction had been experienced.'~ 
This did indeed appear to be a significant turnaround from the 
previous public pronouncements of the banks. That they had no 
problems with the apartheid state's spending of these funds for 
the most sensitive and controversial departments of defence and 
security, does indeed appear to indicate clear support for the 
agenda of the apartheid state, ie at 'worst' the maintenance of 
the status quo, at 'best' the moderate reform agenda of the 
government. In either case the effect would have been to set back 
even f~rther the prospects of a black majority government. We would 
argue however, that this represents not so much a change in their 
position, as the outcome of a logical (and for them, correct) 
reassessment of the risk analysis on their south African exposure 
mainly, though not exclusively in the light of the changed 
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political environment of 1987 as compared to that of 1985. The 
failure of the economy to revive appreciably obviously affected 
their decisions to pump in noticeable amounts of new loans, and the 
high rank that the apartheid state held in the league of morally 
reprehensible regimes, made it difficult for them to publicly 
change their stance. However, both the easy terms of the March 
agreement, and their subsequent actions are indicative of the 
banks' real considerations on matters such as these. These 
considerations place a low value on questions which touch on issues 
of justice, morality, the abolition of racial, gender or other 
oppression. 
What had changed was the political environment. Political stability 
was restored, de Kock's prerequisite of 'law and order' had been 
sufficiently realised and some moderate reform such as the 
abolition of the pass laws had been effected. Political 
organisations and the political activities of the progressive trade 
unions had been heavily restricted. The apartheid state had 
restored a harsh and brutally imposed state of stability into the 
.political landscape. It had displayed the power to survive. It had 
(for a while at least) delayed the transition to a non-racial 
democratic South Africa, and proved wrong those who in 1985 saw or 
predicted its imminent demise : As the Wall street Journal noted 
[ i] n mid 1986, the government imposed a state 0 f emergency, 
rounded up its black opponents and slapped restrictions on the 
media. unrest disappeared from television, and slowly, the 
perception spread that revolution wasn't around the corner and 
the government was in control. n 
The recognition of these changes, is, in our view the real reason 
behind the apparent change in the attitude of the creditor banks 
towards the apartheid state. They could not, because it would 
damage' their potential to recover their loans, do more to affect 
political change. As one commentator observed,~ banks are not in 
the business of setting political agendas. They are in the business 
of making loans to reliable, creditworthy and politically stable 
customers. "Like James Bond, banks never say, 'Never again'. While 
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they might say no to Pretoria now they would be prepared to 
reassess the situation in a year (he wrote in early 1986) if events 
made South Africa a better prospective client."79 
Although the suppression of political resistance (some would 
maintain of the .' insurrectionary' climate 80) was, we would argue, 
the main reason underpinning the actions of the banks in regard to 
the rescheduling of South Africa's debts and their subsequent 
actions, this is not to say that it was the only consideration. Of 
the other factors perhaps the most important was the fact ~hat 
South Africa achieved a successful, albeit painful, adjustment in 
its balance of p~yments. De Kock was apparently told by bankers 
that 'with the exception of Rumania, there is not another country 
in the world that comes close to what South Africa has done', in 
effecting the 'miraculous' adjustment on its balance of payments. 81 
The attitude of the international banks towards South' Africa, was 
also affected by some degree of concern for the effects of a 
possible South African default on the stability of the 
international financial system, although given the small amounts 
here this could only have been a fear of triggering off potentially 
more damaging defaults elsewhere. 
The decision to exclude the 1982 IMF loan repayments from the net, 
ie to continue repaying the loan, also appears to have been 
important to bankers. Given the nature of the relationship between 
private international banks and the IMF, South Africa appears to 
have recognised the importance · of not aggravating its already 
abnormal relationship with the Fund. By the end of 1987 South 
Africa had paid back the loan in its ·entirety. The 1987 IMF mission 
to South Africa appears to have been pleased by the country's 
efforts, although the mission differed from South Africa's monetary 
authorities on certain aspects of the existing economic policy 
package, wanting for example, to see higher interest rates.~ 
(4) CONCLUSION 
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We would argue that the actions of banks in August 1985 were based 
on the normal criteria of country risk analysis ie political 
stability, economic performa.nce, future growth prospects and the 
like. Political strategies which rely on the belief that banks were 
genuinely concerned to make a positive contribution. (as opposed to 
the self-interested gesture of August 1985) to the South African 
struggle by seriously and steadfastly posing the alternative of a 
non-racial democracy in this country as a precondition for the 
restoration of nQrmal international financial relations, would, in 
our view, be based on a fundamentally misconceived and romantic 
understanding of the real dynamics of international banks. The same 
can no doubt be said for multinational corporations in South 
Africa. When they coincide with other strategies and in specific 
poli tical conjunctures '. financial sanctions may well prove to be 
a critical element in campaigns to bring about political change in 
countries such as south~frica. These possibilities clearly existed 
in 1984-1986, and the actions of the banks in regard to 
rescheduling South Africa's debts might have been decisive then, 
had they been firm in demanding political change. But for reasons 
we have set out above they were not. 
By 1987 the political conjuncture made it less probable that banks 
would insist on more dramatic political change towards a non-
racial, democratic South Africa and less ' likely that any watered-
down form of bank pressure or intervention would in fact succeed. 
Gelb has recently argued on the general question of the timing and 
appropriateness of sanctions against the apartheid state that 
[t]he So~th ~frican state is not the Iranian or Phillipine 
state: 1t. w1ll t~ke more than US pressure, even from 
comprehens1ve sanct1ons, to bring it down. To break with this 
appr~ach - to. redefine the meaning of sanctions 'working' _ 
requ1res ~ocat1n9 sanc~ions very explicitly within the context 
of t~e w1~er l1be~at10n struggle. This means understanding 
sanct10ns 1n relat10n to the existing balance of forces and 
th7 o~erall direc~ion of strategy. What is crucial here is'that 
th1s 1S always sh1fting.~ 
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This chapter concludes with brief comments on two further issues. 
It will first look at the immediate future prospects for South 
Africa in the international financial markets, based on some recent 
international developments and on South Africa's relations with 
banks since the beginning of 1988. Secondly it will comment on the 
effects of the recent changes in the attitude of creditor banks on 
the economy and particularly on the implications these have for the 
capacity of the economy to emerge from its crisis. 
(4.1) Recent Developments and Future Prospects 
Changes · in the . political environment do not necessarily or 
automatically mean that South Africa can now expect large and 
regular quantities of new foreign loans in the years ahead. Whether 
this happens or not will depend on a variety of factors. 
Developments and innovations in the international financial markets 
as a whole, in the state of the world economy, the balance of 
economic and political power between North and South and between 
East and west as well as the more obvious relative economic 
performances of potential borrowers are in the broadest sense, 
central to this question. Thus for example, it is arguable whether 
banks and multinational companies will automatically resume their 
activities here, if and when both political and economic factors 
become more favourable. New opportunities have opened up elsewhere 
in the 1970s and 1980s and the relative attractiveness of investing 
and lending here may have changed for some discrete future period. 
In short, changes in any of these wider arenas may, in addition to 
local economic and political developments, help to further ease or 
strain the relationships between South Africa and its creditor 
banks in future. 
Let us . look at some examples by· way of illustrating South Africa's 
future prospects in the international capital market. South Africa 
had in the period 1970-1985 relied mainly on US and European banks 
to assist it in obtaining loans and in managing and underwriting 
its bond issues. However, the emergence of Japanese banks as major 
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lenders and bond managers in the 1980s introduces a change which 
may be 'of no small importance to South Africa in the years ahead. 
Japanese banks eclipsed US banks in leadership for the first time 
in 1986 and were responsible for 55pc of the increase in 
international bank activity between 1986 and 1987. M There are also 
major new banking centres in South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
countries with which the apartheid state has maintained good 
economic relations. Thus any greater predisposition on the part of 
these banks to lend to South Africa, arising for example out of the 
absence of the same intense a~ti-apartheid pressure which faces the 
US, may open up new and 'not inconsiderable sources of international 
credit. 
There have already been some changes along these lines since early 
1988. By 'this time there was a revival of international ~nterest 
in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, ' more European banks apparently 
offered trade credits to South African companies again, a~d there 
is even evidence of some foreign direct investment. In early 1988 
the Sunday Times reported that fifty-five companies, of whom forty-
two were foreign, intended to invest more than R66m in South Africa 
in the following year by setting up factories in decentralised 
areas. The preponderance of Far Eastern (and even Indian) companies 
among this number is striking. Twenty-one were from Taiwan, eleven 
from Hong Kong and two from India. Four companies were Israeli and 
only four more were from the EEC, a figure suggestive of the 
relative decline from the region that was once South Africa's major 
source of direct foreign investment. These companies were involved 
in production in a wide variety of goods, including the manufacture 
of gold chains, leather and plastic products, sports shoes, office 
furniture, clothing, power tools, textiles, and the processing of 
minerals and semi-precious stones.~ In addition to these direct 
investment and some amounts of bank loans mentioned earlier in this 
discussion, some companies made equity investments in South Africa 
in 1987. The Schweizerische Geseleschaft fur 'Kapitalanlangen bought 
the Bata Shoe Company in South Africa after its Canadian owners 
were put under pressure to disinvest. M 
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By early 1989 there was further evidence of an improvement in South 
Africa's relations with private international banks. This is clear 
from the following examples. First, in March, the South African 
government negotiated a R200m loan with an unnamed bank, reputedly 
to have been Swiss. Although the amount was small in relation to 
South Africa's total debt, it created optimism among financial 
officials and enabled them to budget for new foreign loans for the 
first time in three years. 87 Secondly, members of the creditor 
banks' technical committee were reported in June 1989 as saying 
thai;. they were 'relatively po~erless to influence whatever the 
South African authorities decide to offer' when the present debt 
agreement comes to an end in June 1990. M 
Thirdly, two of South Africa's US creditor banks, citibank and 
Manufacturers Hanover, came to an agreement with South Africa in 
April 1988" not to call in their loans of $670m and $230m when the 
February 1987 interim agreement on debt rescheduling expired in 
mid-1990. They agreed to a conversion of this debt inside the net 
into long-term loans outside the net. This move, especially if it 
is followed by other banks, clearly eases the pressure on South 
Africa's external finances, and reduces its potential value as a 
political weapon. Anti-apartheid activists hoped to persuade the 
banks to reschedule South Africa's debt on condition the country 
makes some constitution~l changes. Significantly, and indicative 
of the very changed political environment of 1989, this call was 
less dramatic than their earlier demand that the South African 
government resign as a precondition for rescheduling. However, in 
a recently published book commissioned by the Australian 
government, Ovendon and Cole argue (on the contrary) that the 
conversion option taken. by some banks signal that they were 
indicating 'once and for all that they were done with South 
Africa', and that they would 'have no more to do with the 
country. ,~ Ovendon and Cole make this generalisation on the basis 
of an interview with one official of an unnamed bank. This 
assessment ignores the historical evidence of the wide variations 
(inter-country and other) in the responses of private international 
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banks to all aspects of their relationship with South Africa in the 
period since 1970. Furthermore their conclusion is based on banks' 
perceived moral objections to apartheid and ignores wider economic 
and other forms of political influences, an interpretation we have 
already commented upon critically. We would argue that private 
international banks are likely to continually assess their attitude 
to and exposure in South Africa as well as their stance on 
rescheduling, even in the period before apartheid is finally 
abolished, as their differential responses in the fluctuating 
economic and political environment of 1984-1989 demonstrates. This 
on-going assessment is likely to take account both changing global 
and domestic (South African) factors, and not only their 
'opposi tion' to the apartheid regime, important as this factor 
maybe for some banks in some countries. 
Finally, in Zurich in April, the British anti-apartheid Anglican 
Archbishop Trevor Huddlestone was jeered at a shareholders' meeting 
of the Union Bank of Switzerland when he called on the bank to stop 
doing business with the apartheid state. He was interrupted by the 
bank's Chairman Nikolas Senn, who asked him not 'to attack a 
government with which we have normal diplomatic relations.'~ 
Although the case for foreign capital inflows to South Africa 
continues to be made and new loans are welcomed by the government 
and most sections of business in 'South Africa, it has been claimed 
that the country's need for loan capital is not as high or 
immediately ,urgent as it was in the 1970s. Jan Lombard, Deputy-
Governor of the Reserve Bank observed in late 1987 that domestic 
savings were in 'good condition and exceed likely investment needs 
by a long shot.' He pointed out that ESKOM for one could 
comfortably finance its proj,ec"t:s from the domestic market. 'By and 
large, ' all the large utilities have put a great deal of money into 
expansion over the last decade or so with the result that South 
Africa's present day infrastructure is pretty good for a country 
in our state of development.' 91 Lombard failed to mention that 
extensions to some ESKOM plants have been put on ice, further 
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reducing the need for loans of the magnitude required in the 1970s. 
If Lombard's calculations are t ·o be believed, it would imply, 
ironically that the massive amounts of foreign bank loans which 
were made available to the state and parastatals in the 1970s, have 
in fact contributed to cushioning somewhat the potential damage to 
the economy of restricting such loan inflows in the second half of 
the 1980s1 
(4.2) The Economic Crisis and Restructuring 
At the end of 1985 South Africa ranked among the world's 'leading' 
debtor nations. 92 The analysis in this Chapter has attempted to show 
that, contrary to common wisdom in 1985, South Africa's 
international financial relations improved somewhat since that 
time. It ·has sought to provide explanations, in both economic and 
political arenas, for this turn around or adjustment. This analysis 
is not, however, to be interpreted as arguing that the South 
African economy, and especially its international financial 
relations were, by mid-1989, no longer crisis-ridden. Although the 
balance of payments had moved into surplus, some foreign loans had 
been received and some debts repaid, the fundamental problems of 
slow growth, high rates of unemployment, weak investment demand, 
uncertainty and lack of confidence continued to exist. These 
conditions have been compounded by the erratic movement of the gold 
price and a weak domestic currency. 
Given the uncertain state of the world economy, the continuing 
difficulties in co-ordinating international trade and exchange rate 
policies, the structural changes in the composition of world trade 
(including the move away from metals and minerals), the continuing 
freeze on IMF assistance and on normal flows of private bank loans 
to South Africa, and the probability that sanctions would in time 
begin to have a greater impact on South African exports, the 
likelihood of declining or unstable foreign exchange reserves and 
even tighter domestic monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy is 
ever present. These global and domestic factors are more than 
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likely to dominate debate about appropriate economic policies and 
strategies in the years ahead. For they place distinct limits on 
the capacity of the South African economy to sustain a vigorous 
growth path. Even de Kock admitted, 'we won't shatter any growth 
records. We won't do a Korea or Taiwan. But we have made an 
adj ustment and recovery ••• Businessmen real ise that wi thout 
[international capital], the economy can't be turned loose. 
Minibooms will have to do. ,93 
We have argued earlier that the r1s1ng gold price, private 
international capital flows and consumer-led growth of the early 
1980s presented , a false picture of prosperity to many south 
Africans. The collapse of the rand, the restrictions on new loans, 
the forced debt repayments, the sanctions and disinvestment 
campaign " and the continuing upheaval in the black townships, all 
contributed to stripping away these layers of cosmetic prosperity 
for a while. Similarly the 'adjustment and recovery' that de Kock 
talked about should not blind us to the fundamental crisis that the 
South African economy still faces. 
However, as Gelb has argued not all crises within capitalism are 
'terminal' .94 Fundamental restructuring of a social formation in 
crisis need not imply a movement away from capitalist relations of 
production. such a restructuring of the South African political 
economy may be traced back to the lat~ 1970s, in the 'reform phase' 
which followed the Soweto uprising and the work of the de Kock, 
Kleu, Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions. The imperative for further 
and even more fundamental restructuring was clear by mid-1986 at 
the time the full state of emergency was imposed. Though still 
fraught with contradictions, a simultaneous process of economic 
restructuring, based on export promotion and diversification, 
inward industrialisation, deregulation, privatisation, township 
upgrading, and social reform based on de-racialisation of some 
aspects of political and social life, coupled with re-racialisation 
and authoritarianism in other areas (the tricameral parliament, 
banning of opposition political organisations) was gradually being 
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set in place by mid-1986.~ In short, an attempt was being made to 
transform the conditions and structures of accumulation that 
underpinned the rapid growth of the 1960s, ie apartheid and import-
substitution industrialisation, in an effort to restore the 
foundations for capitalist accumulation in the national and 
international circumstances of the 1980s and beyond. This process 
was by ~o means unproblematic. And it remained contradictory. But 
by the end of 1987 few doubted that it was happening. 
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We argued at the end of Chapter 1 that the variable character of 
a country's relations with the institutions of international 
finance, the underlying international and domestic explanations 
and bases of these changes and the capacity of a country, 
especially one in the developing world, both to profit from this 
relationship as well as to withstand the pressures and consequences 
arising out of its trade, technology and investment links with the 
rest of the world are better understood 'and studied, within the 
theoretical framework of regulation theory. For regulation theory 
is premised upon explanations which explore the interactions 
between changing international and domestic regimes of accumulation 
and modes of regulation, in other words" explanations which r~nge 
over the whole spectrum of institutional, economic, political and 
ideological forces, domestically, regionally and internationally. 
Such an approach allows one the scope to explain better the 
viccissitudes in a country's relations with the world economy, or 
of aspects of such relations, than ei ther the ascripti ve and 
sterile formulations of modernisation theory or (notwithstanding 
its obvious merits over modernisation theory) the stultifying and 
closed formulations of most ver'sions of dependency. 
This thesis has utilised some of the central propositions of 
regulation theory. Yet it is not argued that regulation theory as 
yet provides all the answers to a proper and fuller understanding 
of a country's insertion into the world economy. Hence, only the 
conceptual tools, organising principles and language of regulation 
theory informs this study. Despite the ongoing debate over its 
value as a theoretical paradigm, many have found it a more than 
useful framework for analysis. While remaining critical of some 
aspects of regulation theory, Noel, for example, argues that the 
regulation approach is ~ore satisfying than most rival explanations 
as it "portrays systemic changes in a truly dynamic perspective. 
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Regulationists have contributed •.. signi~icantly to the building of 
a 'theoretically informed understanding 'of time-changing empirical 
patterns. '" Noel argues that the understanding of changes over time 
which regulation theory provides is probably its maj or 
contribution.' This is especially apparent in our examination of 
South Africa's international financial relations since the early 
1970s, a time of crisis and change both in the regulatory 
insti tutions, rules and mechanisms of the international economy and 
in the South African regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. 
Modernisation and depend'ency approaches would be hard pressed to 
adequately locate the changing nature of South Africa's relations 
with the international financial community in the 1970s and 1980s, 
for the relationship was neither uniformly beneficial nor damaging 
as the cr.isis which characterised these relations in the mid-1970s 
and mid-1980s illustrate. Neither as Corbridge has pointed out do 
these approaches 'examine the way in which changes in this 
interdependent world system [open up] .new opportunities for (as 
well as constraints on) national economic and political action.'z 
Let us take two examples to illustrate these problems. First, the 
dependency-influenced arguments of Payer, Hayter and others 
characterise global financial institutions such as the IMF, as 
being narrowly 'designed to solve the problems of the rich 
countries', through means which necessarily imply a distortion and 
suppression of the 'autonomous' development strategies and economic 
plans and pOlicies of countries in the Third World. 3 While this 
view may be true in many cases, this thesis demonstrates that some 
countries such as South Africa were able for some time to pursue 
a relationship with the IMF which for a variety of economic and 
political reasons was, in contrast, more mutually beneficial and 
less asymetrically distorted. 
Second, whereas dependency theory would see in South Africa's 
increasing recourse to foreign bank loans in the early to mid-
1970s only the potential for increased vulnerability to external 
pressure, this thesis attempts to show that the South African state 
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was able to use this medium to long-term foreign finance to build 
up an impressive infrastructural and strategic foundation to its 
economy. This strategy was carried out in terms of the state's 
assumption, incorrect as it turned out, that the gold price would 
remain above $200 an ounce and an awareness of the dangers of 
economic sanctions. Clearly a new form of vulnerability to 
politically-inspired financial sanctions emerged out of this which 
the state did not anticipate · at the time, but the economy in the 
meantime had also developed important strengths and a greater 
resilience to international economic pressure. This greater balance 
in the assessment of the implications (both benefits and problems) 
of a country's links with the international financial community, 
has been a central characteristic . in the work of regulation 
theorists. 4 This concluding chapter attempts, in summarising the 
main propositions and implications which flow from this thesis, to 
capture this greater sense of balance in understanding the changing 
nature and character of South Africa's international financial 
relations in the period 1970-1987. 
By mid-1985, at the time private international banks decided to 
call in their existing loans and restrict most new forms of credit, 
the South African economic and political situation could best be 
described as being in crisis. (These issues were discussed fully 
in Chapter 3.) However, the financial restrictions imposed by the 
banks, and by the IMF in 1983, coupled with limited trade 
sanctions, combined to produce not the sudden apocalyptic collapse 
of the prodl,lcti ve and infrastructural base of the economy which 
pro-sanctions advocates predicted would occur soon thereafter, so 
precipitating the ending of apartheid, but rather a further 
debilitating decline in the performance and prospects of the 
economy, which had already slipped into crisis by the mid-1970s. 
Part of the reason for this lies in the difficulty of policing 
trade sanctions, in the fact that. vital trade .credits were largely 
exempt from the banks' restrictions, that the banks backed off 
somewhat after the 'threat' of black majority rule had receded in 
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the wake of state repression, and that after two years the 
apartheid state began to receive small, though irregular amounts 
of loans from some foreign banks. 
Partly too, this was due to the nature of the South African 
economy. The country possesses a productive and infrastructural 
base which has over decades going back to the 1920s, been built up 
with a combination of state support, local private sector 
initiative and creativity, foreign investment acting in a spirit 
of partnership with indigenous capital, and (between 1970-1984) 
with foreign bank loans utilised under state direction and policy, 
at a time when foreign loans were readily available and foreign 
banks cared little about the ultimate use to which their funds were 
used. 
However, this is not to deny that the specific relations South 
Africa developed with the IMF and banks in the period after 1970 
have brought about a new kind' of vulnerability to political 
pressure, especially through the influence of the US. The financial 
restrictions imposed by the IMF and banks and the ever-present 
threat to foreign exchange reserves have constrained South Africa's 
ability to successfully and quickly restructure its economy and to 
develop the kind of accumulation strategy or growth model which is 
essential to allow it to escape the limits of its now crisis-
ridden post-war accumulation strategy. Such pressure, may intensify, 
and given the correct configuration of socio-political 
circumstances within South Africa, it may increase South Africa's 
economic difficulties even more appreciably. 
The South African economy remains in crisis and this factor alone 
presently discourages an adequate inflow of foreign bank loans, 
credit. and capital. Neither growth nor investment nor employment 
have been adequately regenerated, despite the hesitant, though 
unmistakeable, efforts at economic and political restructuring 
which can be traced to the late 1970s. How long the prevailing 
crisis will drag on for will depend upon economic and political 
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developments within South Africa and the effects of political 
reform on the attitude of western governments, bankers, the IMF 
and others towards South Africa. In other words it will depend upon 
the nature, form and pace with which apartheid is dismantled as 
well as on the capacity which exists to replace the post-war ISI-
based regime of accumUlation with a new growth model, one which 
would facilitate increased output, productivity and employment and 
be internationally competitive as well. 
One thing that is clear four years after the dramatic Chase 
Manhattan Bank decision of late July 1985, is that the mid-1980s 
crisis in south Africa's international financial relations is 
already deeper and more prolonged than its mid-1970s problems. We 
would offer the following explanations for this difference in the 
conditions of the two periods of crisis in South Africa's 
international financial relations. This comparative analysis also 
serves to bring together in succinct and balanced form the main 
propositions and arguments of this thesis. 
First, the nature of the break in south Africa's relations with 
the IMF and banks in the 1980s is of an entirely different 
character and order to that of the mid-1970s. South Africa 
continued to receive financial assistance from the IMF in the years 
after the balance of payments and political tensions and 
instability of 1975/6. Bondholders became circumspect about their 
south African holdings and disposed of these whereever possible 
and the bond market was closed to south Africa for a few years, 
but most US and European banks, simply tightened up on some aspects 
of the terms upon which they lent to South Africa, as we have noted 
already in Chapter 5. 
It is now over four years since the dramatic events of mid-1985, 
and neither the IMF, which restricted assistance to South Africa 
in 1983, nor most banks have resumed normal and regular lending to 
South Africa, even under tightened conditions. The exception 
remains trade credit, which continues to be made available to the 
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apartheid state. Loans from some Far Eastern, Swiss and German 
banks remain small, though their availability is not without long-
term significance to South Africa's future international financial 
relations. Thus unlike the 1970s, the IMF and most banks have cut 
new loans and called in existing loans rather than narrowly 
changing the terms of their lending. Despite the debt rescheduling 
agreements which have given South Africa some breathing space, the 
effects of the mid-1980s crisis have already been more damaging to 
South Africa's prospects of successfully transforming its regime 
of accumulation and mode of regulation in order to emerge from its 
present non-reproductive cyclical downswing. This is most apparent 
in the pressure which the absence of regular capi tal inflows 
continues to exert on foreign exchange reserves. Certain 
accumulation strategies are constrained because of the danger that 
they will, run down scarce foreign reserves. 
Secondly, conditions in the international economy since the mid-
1980s have changed in ways which do not favour South A'frica any 
longer. Renewed growth and lower rates of inflation in most 
advanced industrialised countries, growing intra-European economic 
co-operation, the likelihood of an increased demand for 
international bank and IMF credit from 'reformist' East European 
states such as Poland and Hungary, claims of limited IMF funds, 
the emergence of new and profitable centres of investment in the 
newly industrialising countries, and the decline in net private 
bank lending after 1985, all suggest that south Africa will not 
benefit from the easy access to bank credit which characterised 
the years of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Then slow growth and 
high rates of inflation in the industrialised countries resulted 
in a flow of loans to 'middle income developing countries' such as 
South Africa and Brazil, as the urgent task of recycling surplus 
petro-dollars had to be effected. Since the mid-1980s the threat 
to international financial stability arising out of the debt crisis 
has made banks, and to some extent even the IMF and World Bank . , 
extremely cautious about extending new loans to already indebted 
countries. 
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Thirdly, South Africa's strategic role as a regional power, 
ensuring economic and political stability in southern Africa, has 
been eroded by recent events. We have argued that especially in 
the post-war world economy, South Africa's regional role in support 
of the West, was an important factor in gauranteeing the apartheid 
state the financial and political support of the western 
industrialised countries which dominate international financial 
agencies. Thus for example, South Africa remained an important 
element in the IMF' s plans for southern African economic and 
infrastructural development. However, the longer the country is 
denied full participation in, and the financial support of 
international financial agencies such as the IMF, and as long as 
it remains politically and diplomatically isolated, the less can 
it be expected to continue to play its previous effective role in 
the sUbcontinent. 
Furthermore in the passage of time, this role may become more 
dispensable, especially in the new era of co-operation which has 
come to characterise East-West approaches to the resolution of 
regional instability and the promotion of regional political and 
economic development. In the mid-l970s the country was still viewed 
in the West as being central to the settlement of the Rhodesian 
question, and in the (unsuccessful) attempt to impose a western-
backed government in Angola. In the mid-l980s in contrast, it is 
the apartheid state itself which is under pressure from some 
Western governments over the question of its own internal policies, 
Namibian independence and its support for Unita in Angola and the 
MNR in Mocambique, and there is some evidence of western support 
for 'rival' regional initiatives such as SADCC. 5 South Africa's 
importance to the West, as one of only a few suppliers of strategic 
minera~s has also been on the decline. The need to support South 
Africa in forums such as the IMF for these strategic reasons will 
therefore become less important. The US, for example has recently 
taken legislative steps to reduce its 'dependency on politically 
volatile or otherwise unreliable countries for .•. critical minerals' 
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such as chromi te and manganese ore and the platinum group of 
metals. South Africa is specifically mentioned among this group of 
countries. 6 
Fourthly, while South Africa adjusted its balance of payments to 
the new conditions of its international financial relations, in 
the years immediately after 1985, changing around the deficit in 
the balance of payments though the imposition of tight monetary 
and fiscal policy, the balance of payments adjustment is far from 
being a stable one and the economy itself remains in crisis. 
Economic growth is constrained by th~ fact that the country has 
become a net capital exporter and has to adopt policies which would 
protect rather than run down foreign exchange reserves. Growth, 
inflation, employment, investment and profitability have been 
severely "affected in the post-1981 cyclical downswing, as we have 
argued in some detail in Chapter 3, and in this period it has 
become generally accepted that the post-war model of import-
sUbstitution industrialisation on the basis of a racially-
determined mode of regulating the production-consumption relation 
has come to an end. Despite some efforts at restructuring the 
economic, political and institutional bases for accumulation, via 
strategies such as inward industrialisation, privatisation and 
increased social and infrastructural expenditure in the black 
townships, the prospects of shaking off the economic crisis remain 
uncertain. Additionally, South Africa's comparative advantages in 
gold, mineral and other primary exports in the new economic 
circumstances of the 1980s and 1990s appear less important than 
they did in "the international economic environment of the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s. While the state intervened creatively in the 1960s 
and 1970s to set up an impressive infrastructural and strategic 
foundation, it did not intervene actively in a developmental sense, 
in support of the growth of an internationally competitive 
manufacturing sector, which would have ensured a more diversified 
and sounder economic basis for confronting the problems of being 
a player in the post-1973 international economy.7 
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Finally, though severely blunted by the imposition of the state of 
emergency in June 1986, internal resistance to the South African 
government's racial policies has not been entirely suppressed. And 
though less strident and dramatic than in the period 1984-86, the 
international campaign to isolate the country continues. If 
anything more attention has been paid in this campaign to make the 
ban on South Africa's international financial links more effective. 
There have been greater efforts by church and other anti-apartheid 
organisations at persuading banks and import-export agencies to cut 
off trade credits to South Africa, and at persuading South Africa's 
creditor banks to demand political reform as a precondition to the 
extension of the debt rescheduling agreement which expires in mid-
1990. In these prevailing internal and international circumstances, 
and in the absence of political reform sufficient to satisfy at 
least the US and the UK, the likelihood that there will be a 
resumption of regular flows of new: IMF and bank loans and credit 
to South Africa remains small. However, whether banks would take 
any notice of the appeals to tie future debt rescheduling to 
political 'reform, is a moot point. Our analysis suggests not. But 
continuing internal and international pressure is likely to act to 
curtail the speedy resumption of the kind of 'special relationship' 
with the apartheid state, which characterised the 1970s and early 
1980. 
We have already examined some developments in South Africa's 
international financial relations since the second interim debt 
reschedulin~ agreement of March 1987. South Africa's immediate 
future prospects in obtaining financial assistance from banks and 
the IMF have also been evaluated. But what of international 
financial relations in a 'post-apartheid South Africa'? This 
dissertation is brought to a conclusion with some brief comments 
on this issue. 
The September 1986 conference at York University in the UK on the 
'post-apartheid South African economy', which popularised the usage 
of the term 'post-apartheid' in academic and activist circles, and 
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raised hopes of an imminent solution to the South African crisis, 
ironically took place at a time when the apartheid state, was 
attempting to reassert its control , over the character, pace and 
direction of political and economic restructuring. The tenor of the 
deliberations reflected an optimism about the prospects for a 
revolutionary transformation to a non-capitalist society which the 
events of the following two years have shown to have been somewhat, 
and sadly premature, even misplaced. It has become essential 
therefore to also contemplate a post-apartheid South Africa 
government and society which may be neither revolutionary nor anti-
capitalist. The brief discus~ion which follows, however" begins 
with some thoughts on the difficulties which are likely to be faced 
by a revolutionary, anti-capitalist south African state, in its 
relationship with the international financial community. 
There is little in the theory and practice of non-capitalist 
transformation and development that can effectively be drawn upon 
by post-revolutionary governments seeking some degree of autonomy 
and independence from the politics and institutions of the world 
capitalist system. This is especially the case for those state's 
which, in 'the wake of the demise of former radical versions of 
self-reliance, the Maoist variant is a case in pOint,8 have 
accepted the importance of an appropriately diversified form of 
participation in world trade, finance and investment. What this 
implies is development within the framework of the worid capitalist 
economy, even where, as in the Indian experience of the 1960s, this 
is undertaken within a domestic development option of 'socialism', 
and/or within a pro-Soviet bloc foreign policy. 
It is, however, essential to point ' out that there are much more 
complex issues at stake here ,than just chosinq the 'correct' 
COmbin~tion of international alignments and domestic development 
strategy. As White et al comment 'analytically speaking ••• it is 
inadequate to deal with international alignments ,in terms of the 
options to be chosen by national leaderships. The developmental 
implications of alternative choices are more fundamental than the 
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policy choice paradigm can comprehend. 9 Successful transformation 
"to a set of international financial relations in a post-apartheid 
South Africa, is not simply a matter of 'chosing' from a range of 
neatly packaged alternatives. 10 
Revolutionary governments, especially in the developing world have 
found that it has often been as hard to live with the institutions 
of international finance, such as the IMF, World Bank and private 
international banks, as it has been to live without their financial 
support and endorsements. A country like South Africa, whose 
particular form of development has been intrinsically tied to its 
extensive international economic relations, may ' find the task of 
living with this historical legacy in, say a socialist post-
apartheid era, a particularly crucial and challenging one. 
However, the events of the last few years and the increasing : 
prospects for a negotiated settlement to the South African problem, 
raise the possibility of a post-apartheid South Africa which is " 
neither revolutionary nor anti-capitalist. The analysis in this 
thesis implies that in fact the forces assessed here, the IMF, 
foreign banks and western governments are most unlikely to assist 
in any process that is likely to go "beyond deracialisation and in 
fact appear to be very unsure of black majority rule in any form. 
Yet in a scenario without the problems of apartheid and sanctions, 
and provided the prospects for sustainable growth based on a 
fundamantally restructured accumulation strategy are in place, 
South Africa can expect a much more normal and unproblematic 
relationship with the IMF and private international banks. Whether 
these restored links will allow an improvement in the economic 
status of South Africa's black working class population, or a 
greater control over their lives, is a further question, the answer 
to which, judging by other country experiences, appears less 
satisfactory. 
Post-apartheid South Africa's relationship with the Fund is likely 
to be characterised by increasing tensions, conflic"ts, pressures 
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and struggles as the scenario moves from the pole of a non-racial, 
democratic capitalist state (with a market-oriented economy) to one 
of socialism. Increasing controls over their lives by working and 
popular classes may be accompanied, at one extreme, by an 
increasing threat to the very existence of such a state form from 
western capitalist states, who may seek to maintain or reassert 
their economic and strategic interests in this region. This will 
in turn depend upon the particular configuration or balance of 
geopolitical and economic forces on a global scale, and the extent 
to which, southern Africa is identified as being crucial to 
mediating these crises of international political conflicts and 
accumulation. Examples from the experiences of other countries 
since the early 1970s, suggest that the institutions of 
international finance, such as the IMF, play no small part in these 
processes, though in ways and in directions which are less easy to 
predict than dependency theory implies. They can, in South Africa's 
case too, very well form an integral part in shaping the nature of 
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4. See for example Lipietz, 1986-, 1987; de Vroey 1984. 
5. For a critical discussion of some positive western initiatives 
in southern Africa in recent years, see for example, Holland, 1988. 
6. Daily News, 17.07.89 
7. This is a point made by Leys, 1985, p24 in the British case. 
8. See for example -Payer, 1974, Chapter 2. 
9. White et aI, 1983, p17 
10. For a detailed discussion of alternative scenarios of South 
Africa I s international financia-l relations after apartheid, see 
Padayachee, 1988a. 
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POSTSCRIPT: OCTOBER 1989 
On 18 October 1989, the South African authorities announced details 
of a third interim debt rescheduling arrangement. The announcement 
was clearly timed to undercut a Commonwealth financial sanctions 
campaign to be announced the same day. 
In terms of the agreement South Africa will pay $1,5 billion or 
20.5 per cent of the $8 billion inside the standstill net in 
varying amounts over an extended period of three and a half years 
from June 1990 to December 1993 at one percentage point over 
applicable base lending rates.' Banking sources observed that this 
one point margin over the base lending rate was 'higher than 
expected for a country of South Africa's financial s~anding under 
current market conditions'z. 
Creditor banks retain the option agreed upon in March 1987 of 
converting debt inside the net .into longer-term loans outside 
the net,by which arrangement some $4 billion had already been so 
converted and rescheduled between March 1987 and October 1989. The 
first instalments of such conversions in terms of the latest 
arrangement only falls due at the beginning of 1998. In addition 
to the debt covered by this agreement, the country owes another 
$12 billion 'outside the net,3. These loans have to paid when each 
falls due. Nevertheless, the agreement announced in October 1989 
appears to have been made with a view to synchronising debt 
repayments inside and outside the net: redemptions of debt inside 
the net will be lowest when redemptions of debt outside the net 
are highest, so relieving some pressure on the balance of payments 
and foreign reserves. 
This third interim agreement presents a significant easing up in 
South Africa's debt situation, although the fundamental 
difficulties faced by the country's capital account since the mid-
1970s remain. This point should be emphasised: the agreement 
represents a further easing of, rather than a long-term solution 
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to, the problems and pressure~ on South Africa's international 
financial relations. For it must be remembered that neither the 
IMF nor the major private international banks have, in terms of 
this or any other arrangement, signalled their intention of 
resuming normal financial relations with the apartheid state. In 
other words, substantial new credit from international sources is 
still an unattained objective. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Business Day, 19.10.89 and 23.10.89 
2. Business Day, 23.10.89 




BANKS IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA OVER DEBT THE STANDSTILL 






union Bank of Switzerland 





Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Morgan Guaranty 
[B] BANKS IN BROADER NEGOTIATIONS 
1. Almost certain involvement: 













Ostereicher Landerbanki Credit Anstalt Bankverein (Austria) 
Societe General de Banque (Belgium) 
Credit Lyonaisi Societe Gererali Banque National de Paris (France) 
Sumito Banki Nikko Securities (Japan) 
Midland Bank (UK) 
Chase Manhattani Republic National Banki Bank Americai Bankers 
Trust; North Carolina National Banki Chemical Banki Irving Bank 
(US) 
2. Banks probably/possibly involved: 
Banque Bruxelles Lambert; Creditbank (Belgium) 
Bayerische Vereinsbank; Westdeutsche Landesbank (FRG) 
Banca Commerciale Italiana (Italy) 
Banque Generale de Luxembourg (Luxembourg) 
Bank Leu; Swiss Volksbank (Switzerland) 
SOURCE: ICABASA, Newsletter No 1&2, 1986/7; Lind and Espaldon, 
1986; Stuart Bell, Apartheid's Debt to the West, AAM, London, 1986, 




COUNTRY RISK LEAGUE TABLE: SOUTH AFRICA* 










NOTE: Information on country risk differs according to source, is 
subjective and because it has not been possible to derive this 
table for the years covered all from one source, some inconsistency 
in the figures are to be expected. These differences are not, 
however, critical and in any case the table is useful only to get 
a sense of the broad trends in South Africa's risk profile in this 
period. 
SOURCE: EuromoneYi Institutional Investori Various years 
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Issue Price: 100% 
irrevocably ~nd unconditionally guaranteed by the 
Republic of South Africa 
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft 
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B.lnquC' raribJs Capital Markets 
B'1.)"Ni ... ( hc landL'~han" GirOl.l'nirak 
Credita~lJb-Bonk verein 
Cre.Jitl'f0nn~s 
Dre~dne r ~8nk A"' i \?fl~l.~t: U~c.b~ft 
Hill SJllluei & Co. limited 
Kredietbank International Group 
Nedbank International 
Union Bank of Switzerland (Securities) limited 
Banque lnternationale a luxembourg S.A. 
Baycrische Hypothckcn- und Wcchsel-Bank 
Alt icngcsellschaft 
B.\} eriscnc Vcrl'inshank Akl icngesell!-chaft 
Credit CommerciJI de fr.ln cc 
. Cred it-Su i ~~ fi.r~t Boston lim;;t'J 
Goldmann Sachs Inkrn'\lion.ll Corp. 
J..:\(:in\'.ol1, Benson limill'd 
Morgan Stanley International 
N.M, Rothschild & Sons Limited 
Swiss Bank Corporation International limited 
P...lnl.. Calltnd~ Switzerland (CI.) lilllited Getn!" L('u Inkrn.l!;c n:d L1ll . 
Banquc Populairc Suisse S.", lUll:embourg 
SOURCE: Militz, 1985, p120 
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Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Gencor Group . 
GENBEL FINANCE B.V. 
Amsterdam, Nlederfande 
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BanqUIWonM 
Baldeya aMk Gtoup 
..,.,.,.. HypotheIrarl- unci 
WedIMf 8anIc~tt 
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lew S ...... lnlematlonel Ltd. . 
JoIL 8eIwIbarv. GoeaIer .. Co. 
s.ru-8ant AktIengeaellacflaft 
Bertn«H ...... 
und I'ftIIIII1urtar 8ank 
ISanIdIRa Gelrider 8attu:naM 
Johannesburg, Republlk SOdafrika 
- Wertpapler-Kenn-Nr. 474920 -






iI Luxembourg SA 
N. M. Rothschild & Sons 
Umlted 
Bramer Landaablnk 
Kradltanatalt Oldenburg - Glrozenlrale -
CannoN" Co. 
Ct4dIt du Nord 
Dalbtilck " Co 
DlUtache Gltozantral. 
- Deutsch. Kommunalbank -
DSL Bank DlUtldl. 51edlungl- und 
Land"rentanb.nk 
DGBank 
Deutsch. Geno .. enac:hatt.bank 
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G_nachaftllche Zanlr8lbank AG 
Vlanna 
Glrountral. und Bank 
dar Cilt.tNIdIIKhen SparkasHn 
AllUantMlllachaft . 
GoIdmen Sacha Int_IIon81 Corp. 
HambnIe Bank LImIt" . 
H~Land""ank 
- GIro"ntnile -
HandeIIOank N.W. (O_a., Ltd. 
GIMII Hauck .. $ohn 8ankIe1'l 
K.ommandltSl"lllKhett aut Aktlln 
H .... ache LandI.oank - Glroz.ntrale -
SOURCE: Militz, 1985, pl19 
Weatdeutache landesbank 
Glrozentrale 
Credit Commercial de France 
Union Bank of Switzerland 
(Securities) 
Limited 
latltuto Banc~Iio San Paolo dl Torino 
Klddar. Peabody Intamatlonal Umlted 
Landeabank Rllelniend-PfelZ 
- Glrozentr ... -
Marek, Finck" Co. 
B. Matzler _I. Sohn .. Co. 
MOlgan Stanley Intemational 
Nadbank LImited 
Norddautlc:he Land .. bank Glrozentrlle 
Oat.MlchlldI. Lindertlank 
Aktlangesellach.tt 
Sal. Opp.nheim jr. " Cle. 
R.uSCMI .. Co. 
J . H.nry Schrodar Wigg .. Co. LImited 
SChweizerische Hypotheken-
und Handelablnk 
SmIth Barney. Hantl Upham" Co. 
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VII.ln.- unci vt .. tbank Aktl.ng ... llachltt 
M. lot. Warburg-8rinekmlM. Wirtz" Co. 
W.ltdlUtldl. GanolMnldlattl-
Z.ntralbank • • G. 
W.lttllenbank AktI.ng ... lllchatt 
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Ttl" . nnouncff'M'll ~.n ., • moll., ni It cOId only ",plIl 10 l C16S 
Rep.ublic of South Africa 
U.S.$ 75,000,000 
12'12% Bearer Bonds Due 1991 
Issue Price: 99 '11% 
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft 
Banque Indosuez 
Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale 
Berliner Handels- und Frankfurter Bank 
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 
Nedbank International 
Swiss Bank Corporation International limited 
SOURCE: Mi l itz, 1985, p 124 
Union Bank of Switzerland (Securities) limited 
Banque Populaire Suisse SA Luxembourg 
Bayerische Vereins~ank Aktiengesellschaft 
Credit Commercial de France 
DG Bank Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank 
NM. Rothschild & Sons Limited 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
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Vereins- und Westbank 
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1,1 Wlrtschafts- und Privatbank 
i~ The lhIst BanJt of Africa Limited Volkskas Merchant Bank Limited 
m 
SOURCE: Militz, 1985, p122 
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